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THE NEW FEDERALISM, THE SPENDING POWER,
AND FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW
Richard W Garnettt

It is often said that we are living through a "revival" of federalism.
Certainly, the Rehnquist Court has brought back to the public-law table the
notion that the Constitution is a charterfor a government of limited and
enumerated powers, one that is constrainedboth by that charter's text and by
the structure of the government it creates. This allegedly "revolutionary"
Court seems little inclined, however, to revise or revisit its Spending Power
doctrine, and it remains settled law that Congress may disburse funds in
pursuit of ends not authorized explicitly in Article I and may promote policy
goals that might lie beyond the reach of its enumerated powers merely by
attaching conditions to the money it spends.
This Article considers whether and to what extent Congress may use its
Spending Power-standingalone, or in conjunction with the Necessary and
Proper, or "Sweeping," Clause-to create, prosecute, and punish federal
crimes. Specifically, it examines the challenges to a particularfederal anticorruption statute, concluding that the expansion offederal criminaljurisdiction through spending is inconsistent with the structures explicitly created
and reasonably implied by our Constitution, with the values these structures
were designed to advance, and with the liberties they were intended to protect.
This Article's doctrinal claims cohere well with leading themes in contemporary constitutional law. There are rich connections between the Article's arguments about conditionalspending and criminalization, on the one
hand, and contemporary debates in FirstAmendment law relating to government speech, forum analysis, and expressive association, on the other. In
addition, the understandingof the Spending Power defended here serves not
only as a complement to, but a crucial component of the renewed emphasis
on mediating institutions and civil society that will likely prove an enduring
legacy of the Rehnquist Court.

- Associate Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. Thanks are due to many of
my colleagues and friends, including Randy Barnett, Mitchell Berman, A.J. Bellia, George
Brown, Eric Claeys, Brannon Denning, John Elwood, Nicole Stelle Garnett, Steffen Johnson, Bill Kelley, Gary Lawson, John Nagle, Howard Sklamberg, and Stephen Smith, for
their comments and criticisms. Mark Emery, Fred Marczyk, Diane Meyers, and Rebecca
D'arcy provided valuable assistance. I should also note that parts of this Article expand on
a brief survey, co-authored a few years ago with a friend and colleague, of federal courts'
efforts to identify and enforce the boundaries of 18 U.S.C. § 666, the federal-program bribery statute. SeeJohn P. Elwood & Richard W. Garnett, Section 666, The Spending Power and
Federalization of Criminal Law, THE CHAMNPION 25 (May 2001).
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The Constitution does not contemplate that federal regulatory power should
tag along afterfederal money like a hungry dog.

-David

E. Engdahl'

INTRODUCTION

Professor Gary Lawson observed a decade ago that "in this day
and age, discussing the doctrine of enumerated powers is like discussing the redemption of Imperial Chinese bonds." 2 But then, not many
months later, came the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Lopez, and with it a reaffirmation of what the Court called one of the
"first principles" of American law, namely, the notion that our Constitution "creates a Federal Government of enumerated powers," powers
that, although vast, are at the same time "'few and defined."'

3

With

these observations, Chief Justice Rehnquist seemed to echo those offered nearly two centuries before by his most formidable predecessor:
"This government is acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated
powers. The principle, that it can exercise only the powers granted to

I David E. Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 DuKE L.J. 1, 92 (1994).
2 Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. Rsv. 1231,
1236 (1994).
3 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292 (James Madison)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
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.

. is now universally admitted. ' 4 At the same time, Lopez and its

aftermath have proved prescient Chief Justice Marshall's guess that
the "question respecting the extent of the powers actually granted, is
perpetually arising, and will probably continue to arise, as long as our
5
system shall exist."

Although Professor Lawson's quip could only have hit home ten
years ago, ours, evidently, is a different "day and age." Today, given
the content and trajectory of the Court's recent work,- few public-law
scholars can afford to let enumerated-powers questions languish with
"Imperial Chinese bonds" and other arcana in the constitutional junk
drawer. 7 For better or worse, "[f]ederalism is back, with a
vengeance."8
Perhaps. Despite talk of epochs, revivals, revolutions, and paradigm shifts, 9 one might just as reasonably conclude that the practical,
4
M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819); see alsoJohn C. Eastman, Re-entering the Arena: Restoring aJudicialRole for Enforcing Limits on FederalMandates, 25
HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 931, 931 (2002) ("Overlooked for the better part of the last century, [the] principle [of enumerated powers] has undergone a renaissance of sorts since
the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Lopez. ... ).
5
M'Culloch, 17 U.S. at 405. Further confirmation of Chief Justice Marshall's prediction can be found in several of the dissents in recent federalism cases. See, e.g., Fed. Mar.
Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 788 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("Today's decision reaffirms the need for continued dissent-unless the consequences of the
Court's approach prove anodyne, as I hope, rather than randomly destructive, as I fear.");
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 814 (1999) (Souter,J., dissenting) ("I expect the Court's late
essay into immunity doctrine will prove the equal of its earlier experiment in laissez-faire,
the one being as unrealistic as the other, as indefensible, and probably as fleeting.").
6
See infra text accompanying Part I.A. During the past few years, the Supreme Court
has in a variety of contexts reasserted-expanded, some would say-its own role in policing both the vertical and horizontal boundaries of congressional power. These moves have
prompted mountains of academic and other criticism and commentary. A recent study by
a colleague of mine is particularly helpful. See generally AnthonyJ. BelliaJr., Federal Regulation of State Court Procedures, 110 YALE L.J. 947 (2001). For a sharp and wide-ranging critique of some of these developments, see, for example,Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson,
Understandingthe ConstitutionalRevolution, 87 VA. L. REv. 1045, 1045-61 (2001).
7
Cf Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Puzzling Persistenceof Process-BasedFederalism Theories, 79 TEX. L. REv. 1459, 1459 (2001) ("Like bell-bottom jeans, the theory of the
political safeguards of federalism periodically makes a brief comeback, before common
sense returns it from whence it came.").
8 John C. Yoo, Sounds of Sovereignty: Defining Federalism in the 19 9 0s, 32 IND. L. REv. 27,
27 (1998); see Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalismand the Double Standard ofJudicial
Review, 51 DuKE L.J. 75, 75 (2001) (noting that "[tlrom 1937 to 1995, federalism was part
of a 'Constitution in exile'"); Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law:
Printz and Principle?,111 HARV. L. REv. 2180, 2181 (1998) ("The constitutional law of federalism-based constraints on the federal government has risen phoenix-like from the ashes
of post-New Deal enthusiasm for the exercise of national power."); Michael B. Rappaport,
Reconciling Textualism and Federalism: The ProperTextual Basis of the Supreme Court's Tenth and
Eleventh Amendment Decisions, 93 Nw. U. L. Rev. 819, 819 (1999) ("In recent years, one of
the most important developments in constitutional law has been the resurgence of
federalism.").
9
See, e.g.,
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 615 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(warning that "[n]ot every epochal case has come in epochal trappings"); Balkin & Levin-
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doctrinal, and jurisprudential consequences of what is sometimes
called the Court's "New Federalism" ' are both slight and exaggerated. As Professor Fried asked, commenting on claims about "revolutions," "should the Court's works and words really cause our heads to
spin? After all, what exactly [has] happened?"' The combined complaints of the Chief Justice, t2 the American Bar Association,1 3 and
countless others 14 have done little to halt the "federalization" of
crime.' 5 Nor have the federal courts shown much enthusiasm for aggressively employing Lopez's Commerce Clause analysis. 16 The Tenth
Amendment is still not much more than a truism; 1 7 provocative scholarly speculation about the invigoration of the Guaranty Clause", goes
largely unnoticed in the courts; and the nondelegation doctrine reson, supra note 6, at 1051 ("We are in the middle of a paradigm shift that has changed the
way that people write, think, and teach about American constitutional law."); Mark
Tushnet, Keeping Your Eye on the Ball: The Significance of the Revival of ConstitutionalFederalism,
13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1065, 1065 (1997) (arguing a "point about the recent revival of
constitutional federalism").
10 See, e.g., Symposium, The New Federalism After United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 631 (1996).
11
Charles Fried, Foreword: Revolutions?, 109 HARV. L. REv. 13, 13-14 (1995).
12
See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE 1998 YEAR-END REPORT OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY,

reprinted in 11 FED. SENTENCING REP. 134, 135 (1998) ("The trend to federalize crimes that
traditionally have been handled in state courts not only is taxing the Judiciary's resources ....
but it also threatens to change entirely the nature of our federal system.").
13
See TASK FORCE ON THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW, AM. BAR Ass'N, THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAw 55 (1998) ("The expanding coverage of federal criminal law,
much of it enacted in the absence of a demonstrated and distinctive federal justification .... has little to commend it and much to condemn it.").
14 See, e.g., Edwin Meese III, Big Brother on the Beat: The ExpandingFederalizationof Crime,
1 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 1, 4, 6 (1997) (describing federal criminal laws as "ineffective and
partisan," and arguing that such laws increase "the potential ... for an oppressive and
burdensome federal police state").
15
See, e.g., George D. Brown, Constitutionalizing the Federal Criminal Law Debate: Morrison, Jones, and the ABA, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 983, 992-1001, 1023 (analyzing the ABA's
objections to the federalization of criminal law but eventually concluding that "[flederal
criminal law is here to stay"); cf, e.g., Susan A. Ehrlich, The IncreasingFederalizationof Crime,
32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 825, 825 (2000) ("In Congress' 105th Term, hundreds of bills were introduced having to do with federal criminal statutes .... ").
16 See, e.g., Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Rulings and Resistance: The New
Commerce ClauseJurisprudenceEncounters the Lower Courts, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1253, 1256 (2003)
("There is evidence from the lower courts' opinions that they are still reluctant to take
Lopez seriously[.]"); Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, Lower Court Readings of
Lopez, or What If the Supreme Court Held a ConstitutionalRevolution and Nobody Came?, 2000
'is. L. REV. 369, 370 (2000) ("[In the courts of appeal,] the impact of Lopez has been
limited, to say the least.").
17
SeeNewYork v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992) ("[T]he Tenth Amendment
'states but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered."' (quoting United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941))).
18
Deborah Jones Merritt, Republican Governments and Autonomous States: A New Role for
the Guarantee Clause, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 815 (1994); Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee
Clause and State Autonomy: Federalismfor a Third Centuy, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 70 (1988)
("For more than a hundred years ... the Supreme Court has maintained that the guarantee clause raises only nonjusticiable political questions.").
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mains a theoretical curiosity. 19 The Establishment Clause continues
to bind state and local governments; 20 Roe and Miranda remain, for
the most part, the law of the land, 2 1 and so on. In light of all this
humdrum doctrinal sameness, it seems reasonable to wonder whether
the Rehnquist Court's much-remarked federalism revival is, in the
'2 2
end, "much ado about nothing.
In particular, the Rehnquist Revolution thesis is weakened considerably by the fact that the Court has done nothing, and seems little
inclined to do anything, to revise or even revisit its Spending Power
and conditional-spending doctrines. 2 3 Lopez and other New Federalism salvos notwithstanding, it remains settled law that Congress may
spend money on projects and in pursuit of ends that are not authorized explicitly in Article I, and also may enthusiastically promote policy goals that might lie beyond the reach of its enumerated powers
merely by attaching conditions to the money it spends. 2 4 Even as the
19 See, e.g.,
'Whitman v.Am. Trucking Ass'n, 531 U.S. 457, 474 (2001) (noting that the
Court has struck down only two statutes under the rubric of the nondelegation doctrine).
20
Cf Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 678 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring)
("[I]n the context of the Establishment Clause, it may well be that state action should be
evaluated on different terms than similar action by the Federal Government.").
21 See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000) (upholding Miranda);
Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 930-31 (2000) (invalidating state ban on partial-birth
abortions).
22 John C. Eastman, Restoring the "General" to the General Welfare Clause, 4 CHAP. L. REv.
63, 64 (2001). See also Marci A. Hamilton, Nine Shibboleths of the New Federalism, 47 WAYNE L.
REv. 931, 940 (2001) ("The Court is doing next to nothing. The new federalism is intellectually fascinating, and scholars have something wonderful to chew on, but the Court itself
is nibbling."). For a penetrating, and pessimistic, assessment of the Rehnquist Court's progress toward a meaningful, authentic federalism, see generally ROBERT F. NAGEL, THE IlPLOSION OF AAIERICAN FEDERALISM (2001)

(critiquing the Court's decisions on federalism

and blaming the trend of nationalization on the changing character of the American
people).
23
See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, ConditionalFederal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REv.
1911, 1914 (1995) ("[P]revailing Spending Clause doctrine appears to vitiate much of the
import of Lopez and any progeny it may have."); Mark Tushnet, What Is the Supreme Court's
New Federalism?, 25 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 927, 936-37 (2000) ("The Court is unlikely to
succeed in radically transforming the relative roles of the national and the state governments unless it changes its doctrine regarding Congress's power to require that states accepting federal grants comply with federally prescribed requirements.").
The Court's lack of interest was confirmed, perhaps, with its recent, unanimous decision in Pierce County v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129 (2003). In that case, notwithstanding the
Washington Supreme Court's detailed determination that certain features of the federal
Hazard Elimination Program, 23 U.S.C. § 152 (2000), exceeded Congress's power under
the Spending Clause, Guillen v.Pierce County, 31 P.3d 628, 651 (Wash. 2001), rev'd in part,
537 U.S. 129 (2003), the Justices quickly concluded that the disputed provisions were well
within the scope of Congress's Commerce Clause authority, and noted simply that, in light
of its Commerce Clause holding, "we need not decide whether [the provisions] could also
be a proper exercise of Congress'[s] authority under the Spending Clause or the Necessary
and Proper Clause." 537 U.S. at 148 n.9.
24 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) ("'[T]he power of Congress to
authorize expenditure of public moneys for public purposes is not limited by the direct
grants of legislative power found in the Constitution [,]'" and so "objectives not thought to
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Court tweaks the outer boundaries of federal power, Congress's ability
to regulate broadly through conditional spending-i.e., its power to
regulate via contract 2 5-is presumed, and serves perhaps to reassure
those troubled by the Court's supposed anti-federal direction. When,
for instance, the Court in Printz v. United States invalidated on Tenth
Amendment grounds certain provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Justice O'Connor was quick to note in her concurring opinion that "[the Court's] holding.., does not spell the end
of the objectives of the Brady Act ...

[because] Congress is ... free to

amend the interim program to provide for its continuance on a contractual basis with the States if it wishes, as it does with a number of
other federal programs. '26 Apparently, as Professor Tushnet has observed, "the revolutionary path leads to places the Court has .

..

no

27
interest in reaching."
At the very least, the Court's failure to import into its Spending
Power doctrine the proposition that "Congress has vast power[,] but
not all power" 28 sits uneasily with its New Federalism decisions. This
Article explores the resulting dissonance by considering whether and
to what extent Congress may use its Spending Power-that is, its

power to "provide for the . . . general Welfare of the United
States" 29-to create, prosecute, and punish federal crimes. "[H]ow
far," in other words, "[may] Congress . . . go[ ] to federalize
be within Article I's 'enumerated legislative fields' may nevertheless be attained through
the use of the spending power and the conditional grant of federal funds." (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65-66 (1936))); Davis v. Monroe County
Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 654 (1999) (KennedyJ., dissenting). In Davis,JusticeKennedy
stated:
The Court has held that Congress' [s] power "to authorize expenditure of
public moneys for public purposes is not limited by the direct grants of
legislative power found in the Constitution." As a consequence, Congress
can use its Spending Clause power to pursue objectives outside of "Article
I's enumerated legislative fields" by attaching conditions to the grant of
federal funds.
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Dole, 483 U.S. at 207).
25 See Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 186 (2002) ("We have repeatedly characterized ... Spending Clause legislation as 'much in the nature of a contract...
') (quoting
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)); Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at
17 ("[Liegislation enacted pursuant to the spending power is much in the nature of a
contract: in return for federal funds, the States agree to comply with federally imposed
conditions.").
26 521 U.S. 898, 936 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring); see Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S.
706, 755 (1999) (citing Dole, and observing that the Federal Government does not "lack the
authority or means to seek the States' voluntary consent to private suits"); Thomas R. McCoy & Barry Friedman, Conditional Spending: Federalism's Trojan Horse, 1988 Sup. CT. REV.
85, 116 ("[A]ny time that Congress finds itself limited by . . . delegated regulatory powers ....
[it] need only attach a condition on a federal spending grant that achieves the
same (otherwise invalid) regulatory objective.").
27 Tushnet, supra note 23, at 937.
28 Alden, 527 U.S. at 758.
29 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
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crime[?]"30 Does Congress's well-established ability to attach regulatory conditions to federal-program funds-either alone, or in conjunction with its power "[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary
and proper for carrying into Execution [its other enumerated] Powers" 3 1-authorize the federal prosecution and punishment of all persons whose conduct in some way crosses paths with those funds? Does
the Constitution authorize the government of the United States to
"criminalize" 32 conduct merely because it has disbursed federal monies in that conduct's general direction?
Chief Justice Rehnquist, paying tribute to non-blockbuster decisions, has been known to quote Thomas Gray's Elegy Written in a Country Churchyard, and to describe such sleeper cases as "flowers which are
'3 3
born to blush unseen and waste their sweetness on the desert air."
The case of United States v. McCormack might, at first glance, seem just
such a blushing flower-a surburban thug was charged with buying
the inattention of a local police officer in Malden, Massachusetts. 3 4
What is noteworthy, however, about this case is not its seedy tale of
garden-variety corruption, but rather the fact that Kevin McCormack
was charged with a federal offense. What did he do, one might wonder, to merit the prosecutorial attentions of a government of "enumerated," "few," and "defined" powers?
McCormack was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 666. That provision-known as "the Beast in the Federal Criminal Arsenal" 35 and
"the Stealth Statute" 3 6-makes run-of-the-mill bribery a federal crime
if the bribe relates to a transaction worth more than $5,000 and involves the agent of any organization or government that "receives, in
any one year period, benefits in excess of $10,000 under a Federal
program . . . . 37 In McCormack, no one disputed that Malden's local
police department, "like scores of departments across the country,"
received more than $10,000 in federal-program funds. 38 For present
purposes, the important point is that this anti-corruption statute's purUnited States v. McCormack, 31 F. Supp. 2d 176, 177 (D. Mass. 1998).
31
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.18.
32 This is an unfortunate but unavoidable term. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549, 561 n.3 (1995) ("When Congress criminalizes conduct already denounced as
criminal by the States, it effects a 'change in the sensitive relation between federal and state
criminal jurisdiction.'" (quoting United States v.Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 411-12 (1973)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
33 SeeJennifer Myers, No Talk of Retirement at Circuit Meeting, LEGAL TIMEs, July 9, 2001,
at 8.
34 McCormack, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 177.
35 Daniel N. Rosenstein, Note, Section 666: The Beast in the Federal Criminal Arsenal, 39
CATH. U. L. REv. 673 (1990).
36 George D. Brown, Stealth Statute-Corruption,the Spending Power, and the Rise of 18
U.S.C. § 666, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 247 (1998).
37
18 U.S.C. § 666(b) (2000).
38 McCormack, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 178.
30
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ported constitutional basis39 is not Congress's power to, say, "regulate
Commerce" 41° or "establish Post Offices. ' 4 1 Instead, Congress relied
simply on its above-mentioned ability to attach regulatory conditions
to the money it spends, 4 2 and perhaps also on its power to create and
prosecute crimes when "necessary and proper" for the smooth func43
tioning of spending programs.
At present, the federal courts are sharply divided over whether
the government in Section 666 cases is required to establish a particular "nexus" between a criminal defendant's conduct and federal-program funds. 4 4 This is an interesting question, one that the Justices

39
For an overview of the various "bases" for federal criminal jurisdiction, see, for
example, NORMAN ABRAMS & SARA SUN BEALE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 19-61 (3d ed. 2000); G. Robert Blakey, Federal Criminal Law: The Need, Not for Revised
Constitutional Theory or New CongressionalStatutes, but the Exercise of Responsible Prosecutorial
Discretion, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1175, 1219-44 (1995).
40 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
41
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7; see Ex parteJackson, 96 U.S. 727, 732 (1877), in which
Justice Field noted that
[t] he power vested in Congress "to establish post-offices and post-roads" has
been practically construed, since the foundation of the government, to authorize not merely the designation of the routes over which the mail shall
be carried ... but.., all measures necessary to secure its safe and speedy
transit
and that "[t]he power possessed by Congress embraces the regulation of the entire postal
system of the country."
42 See, e.g., Fischer v. United States, 529 U.S. 667, 689 n. 3 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("Section 666 was adopted pursuant to Congress'[s] spending power, Art. I, § 8, cl.
1."); Brown, supra note 36, at 251 ("[Section] 666 represents an exercise of the spending
power.").
.
3
See, e.g., United States v. Lipscomb, 299 F.3d 303, 336-37 (5th Cir. 2002). The
Lipscomb court noted that
Congress could have believed ..
that preventing federal funds from passing through state and local legislative bodies whose members are corrupt,
and to do so with the deterrent of criminalizing the legislators' corruption,
even with respect to purely state or local issues, was necessary and proper to
the federal spending power.
Id.
44
See, e.g., Brown, supra note 36, at 305-06 (urging adoption of a nexus requirement). Compare, e.g., Lipscomb, 299 F.3d at 309 ("[Lipscomb] proposes that we construe the
statute to require a nexus between his offense conduct and federal funds-or, put differently, that his conduct implicate a tangible federal interest ....
[This] contention [does
not] succeed[ ]."), with United States v. Zwick, 199 F.3d 672, 687 (3d Cir. 1999) ("[W]e
hold that § 666 requires that the government prove a federal interest is implicated by the
defendant's offense conduct."). See generally Cheryl Crumpton Herring, Comment, 18
U.S. C. § 666: Is It a Blank Check to FederalAuthorities ProsecutingState and Local Corruption?, 52
ALA. L. REV. 1317, 1318-25 (2001) (discussing a split in authority among the United States
Courts of Appeals regarding whether federal funds must be affected to trigger Section
666); Paul Salvatoriello, Note, The PracticalNecessity of Federal Intervention Versus the Ideal of
Federalism:An Expansive View of Section 666 in the Prosecution of State and Local Corruption, 89
GEO. L.J. 2393, 2403-09 (2001) (same).
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have dodged (at least) twice, 4 5 but will almost certainly resolve soon.
At the same time, though, the question presumes too much. This
is because Section 666 itself-and not simply its application in cases
involving no apparent federal interest 4 6-is unconstitutional. In
other words, the problem with the statute is not merely one of degree.
Rather, the problem is that the Spending Power is simply not a valid
vehicle for the creation of federal crimes and the expansion of criminal jurisdiction. Nor does it seem to be constitutionally outfitted for
this task by the Necessary and Proper, or "Sweeping," Clause. 4 7 Thus,
"the law is unconstitutional, void ab initio.''48
None of this is to say that certain activities or actors are categorically beyond the reach of the federal criminal law. It could well be,
given the vastness of even Congress's few and defined enumerated
powers, that nearly every crime can be a federal crime. 49 The claim
here is more modest: there are real and enforceable constitutional
limits on Congress's ability to create crimes by spending and tying
strings to money.
This inquiry is both timely and important. Several United States
Courts of Appeals disagree about the implications of enumerated45
See Fischer, 529 U.S. at 681-82; Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 61 (1997)
("Whatever might be said about [Section 666's] application in other cases, the application
of [the statute] to Salinas did not extend federal power beyond its proper bounds.").
46
See Lipscomb, 299 F.3d at 313 (concluding that "once a local government accepts
more than $10,000 per year from the federal government, no further federal interest is
needed to justify prosecution under § 666"); United States v. McCormack, 31 F. Supp. 2d
176, 178 (D. Mass. 1998) (noting the Government's argument that "any and all bribes,
about any aspect of the entity's business, so long as they reach a certain level . . . may be
prosecuted as federal offenses" and that "[i]t does not matter if federal funds were
threatened, either directly or indirectly, or if a federal program was implicated in any
way").
47
See U.S. CONST. art. I. § 8, cl. 18. See generally Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger,
The "Proper"Scope of FederalPower: A JurisdictionalInterpretationof the Sweeping Clause, 43 DuKE
LJ. 267 (1993) (analyzing the Clause as a tool for preserving federalism).
48 United States v. Morgan, 230 F.3d 1067, 1073 (8th Cir. 2000) (Bye, J., concurring)
("Congress may not pass laws unless it acts pursuant to an express grant of power or authority in Article I of the Constitution. Section 666 cannot properly be linked to any grant
of Congressional power in the Constitution. Hence, Congress exceeded its proper authority in enacting § 666 ..... ). But see, e.g., United States v. Sabri, 326 F.3d 937, 948-53 (8th
Cir. 2003) (concluding that Section 666 is a "necessary and proper" exercise of Congressional power), cert. granted, No. 0344, 2003 'AL 21692658 (U.S. Oct. 14, 2003).
49
Cf United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995). The Lopez Court noted:
"To uphold the Government's contentions here, we would have to pile inference upon
inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional authority under the
Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the States .... This we
are unwilling to do." Id. For further reference, compare also Reynolds & Denning, supra
note 16, at 376 (discussing Lopez's "'non-infinity principle'-the principle that any accepted theory of the Commerce Clause resulting in a virtually unlimited source of governmental power must be invalid" (footnote omitted) (quoting David B. Kopel & Glenn H.
Reynolds, Taking FederalismSeriously: Lopez and the Partial-BirthAbortion Ban Act, 30 CONN.
L. REv. 59, 69 (1997))).
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powers principles and Spending Power doctrine for one particular
criminal statute, and the Supreme Court will inevitably agree to resolve this disagreement. What is more, several judges have flagged the
broader problem whether the Spending Power can be used to create
crimes at all. 50 More generally, though, the doctrinal and normative

problems addressed here sit at the intersection of several contemporary discussions and developments in constitutional law, and invite us
to engage challenging questions about formalism, federalism, and
freedom.
Part I sets the stage for the discussion that follows. Here, the Article takes stock of the Supreme Court's renewed interest in questions
of structural federalism and enumerated powers. More particularly, it
surveys the Court's Spending Power and regulatory-conditions doctrine, suggesting that this is an area relatively untouched by the supposed federalism revival. Part II serves as a kind of case study. The
Article will in Part II discuss the text, history, and purpose of Section
666 and review its judicial treatment, focusing on the gradual constitutionalization of claims concerning the statute's scope and on courts'
responses to arguments invoking enumerated-powers and conditionalspending principles.
Part III analyzes and evaluates these claims and responses. The
Article concludes that the prosecution and punishment of criminal
defendants like Kevin McCormack cannot be justified under conditional-spending doctrine, because the possibility of such prosecution
and punishment is not a "condition" to which the defendants previously agreed. In other words, the regulation-by-contract framework
set out in South Dakota v. Dole51 does not work as a method of analyzing federalism-based challenges to Section 666 and its applications.
Nor, this Article submits, are such statutes and prosecutions authorized by Congress's power to enact laws "necessary and proper for car52
rying into Execution [its other enumerated] Powers."
Finally, there remains a perhaps more difficult question: Why
might these doctrinal claims matte. Accordingly, the Article concludes by suggesting that its doctrinal claims are normatively attractive
and cohere well with leading themes in contemporary constitutional
law. It notes, for example, an unremarked but instructive connection
50
See, e.g., Lipscomb, 299 F.3d at 366-67 (Smith, J., dissenting); Morgan, 230 F.3d at
1072-75 (Bye, J., concurring); United States v. Sabri, 183 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1156-58 (D.
Minn. 2002), affd in part,rev'd in part, 326 F.3d 937 (8th Cir. 2003), cert. granted,No. 03-44,
2003 WL 21692658 (U.S. Oct. 14, 2003).
51
483 U.S. 203 (1987).
52
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl.18. However, as discussed in more detail below, several
courts of appeals have concluded otherwise. See United States v. Bynum, 327 F.3d 986, 991
(9th Cir. 2003); Sabri, 326 F.3d at 948-53; United States v. Edgar, 304 F.3d 1320, 1325
(IIth Cir. 2002).
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between a sound understanding of conditional spending and criminal
jurisdiction, on the one hand, and developments in First Amendment
law relating to government speech, forum analysis, and expressive association, on the other. More generally, the Article suggests that such
an understanding should serve not only as a complement to, but also
as a crucial component of, the renewed emphasis on mediating institutions and civil society that has been provocatively identified as the
53
enduring legacy of the Rehnquist Court.

I
SETTING THE STAGE: THE NEW FEDERALISM, CONDITIONAL
SPENDING, AND THE FEDERALIZATION DEBATE

The question whether the Spending Power, either standing alone
or with the aid of the Sweeping Clause, may serve as the vehicle for
the creation and prosecution of federal crimes is interesting and important in its own right. At the same time, it is probably best understood and addressed in context, against the backdrop of several
contemporary debates and developments. After all, to inquire into
the connection between conditional spending and crime-creation is to
join any number of provocative and crowded conversations about the
text, history, and structure of our Constitution; about the efficient administration of criminal justice; and about localism, subsidiarity, and

political accountability.
This Part situates appropriately the analysis and arguments that
follow. Accordingly, it first provides a brief overview of the Rehnquist
Court's New Federalism and its more prominent themes, then turns
to the state of the Court's Spending Power and conditional-spending
doctrines, and, finally, fleshes out the observation that these doctrines-particularly in the criminal-law context-appear unmoved by
any "revival" of or "revolution" in federalism.
A.

An Overview of the New Federalism

It is difficult in legal and political circles to avoid the observation
that we are living through a "revival," 54 or a "revolution," 55 of federalism. The doctrines and decisions said to warrant this observation are
both hailed and condemned. To some, they reflect a "conservative"
53
See John 0. McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville's America: The Rehnquist Court'sJurisprudence of Social Discovery, 90 CAL. L. REV. 485, 490-91 (2002).
54
See, e.g., Lynn Baker, The Spending Power and the Federalist Revival, 4 CHAP. L. REV.
195, 195 (2001); Tushnet, supra note 9, at 1065.
55
See, e.g., Balkin & Levinson, supra note 6, at 1045, 1053 (discussing the "constitutional revolution we are living through"); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Federalism Revolution, 31
N.M. L. REV. 7, 7 (2001) ("[T]here has been a revolution with regard to the structure of
the American government because of the Supreme Court decisions in the last few years
regarding federalism.").
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brand of ahistorical and unwise 'Judicial activism," substantive policy
preferences masked as neutral principles, and even raw, shameless,
partisan politics. To others, these developments represent a longoverdue return to bedrock principles of structural federalism, and are
evidence of a commendable recommitment to text, forms, and restraint, and to localism, accountability, and experimentation. Some
see the federal power to protect individual liberties and provide redress for their violation hobbled in the name of suspect "States'
rights" abstractions; 56 others see a determination to secure freedom in
a manner consistent with the plan of the Constitution, through enforcement of the limitations on Congress's power, deference to the
States' legislatures in disputed matters of policy and morality, and so57
licitude for the independence of mediating associations.
However evaluated, though, it is a hallmark-and perhaps the
legacy-of the Rehnquist Court to have brought back to the publiclaw table the notion that the Constitution is a charter for a government of limited and enumerated powers, one that is constrained both
by that charter's text and by the structure of the government it creates
and authorizes. 58 More controversially, perhaps, the Court has revived the claim that the reach, content, and implications of these pow56

SeeJOHN T.

NOONAN, JR., NARROWING THE NATION'S POWER: THE SUPREME COURT

1-14 (2002).
For only a sample of the work of the many scholars and commentators who have
recently provided detailed and ambitious studies of the Supreme Court's recent "federalism" decisions, see, for example, Balkin & Levinson, supra note 6 (concluding that the
Court has not truly dampened federal regulatory power); Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers": In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV.
752 (1995) (arguing that Lopez illustrates that the Court-and the Country-can return to
an era of limited national power); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The "Conservative" Paths of the
Rehnquist Court's FederalismDecisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 429 (2002) (concluding that the
Rehnquist Court has done less to promote federalism than is widely perceived); Jackson,
supra note 8 (discussing the Supreme Court's recent revival of federalism); Calvin Massey,
Federalism and the Rehnquist Court, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 431 (2002) (concluding that the Rehnquist Court has not been ambitious about achieving a federalist vision); McGinnis, supra
note 53 (arguing that the Rehnquist Court has pursued a coherent jurisprudence of federalism); Saikrishna Prakash, Are theJudicial Safeguards of Federalism the Ultimate Form of Conservative JudicialActivism?, 73 U. COLO. L. REv. 1363 (2002) (arguing that judicial review
safeguarding federalism is not "activism"); Rappaport, supra note 8 (claiming that the
Rehnquist Court is responsible for a resurgence of federalism).
58
Professor Walter Dellinger suggested recently that Chief Justice Rehnquist telegraphed his hopes for precisely this legacy more than twenty-five years ago, soon after his
arrival on the Court, in "an obscure 1975 decision," Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
Tony Mauro, The Rehnquist Revolution's Humble Start, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 3, 2003, at 1. In Fry,
the Court upheld a federally imposed wage freeze on Ohio state employees. In dissent,
then-Justice Rehnquist insisted, among other things, that "basic constitutional principles"
required greater solicitude for the State's dignity and sovereignty. Fry, 421 U.S. at 550
(Rehnquist,J., dissenting). For similar evidence that the recent federalism revival was presaged in the Chief Justice's earlier work, see Jeff Powell, The Compleat Jeffersonian:Justice
Rehnquist and Federalism,91 YALE L.J. 1317, 1320 (1982) ("outlin[ing] the theory of federalism that emerges from Justice Rehnquist's work on the Court").
SIDES WITH THE STATES
57
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ers and structure are to be identified and enforced by the federal
courts.

For example, the Court has, during the last decade or so, reaffirmed repeatedly the States' sovereign immunity from suit, and invalidated congressional attempts to abrogate that immunity through antidiscrimination and various other statutes. 59 It has cabined the power
of Congress to employ Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as a
means of protecting individual rights and remedying various forms of
discrimination or as a vehicle for ameliorative social legislation. 60 The
Justices have insisted that there are identifiable and enforceable limits
to the subjects Congress may regulate, and the extent to which it may
regulate them, pursuant to its authority over "'Commerce ...among
the several States." 6 1 And, as if to insist that the Tenth Amendment
retains more bite than the typical truism, they have stated that the
Amendment and the structural premises it reflects disable Congress
from "commandeering" for its own purposes the States' officers and
62
political processes.
But these are only some of the more obvious and prominent (or
notorious) New Federalism developments. In addition, the increasing
use of and reliance upon interpretive tools, such as the avoidance canon, 63 has constrained the regulatory power of Congress and solidi59

See, e.g.,
Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 n.9 (2001);

Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 78-79 (2000); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,
712-13 (1999); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S.
666, 691 (1999); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S.
627, 635-36 (1999); Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 269 (1997); Seminole
Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996).
60
See, e.g.,
Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374; United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627
(2000); Kimel, 528 U.S. at 82-83; City of Boerne v.Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
But
see Nev. Dep't of Hum. Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003) (concluding that Congress
had, in creating private rights of action under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993,
validly abrogated the States' immunity from suit pursuant to its power under Section Five
of the Fourteenth Amendment).
61 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607 (quoting U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl.3); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (same); cf Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 858 (2000)
(rejecting interpretation of federal arson that would criminalize damaging or destroying a
private residence due to "the concerns brought to the fore in Lopez").
62 See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 914 (1997); New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992). For more on the Court's "commandeering" cases and
doctrine, see, for example, Bellia, supra note 6. For an argument that Printz might be
better understood as a separation-of-powers case, see Jay S. Bybee, Printz, The Unitary Executive, and the Fire in the Trash Can: HasJustice Scalia Picked the Court's Pocket?, 77 NOTRE DAME
L. REv. 269 (2001).
63 See, e.g., United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 78 (1994) (invoking
and applying the avoidance canon, which urges an interpretation that avoids "rais[ing]
serious constitutional doubts"). For a detailed analysis and critique of the avoidance canon, or the rule of "constitutional doubt," see William K. Kelley, Avoiding Constitutional
Questions as a Three-Branch Problem, 86 CORNELL L. Rv. 831, 832 (2001) ("The rule of 'constitutional doubt' holds that 'where a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of
which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such
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fled structural boundaries no less than the Court's substantive
interpretations of constitutional text. 64 In fact, Professors Eskridge
and Frickey suggested a decade ago that "[t] he most remarkable development in the 1980s was the greater enthusiasm the Court brought
''6 5
to the federalism-based canons.

In several areas of substantive public law the Court's approach to
both constitutional doctrine and statutory text seems to reflect the
same commitments and priorities as do its more explicitly federalismrelated decisions. The Court's habeas corpus cases, for instance, often
reflect New Federalism-style deference to state-law procedures, statecourt determinations, and state legislatures' policy preferences. 66 The
Justices have invoked principles of federalism in a wide variety of preemption cases. 6 7 Less obvious, perhaps, is the gradual retreat, at least
in some contexts, from a strict-separationist, no-aid reading of the Establishment Clause, and from a compelled-exemptions account of the
Free Exercise Clause, 68 which has had the effect of permitting more
questions are avoided, [a court's] duty is to adopt the latter.'" (quoting Jones v. United

States, 526 U.S. 227, 239 (1999)).
64
See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 857-58 (2000). In Jones, the Court
unanimously held that the federal arson statute did not apply to the burning of an owneroccupied private residence not used for any commercial purpose. In so doing, the Court
was moved by the principle of "constitutional doubt"; that is, the Justices rejected a broader
reading of the statute-one that would have encompassed owner-occupied private residences-because of concerns about Congress's authority to criminalize such "'traditionally
local criminal conduct."' Id. at 858 (quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 350
(1971)); see also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 170 (invoking rule of constitutional
doubt).
65
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-ConstitutionalLaw: Clear Statement
Rules as ConstitutionalLawmaking, 45 VAND. L. Rev. 593, 619 (1992).
66
See, e.g., Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451 (2000); Williams v. Taylor, 529
U.S. 420, 436 (2000); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 726 (1991) ("This is a case
about federalism."); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 308 (1989).
67
See, e.g.,
City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Service, Inc., 536 U.S. 424,
439-40 (2002). The Columbus Court stated:
Absent a basis more reliable than statutory language insufficient to demonstrate a "clear and manifest purpose" to the contrary, federal courts should
resist attribution to Congress of a design to disturb a State's decision on the
division of authority between the State's central and local units over safety
on municipal streets and roads.
Id. For additional support, see, for example, Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861,
887 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 533
(1992) (Blackmun,J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part, and dissenting
in part) (noting that "[t]he principles of federalism and respect for state sovereignty that
underlie the Court's reluctance to find pre-emption where Congress has not spoken directly to the issue apply with equal force where Congress has spoken, though ambiguously."); Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 419-20 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the presumption against pre-emption is an incident of
federalism).
68
See generally, e.g.,
William K. Kelley, The Primacy of PoliticalActors in Accommodation of
Religion, 22 U. HAw.L. REv. 403, 407-22 (2000) (analyzing the Supreme Court's decisions
involving non-mandatory exemptions for religious actors).
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variation, experimentation, and accommodation by States and localities. 69 The Court's refusal in Washington v. Glucksberg to create a substantive-due-process right to assisted suicide suggests a desire to avoid
imposing a divisive and premature end to public debate concerning a
difficult moral question. 70 And so on.
These are discrete illustrations; the New Federalism might also be
71
understood through an overview of several of its leading themes.
Certainly, the Court's insistence that it is the task of the Justices to
enforce both textual and structural limitations on federal power-i.e.,
that "political safeguards" are not enough 7 2-is one such theme. And
some would no doubt insist that the most salient and telling features
of the federalism revolution include hostility to antidiscrimination
laws and norms, 73 the disingenuous pursuit of certain Justices' partisan agendas,74 an extravagant commitment to judicial suprem69
Cf Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 678-79 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring). In Zelman, Justice Thomas urged such an approach:
[I]n the context of the Establishment Clause, it may well be that state action should be evaluated on different terms than similar action by the Federal Government. "States, while bound to observe strict neutrality, should
be freer to experiment with involvement [in religion]-on a neutral basisthan the Federal Government." Thus, while the Federal Government may
"make no law respecting an establishment of religion," the States may pass
laws that include or touch on religious matters so long as these laws do not
impede free exercise rights or any other individual religious liberty interest.
By considering the particular religious liberty right alleged to be invaded by
a State, federal courts can strike a proper balance between the demands of
the Fourteenth Amendment on the one hand and the federalism prerogatives of States on the other.
Id. (Thomas, J., concurring) (second alteration in original) (citation omitted) (first quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 699 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
70
See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997) ("Throughout the Nation,
Americans are engaged in an earnest and profound debate about the morality, legality,
and practicality of physician-assisted suicide. Our holding permits this debate to continue,
as it should in a democratic society.").
71
What follows does not, of course, purport to be the complete and definitive account, either in a descriptive or a normative sense, of these themes.
72
See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, Puttingthe Safeguards Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REv. 951 (2001); Calabresi, supra note 57, at 790-99 (making "the case
against reliance on the political branches").
73
See, e.g.,Jed Rubenfeld, The Anti-AntidiscriminationAgenda, 111 YALE LJ. 1141, 1142
(2002) ("In place of judicial activism, textualism, or federalism, I want to suggest a different unifying thread behind the Court's innovative constitutional case law.... It is possible
that an anti-antidiscriminationagenda, deeply felt but as yet poorly theorized, is working
itself out in the current Court's jurisprudence."). More generally, Professor Susan Bandes
has insisted that federalism, as a concept, is "pervasively indeterminate," and is necessarily
"animated by particular values[.]" Susan Bandes, Eie and the History of the One True Federalism, 110 YALE L.J. 829, 866 (2001) (book review).
74 See, e.g., William P. Marshall, Conservativesand the Seven Sins ofJudicialActivism, 73 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1217, 1255 (2002) ("The conservatives' record reflects a jurisprudence of
judicial results, not of judicial method-nothing more and nothing less."); Jeffrey Rosen,
Disgrace:The Supreme Court Commits Suicide, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 25, 2000, at 18 ("[T]he
five conservatives ....

have ....

made it impossible for citizens of the United States to

sustain any kind of faith in the rule of law as something larger than the self-interested
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acy, 75 a hostility to democracy itself,76 or even the stench of pervasive
77
corruption and illegitimacy.
But even a skeptical review of the Rehnquist Court's work would
yield a number of other, less malevolent, storylines. For instance, a
recurring theme in recent decisions is the notion of the States' "dignity," an idea that is closely tied to the purported nature of their "sovereignty."7 8 Particularly in the Court's Eleventh Amendment
immunity-from-suit cases, one frequently encounters the image of the
States as metaphysical, almost mystical, entities, as demiurges in a kind
of constitutional creation "myth." 79 The States are, a narrow majority
ofJustices continues to insist, the kinds of things that simply cannot be
treated, or acted upon, in certain ways. 8°1 After all, the argument goes,
political preferences of William Rehnquist, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Anthony
Kennedy, and Sandra Day O'Connor.").
75
See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, Foreword: We the Court, 115 HRAv. L. REV. 4, 14 (2001). In
discussing the Rehnquist Court, Professor Kramer notes that
something significant has happened on Chief Justice Rehnquist's watch: a
subtle, unacknowledged shift in the Court's understanding of judicial review that has troubling consequences for constitutional doctrine and for
constitutionalism generally. As opposition to judicial supremacy has receded, the seeming naturalness of the Court's power to interpret has
grown, and with it the Court's own apparent sense that interpretation by
non-judicial actors is somehow unnatural. . . . The Rehnquist Court no
longer views itself as first among equals, but has instead staked its claim to
being the only institution empowered to speak with authority when it comes
to the meaning of the Constitution.
Id.
76
See, e.g., JAMIN B. RASKIN, OVERRULING DEMOCRACY: THE SUPREME COURT VS. THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE (2003).

77 See, e.g., Balkin & Levinson, supra note 6, at 1049-50. Professors Balkin and Levinson supply a scathing description of the recent revolution:
Why do we begin an article on the constitutional revolution with an account of the illegality of the 2000 election and the illegitimacy of the Bush
Presidency? The answer is depressingly simple: Five members of the United
States Supreme Court, confident of their power, and brazen in their authority, engaged in flagrant judicial misconduct that undermined the foundations of constitutional government. That is worth pointing out even if,
empirically, they appear to have gotten away with it .... The election is like
the stinking carcass of a pig dumped unceremoniously into a parlor. The
smell of rot is everywhere.
Jd.
78 See, e.g., Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002)
("The preeminent purpose of state sovereign immunity is to accord States the dignity that
is consistent with their status as sovereign entities.").
79 To take just one example, Professor Weinberg maintains that Alden v. Maine, 527
U.S. 706 (1999), and its premises rest not on constitutional federalism, properly understood, but on "myths." Louise Weinberg, Of Sovereignty and Union: The Legends ofAlden, 76
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1113, 1116 (2001).
80
See Alden, 527 U.S. at 748 (insisting that Congress "treat the States in a manner

consistent with their status as residuary sovereigns and joint participants in the governance
of the Nation"); NOONAN, supra note 56, at 41-57 (playfully critiquing the Courts' sovereign-immunity cases in a chapter entitled "Superior Beings"). A variation on this theme is
the idea that certain subjects, kinds of transactions, or forms of regulation are particularly
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"the Framers explicitly chose a Constitution that confers upon Congress the power to regulate individuals, not States."8 1 They and their
sovereignty pre-existed Congress; the Constitution is their creation,
and its scope is entirely a function of what the "States as States" consented to share or give away. Thus, for example, the States may not be
sued for money damages without their consent, 82 nor may their political processes, officials, or courts be commandeered. 3 But because
neither the States' abstract dignity, nor the immunity that is thought
to result from it, is obviously required by or described in the relevant
constitutional text, this theme has opened the Court up to perhaps its
84
most formidable criticism.
At the other end of the spectrum, from the metaphysical to the
mundane, is the more functional New Federalism claim that the structural and enumerated-powers features of our Constitution promote
sound policy by permitting diversity, encouraging competition, and
facilitating experimentation. 85 As Justice Brandeis famously put it,
and specially the province of state governments. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598, 618 (2000) ("The regulation and punishment of intrastate violence that is not
directed at the instrumentalities, channels, or goods involved in interstate commerce has
always been the province of the States."); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 580 (1995)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[I]t is well established that education is a traditional concern
of the States."); Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 625 (1987) (domestic-relations law traditionally
left to state regulation); cf San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth. v. Donovan, 557 F. Supp. 445,
453 (W.D. Tex. 1983), rev'd, 469 U.S. 528 (1985). According to DistrictJudge Shannon:
If transit is to be distinguished from the exempt.., functions [identified in
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976),] it will have to be by
identifying a traditional state function in the same way pornography is
sometimes identified: someone knows it when they see it, but they can't
describe it.
Id.
81
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992).
82 See, e.g., Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 535 U.S. at 765-67.
83 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997).
84 For a critique of the "dignity" theme from a scholar who is quite sympathetic to
federalism values, see Michael S. Greve, Federalism'sFrontier, 7 TEX. REv. L. & POL. 93
(2002). On the other hand, for a powerful defense of the textualist bonafides of the sovereign-immunity decisions, see Rappaport, supra note 8. The Court's solicitude for the
States' dignity and "sovereignty interests" can put the Justices in an awkward position when
they are asked to referee a dispute pitting one State against another. See, e.g., Franchise
Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 123 S. Ct. 1683, 1690 (2003) ("Without a rudder to steer us, we
decline to embark on the constitutional course of balancing coordinate States' competing
sovereign interests to resolve conflicts of laws under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.").
Similarly, some scholars have contended that the Court's sovereign-immunity decisions undermine other important federalism values, and "suggest an indifference to the States'
potential to act as democratic, locally accountable policy makers within our federal structure." Richard Briffault, A Fickle Federalism, 14 AM. PROSPECt, Spring 2003, at A26, A28.
85 On "competitive federalism," and the claimed nexus between competition and exit
rights, on the one hand, and innovation, efficiency, and freedom, on the other, see, for
example,Jesse H. Choper &John C. Yoo, The Scope of the Commerce Clause AfterMorrison, 25
OKa. Cl' U. L. REv. 843, 847 (2000) ("State governments seek to attract households and
businesses by enacting competitive policies; this jurisdictional competition produces overall efficiency for the nation in the long run, much in the way a market forces corporations
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"[i]t is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and
try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of
the country."8 6 The claim is, in a sense, a constitutionalization of
Charles Tiebout's groundbreaking work in the local-government
arena. 87 And yet, this theme sounds not only in contexts where one
might expect it, such as securities regulation and corporate governance, or land use and environmental protection, but also, for example, in the Justices' recent treatment of school choice,8 8 expressive
association,8 9 and the deach penalty. 90 It goes beyond public-choice
theory, and claims about exit rights and competition, to include a respect for moral and political deliberation. In Washington v. Glucksberg,
for example, after declining to create a fundamental right to assisted
suicide, ChiefJustice Rehnquist closed his majority opinion by observing that "[t]hroughout the Nation, Americans are engaged in an earto adopt efficient business practices, which leads to overall increases in consumer welfare."); Richard A. Epstein, Exit Rights Under Federalism, 55 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs. 147
(1992); Michael S. Greve, Against Cooperative Federalism, 70 Miss. L.J. 557 (2000); see also
MICHAEL S. GREVE, REAL FEDERALISM: WHY IT MATrERS, How IT COULD HAPPEN 2 (1999)
(discussing a federalism that "aims to provide citizens with choices among different sovereigns, regulatory regimes, and packages of government services"). For a recent critiqueonly one of many-of competitive federalism, see, for example, Frank B. Cross, The Folly of
Federalism, 24 CARDozo L. REV. 1, 8-18 (2002).
86
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, j., dissenting).
87
See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. EcoN. 416
(1956) (proposing a model for calculating "the level of expenditures for local public goods
which reflects the preferences of the population more adequately than they can be reflected at the national level").
88
See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 680 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(referring to the "wisdom of allowing States greater latitude in dealing with matters of
religion and education").
89 See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 664 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens in Dale invoked Brandeis' New State Ice dissent in defense of New Jersey's
application of its anti-discrimination law. Id. The majority, however, was unpersuaded:
Justice Brandeis, a champion of state experimentation in the economic
realm,... was never a champion of state experimentation in the suppression of free speech. To the contrary, his First Amendment commentary
provides compelling support for the Court's opinion in this case. In speaking of the Founders of this Nation, Justice Brandeis emphasized that they
"believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are
means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth."
Id. at 660-61 (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), overruled in part by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)).
90
See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 326 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Chief
Justice Rehnquist argued:
For the Court to rely on [the official positions of religious and professional
groups] today serves only to illustrate its willingness to proscribe by judicial
fiat-at the behest of private organizations speaking only for themselves-a
punishment about which no across-the-board consensus has developed
through the workings of normal democratic processes in the laboratories of
the States.
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nest and profound debate about the morality, legality, and practicality
of physician-assisted suicide. Our holding permits this debate to continue, as it should in a democratic society." 9 1
The judicial notice taken in Glucksberg of an "earnest and
profound" moral debate points to another related, though distinct,
theme in work of the Rehnquist Court. The Court is often faulted for
its "arrogance," 92 "aggressiveness," 9 3 and even its "imperious"9 4 ap-

proach, both to disputed questions themselves and to its own authority to answer them. Even conceding some merit to these complaints,
though, there is also a moral humility that runs through many of the
Rehnquist Court's decisions. 95 Particularly in its First Amendment decisions, this Court "appears not to resist, and seems even to accept, the
inevitability of reasonable disagreement on important political and
moral questions."9 6 What is more-and again, this is not to deny categorically the critics' judicial-supremacy charges-the Court has
seemed willing to "acknowledge[ ] candidly its own and government's
limited competence and prerogative to resolve authoritatively such

91 521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997). In a similar vein, Professor Susan Klein has recently
explored the idea of "independent-norm federalism." Susan R. Klein, Independent-Norm
Federalism in Criminal Law, 90 CAL. L. REv. 1541 (2002). This form of federalism, she explains, involves more than the promotion of diversity and experimentation in matters of
policy, but also fosters and protects communities' "expression[s] of morality," even where
"a [S]tate's norm is independent of[, and departs from,] the federal norm." Id. at 1542,
1543. And, as Professor Lynn Baker has reminded us, the policy experimentation that
federalism enables does not necessarily favor one ideology or set of positions over another.
Lynn A. Baker, Should Liberals Fear Federalism?, 70 U. CIN. L. RFv. 433, 450-53 (2002).
92 Larry Kramer, The Arrogance of the Court, WASH. POST, May 23, 2000, at A29. Cf
Suzanna Sherry, IrresponsibilityBreeds Contempt, 6 GREEN BAG 2D 47, 47 (2002) ("The Court
is portrayed as arrogant, self-aggrandizing, and unduly activist, and accused of giving insufficient deference-or even a modicum of respect-to Congress. Of course, these critics
presume that Congress is worthy of deference and respect. .. ").
93
Guido Calabresi, What Clarence Thomas Knows, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 1991, at 15 ("I
despise the current Supreme Court and find its aggressive, willful, statist behavior
disgusting....").
94 Jeffrey Rosen, The End ofDeference, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 6, 2000, at 39, 42 (book
review) ("The Rehnquist Court .. . routinely adopts an imperious tone ... even when
striking down relatively insignificant, and symbolic laws ..
").
95
See Richard W. Garnett, The Story of Henry Adams's Soul: Education and the Expression of
Associations, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1841, 1860-64 (2001). But see, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.
Ct. 2472 (2003).
96
Garnett, supra note 95, at 1861; see also Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 660
(2000) ("The First Amendment protects expression, be it of the popular variety or not....
And the fact that an idea may be embraced and advocated by increasing numbers of people is all the more reason to protect the First Amendment rights of those who wish to voice
a different view."); Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229 (2000) ("It is inevitable
that government will adopt and pursue programs and policies... [which are] contrary to
the profound beliefs and sincere convictions of some of its citizens."); id. at 232 ("It is all
but inevitable that the fees will result in subsidies to speech which some students find
objectionable and offensive to their personal beliefs.").

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

disagreements,"

97

[Vol. 89:1

and appears appropriately resigned to the crooked

98
timber of free society.

Another New Federalism theme sounds more in democratic theory than in claims about competition and exit. Structural federalism
is sometimes said by the Justices not only to facilitate optimal outcomes through competition and choice, or diversity and experimentation; the Court's decisions and reasoning are animated as well by
claims that decisionmakers and regulators ought to be "accountable"
to those they serve, and that this accountability is enhanced by the
dual sovereignty and decentralization preserved by our Constitution. 99
Thus, and particularly in the opinions ofJustices O'Connor and Kennedy, the objection sometimes seems to be less to the injury, if any,
done to the dignity of "States as States," than to the asserted loss of
97
Garnett, supra note 95, at 1861; see also Dale, 530 U.S. at 651 ("[I]t is not the role of
the courts to reject a group's expressed values because they disagree with those values or
find them internally inconsistent."); id. ("'[A]s is true of all expressions of First Amendment freedoms, the courts may not interfere on the ground that they view a particular
expression as unwise or irrational.'") (citation omitted); id. at 661 ("'[The law] is not free
to interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an approved message or
discouraging a disfavored one, however enlightened either purpose may strike the government."' (quoting Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515
U.S. 557, 579 (1995)). But see Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 866-67 (1992)
(plurality opinion). The Court stated:
Where ... the Court decides a case in such a way as to resolve the sort of
intensely divisive controversy reflected in Roe and those rare, comparable
cases, its decision has a dimension that the resolution of the normal case
does not carry. It is the dimension present whenever the Court's interpretation of the Constitution calls the contending sides of a national controversy to end their national division by accepting a common mandate rooted
in the Constitution.
Id.; Cal. Democratic Party v.Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 587 (2000) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("A
political party might be better served by allowing blanket primaries ....
Under the First
Amendment's guarantee of speech through free association, however, this is an issue for
the party to resolve, not for the State[s]."); id. at 590 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("In a free
society the State is directed by political doctrine, not the other way around."); Southworth,
529 U.S. at 232 ("It is not for the Court to say what is or is not germane to the ideas to be
pursued in an institution of higher learning."); Hurley, 515 U.S. at 575 ("But whatever the
reason, it boils down to the choice of a speaker not to propound a particular point of view,
and that choice is presumed to lie beyond the government's power to control."). In the
end, as Professor (nowJudge) McConnell has put it, "there are many reasonable, but mutually inconsistent, worldviews that are compatible with good citizenship, and it is neither
necessary nor desirable to attempt to forge agreement." Michael W. McConnell, The New
Establishmentarianism,75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 453, 454 (2000).
98
See ISAIAH BERLIN, THE CROOKED TIMBER OF HUMANITY Xi (Henry Hardy ed., Alfred
A. Knopf, Inc. 1991) ("Out of timber so crooked as that from which man is made nothing
entirely straight can be built.") (quoting IMMANLIEL KANT, IDEE ZU EINER ALLGEMEINEN GESCHICHTE IN WELTBURGERLICHER ABsici-rr (1784)).

99 See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 908 (2000) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("We have addressed the heightened federalism and nondelegation concerns
that agency pre-emption raises by using the presumption to build a procedural bridge
across the political accountability gap between States and administrative agencies.").
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transparency, the blurring of officials' responsibility, and the undermining of citizens' ability to assess praise and blame."' 0
As mentioned at the outset of this Article, yet another common
premise of the New Federalism is that federal power is limited not
only by division-among the branches of government, and between
the States and Congress-and by the States' very nature, but also by
enumeration. Here, Lopez sets the tone:
The Constitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated
powers. As James Madison wrote: "The powers delegated by the
proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite." This constitutionally mandated division of
authority "was adopted by the Framers to ensure protection of our
0
fundamental liberties."' '
Form and text are not simply matters of methodology, e.g., "how
ought we to decide what this statute means?" They are more than the
raw materials of the Court's work, and more than what the Justices are
seeking to apply or understand. The text of the Constitution-specifically, its enumeration of those "few" and "defined" powers enjoyed by
Congress-is not only a tool to be employed, but a constraint on what
may be done.

100 See, e.g., Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 528 (2001) (Kennedy, J.,concurring). As
Justice Kennedy observed,
[t]he idea of federalism is that a National Legislature enacts laws which
bind the people as individuals, not as citizens of a State; and, it follows,
freedom is most secure if the people themselves, not the States as intermediaries, hold their federal legislators to account for the conduct of
their office. If state enactments were allowed to condition or control certain
actions of federal legislators, accountability would be blurred....
Id.; New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 169 (1992) ("Accountability is thus diminished
when, due to federal coercion, elected state officials cannot regulate in accordance with
the views of the local electorate in matters not pre-empted by federal regulation."); see also
Michael S. Greve, Friends of the Earth, Foes of Federalism, 12 DuKE E,'VrL. L. & POL'Y F. 167,
168 (2001) (observing that "the Supreme Court's conservative-centrist majority has generally placed a premium on public accountability and responsibility"); Ilya Somin, Closing the
Pandora's Box of Federalism: The Casefor Judicial Restriction of Federal Subsidies to State Governments, 90 GEO. L.J. 461, 484 (2002) (discussing the Court's concern both for "maintaining
states' control over their own bureaucratic machinery" and that "federal legislation not
undermine state governments' responsiveness to the preferences of their electorates").
But see, e.g.,
Fed. Maritime Comm'n v. S.C. Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 787 (2002) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) ("An overly restrictive judicial interpretation of the Constitution's structural
constraints (unlike its protections of certain basic liberties) will undermine the Constitution's own efforts to achieve its far more basic structural aim, the creation of a representative form of government capable of translating the people's will into effective public
action.").
101
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (citations omitted) (first quoting
THE FEDERALiST No. 45, at 292-93 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)) (second
quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991)).
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Finally, and as Professor McGinnis has explored in great detail, 10 2
a powerful and pervasive theme in the Rehnquist Court's decisions is a
recognition, and even a celebration, of the place of mediating associations, their expression, and their diversity in civic life. t0 3 Federalism is
about allowing room for competition and innovation, but not simply
by and among state and local governments. The landscape that is created, regulated, and reflected by our Constitution includes more than
a federal government and States, and more than persons and governments. The structural features of that charter both preserve and clear
out the "space" of civil society in which associations and mediating
institutions also work to safeguard political liberty and constrain political authority. As I have suggested elsewhere:
[A]ssociations have a structural,as well as a vehicular, purpose. They
hold back the bulk of government and are the "critical buffers between the individual and the power of the State." They are "laboratories of innovation" that clear out the civic space needed to
"sustain the expression of the rich pluralism of American life." Associations are not only conduits for expression, they are the scaffolding around which civil society is constructed, in which personal
freedoms are exercised, in which loyalties are formed and transmit04
ted, and in which individuals flourish. 1
Thus, the New Federalism that is likely to be the legacy of the
Rehnquist Court is more than a body of case law, or a litany of discrete, controversial decisions. It is also the playing out in concert of a
number of related themes. It is, taken as a whole, an argument, in
which certain claims about decision making and deliberation are said
to proceed from a variety of premises about our Constitution's text,
history, and structure.

See McGinnis, supra note 53, at 526-43.
See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000) (observing that freedom of association is "'especially important in preserving political and cultural diversity
and in shielding dissident expression from suppression by the majority"' (quoting Roberts
v. United StatesJaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984)); id. at 655 (noting that "associations do
not have to associate for the 'purpose' of disseminating a certain message in order to be
entitled to the protections of the First Amendment"); Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530
U.S. 567, 574 (2000) ("Representative democracy in any populous unit of governance is
unimaginable without the ability of citizens to band together in promoting among the
electorate candidates who espouse their political views."); Bd. of Regents v. Southworth,
529 U.S. 217, 231 (2000) (noting the importance of student associations at public universities to the "fulfillment of... personal aspirations and ... potential"); Garnett, supra note
96, at 1853-54, 1863-64.
104
Garnett, supra note 95, at 1853-54 (footnotes omitted). See alsoJason Mazzone, The
Social Capital Argument for Federalism, 11 S. CAL. IN-rERDisc. L.J. 27, 27 (2001) (arguing that
"[f] ederalism promotes social capital because dividing power between the national government and the states provides greater opportunities for citizen groups to influence politics
and for individual citizens to participate in public life").
102

103
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Conditional Spending and Regulation by Contract

This Part so far has provided the necessary context for the following discussion about the Spending Power, and about the possibility of
employing conditional-spending arguments to justify the creation and
prosecution of federal crimes.
It is clear that the Constitution gives Congress the power to raise,
and to spend, money. True, as Professor Lawson and others have reminded us, there really is no "Spending Clause."10 5 That is, there is
no obvious textual counterpart-i.e., the "power to spend money"to, for example, the power "[t]o regulate Commerce."1 0 6 In any
event, it seems settled that the national legislature may spend money
not only as specifically authorized, and not only as a necessary-andproper means of exercising its several enumerated powers (after all,
Congress cannot "support Armies" without spending money' 0 7 ), but
also, and more generally, to "provide for ...

the general Welfare of

the United States."' 0 8 For purposes of this Article, then, this is the
"Spending Power." 10 9
See Lawson, supra note 2, at 1235.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. That said, the Constitution does, in some cases, explicitly authorize outlays from the national treasury. Senators and Representatives are to "receive a Compensation for their Services ....
paid out of the Treasury," U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 6, cl. 1; "[e]xpenditures of all public Money" are to be "published from time to time,"
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7; and money is to be "drawn from the Treasury" only "in Consequence of Appropriations made by [l]aw." Id.
107
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 12. In addition, even where the power to spend money is
not obviously built into a specific, enumerated power, it would nonetheless be conceded all
around that federal disbursements are not only "proper," but "necessary," for "carrying
into execution," for example, the power to "constitute Tribunals" (judges will not likely
work for free), U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9, or to "establish . . . post Roads" (an "established," but unmaintained, post road is of no use to anyone), U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7,
or to "punish Piracies and Felonies" (crime may not pay, but it costs money to punish),
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 10, and so on. Similarly, it is not possible to "maintain a Navy,"
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 13, or to "[e]rect[ ] dock-Yards," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17,
without spending money. A power to "borrow Money on the credit of the United States,"
U.S. CON T. art. I, § 8, cl. 2, not only implies but probably includes a power to spend the
money so borrowed; and a promise to honor as "valid" "[a]ll Debts" incurred under the
Articles of Confederation, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 1, can only mean that such debts will be
paid. See also U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 ("The Congress shall have Power... to pay the
Debts . . . of the United States."). Not to belabor the point, but even had the Framers
omitted from Article I the "Sweeping Clause," there would not likely be hand-wringing,
even in the most scrupulously textualist quarters, about the constitutional authorization to
pay wages to our soldiers and sailors.
108
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. It should be emphasized here that several prominent
scholars dissent from what appears to be the prevailing view. See, e.g., David E. Engdahl,
The Spending Power, 44 DuKE LJ. 1 (1994) (critiquing the named individuals' interpretations of the Spending Clause); Jeffrey T. Renz, What Spending Clause? (Or, the President's
Paramour):An Examination of the Views of Hamilton, Madison, and Story on Article I, Section 8,
Clause 1 of the United States Constitution, 33J. MARSHALL L. REv. 81 (1999) (same).
109 There is, I realize, some disagreement about which constitutional provision confers
the "Spending Power." See, e.g., Bradley A. Smith, Hamilton at Wits End: The Lost Disciplineof
the Spending Clause Vs. the False Discipline of Campaign Finance Reform, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 117,
105
106
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At first blush, it is difficult to discern any limits or bounds to a
power to "provide for" or "promote the general Welfare" of the Nation. Subject only to the Constitution's explicit, affirmative restrictions-for example, the First Amendment's Establishment Clausethe General Welfare Clause might seem to create a plenary power to
disburse funds in pursuit of any project or aim thought by a particular
majority to be in the public interest.' 1 0 The only constraint on the
employment of this Power would be public opinion, mediated
through legislators' votes. What is more, we should add to the picture
the earlier mentioned and well-settled rule that Congress may tie regulatory strings to the money it spends-that it may, in other words,
"'further [its] broad policy objectives by conditioning receipt of federal moneys upon compliance by the recipient with federal statutory
and administrative directives.' II I In Oklahoma v. Civil Service Commis-

sion, for example, the Commission withheld federal highway funds
from the State after a state official violated the federal Hatch Act; 1 2 in
King v. Smith, Congress required a State that received federal Aid for
Families with Dependent Children funds to disburse AFDC program
benefits in accord with the federal Social Security Act;" 3 and in South
Dakota v. Dole, Congress successfully conditioned the receipt of federal
highway funds on the States' adoption of a twenty-one-year-old drink120-22 (2001) (discussing several possible textual sources of the Spending Power). Professor Engdahl, for example, has argued that the Property Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl.
2 ("The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regula"),
tions respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States ..
rather than the General Welfare Clause, is the Power's textual basis. See David E. Engdahl,
The Basis of the Spending Power, 18 SEATrLE U. L. REv. 215 (1995); Engdahl, supra note 1, at
50-53. In Professor Stith's view, the power to spend is lodged squarely in the Necessary
and Proper Clause, and no additional textual hooks are necessary. See Kate Stith, Congress'
Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343, 1348 (1988) ("Congress'[s] power to appropriate
originates in article I, section 8. The concept of 'necessary and proper' legislation to carry
out 'all . . . Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States'
includes the power to spend public funds on authorized federal activities."). Finally, Professor Smith has suggested that the Spending Power's source might be the requirement set
out in Section 9 of Article I that "[n]o Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7; see Smith,
supra, at 120. Again, for present purposes, it is enough to note that the courts-including
the Supreme Court-appear content to ground the Spending Power in the General Welfare (or "Spending") Clause, notwithstanding the undeniable fact that several other
Clauses seem clearly to contemplate, and authorize, the disbursal of funds. See, e.g., South
Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) (quoting U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 1).
110 See Eastman, supra note 22, at 87 ("For the first eighty-five years of our nation's
history, under both the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution, the language of
'general welfare' was viewed as a limitation on the powers of Congress, not as a grant of
plenary power."); id. at 66 ("Indeed, the contemporary view is that Congress's power to
provide for the 'general welfare' is a power to spend for virtually anything that Congress
itself views as helpful.").
III Dole, 483 U.S. at 206 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980)).
112 330 U.S. 127, 133 (1947).
11 3
392 U.S. 309, 333-34 (1968).
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The result of this kind of regulation-by-contract

1 5

is that

Congress can often accomplish indirectly what it perhaps cannot
achieve directly, and may pursue regulatory ends that might lie beyond the reach of those specific legislative means enumerated in the
Constitution.116

This cannot be the end of the matter, though. Otherwise, ours
would not be, contra Lopez, a government of limited powers, but a government that is in effect empowered to pursue almost any objective by
almost any means.117 Such a conclusion is irreconcilable not only with
the "New Federalism" but with the old as well, and with almost everything we know about the understanding of those who thought about,
drafted, and ratified the Constitution. And so, we come to one of the
oldest questions 1 8 of constitutional law-whether Congress's power
to tax and spend in pursuit of the general welfare is bounded by the
more specific, express grants of power set out in Article I, or whether
the Spending Power supplements the national government's enumerated regulatory powers.
Others have described, analyzed, and evaluated the process
through which this question was answered,' 19 and there is no need to
114

483 U.S. at 210-12.
See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)
("[L]egislation enacted pursuant to the spending power is much in the nature of a contract: in return for federal funds, the States agree to comply with federally imposed conditions."). See also Bennett v. Ky. Dep't of Educ., 470 U.S. 656, 664-66 (1985) (following
Pennhurst and concluding that the relevant spending condition was expressed with sufficient clarity to bind a State that chose to participate in the program at issue).
116 See, e.g., Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 654 (1999) (Kennedy,
J., dissenting) (noting that "Congress can use its Spending Clause power to pursue objectives outside of 'Article I'senumerated legislative fields' by attaching conditions to the
grant of federal funds." (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Dole, 483 U.S. at
207)); see also Eastman, supra note 22, at 64 (noting arguments that Congress could reenact
the programs struck down in decisions such as Lopez as conditions on grants given to
States); McCoy & Friedman, supra note 26, at 116 ("[A]ny time that Congress finds itself
limited by . . .delegated regulatory powers, . . . [it] need only attach a condition on a
federal spending grant that achieves the same (otherwise invalid) regulatory objective.").
117
See Baker, supra note 23, at 1919-20 ("In the post-Lopez era, should Congress be
permitted to use conditional offers of federal funds to regulate the states in ways that it
could not directly mandate? .... The answer . . .cannot be a simple 'yes'[.]").
II
See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992) ("The constitutional
question is as old as the Constitution: It consists of discerning the proper division of authority between the Federal Government and the States."); H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest
Question of ConstitutionalLaw, 79 VA. L. REv. 633, 633 (1993) ("Here is one of the most
important questions conceivable, with respect to the legal basis federalism. Is there an
implied limitation on the federal powers, to the effect that they shall not be used to deal
with some matters under state authority?" (quoting CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., PERSPFCTIVES IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 25, 29 (rev. ed. 1970))).
119
See, e.g., Eastman, supra note 22; Engdahl, supra note 108; Engdahl, supra note 1;
Renz, supra note 108, at 136-42; Peter J. Smith, Pennhurst, Chevron, and the Spending
Power, 110 YALE L.J. 1187 (2001); Rebecca E. Ziedow, Federalism's Paradox: The Spending
Power and Waiver of Sovereign Immunity, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 141, 167-99 (2002).
115
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tell the story again here. In brief-over time, and culminating in the
Butler decision, 20 the "Hamiltonian" answer prevailed over the
"Madisonian" one.) 2 1 That is, the view that "the General Welfare
Clause could not in any way be construed as expanding Congress's
powers beyond the enumerated objects of the Constitution" lost out to
a reading that would "enable Congress to spend for any purpose that
served the 'general welfare,' whether that purpose lay within its enu122
merated powers or not."
Still, for another half-century, the question remained whether an
apparently boundless power to spend included an equally far-reaching
power to regulate through conditional spending.' 2 3 Then, in South
Dakota v. Dole, the Court confronted Congress's effort to impose a nationwide drinking age of twenty-one-a goal that, arguably, Congress
could not achieve through direct regulation or fiat12 4-by threatening
to withhold a portion of federal highway funds from any State that
failed to impose such a rule on its own. 125 South Dakota objected,
arguing, among other things, that Congress's carrot-and-stick efforts
120 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936). In Butler, the Court invalidated a statute
authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture to pay farmers not to grow crops, but in so doing,
indicated its agreement with the Hamiltonian account, and with the view that the Spending Power's objects were not bounded by the tasks specified in Article I; rather, Congress
could spend for any general purpose thought to be in the public interest. See id. at 64-66.
One year later, the Court reaffirmed its embrace of the Hamiltonian position in Helvering
v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937) (upholding unemployment-insurance program and urging deference to Congress's discretion to spend for the general welfare "unless the choice
is clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, [or otherwise] not an exercise ofjudgment").
121
As summarized by Professor Chemerinsky,
Hamilton believed that Congress could tax and spend for any purpose that
it thought served the general welfare, so long as Congress did not violate
another constitutional provision....
Madison took the view that Congress was limited to taxing and spending to
carry out the other powers specifically granted in Article I of the Constitution. The Court expressly adopted Hamilton's competing position as "the
correct one."
Erwin Chemerinsky, Protectingthe Spending Power, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 89, 90-91 (2001) (footnotes omitted); I LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 5-6, at 834-36 (3d
ed. 2000) (describing the "main debate about the construction of the spending power").
122
Alex Kozinski & Steven A. Engel, Recapturing Madison's Constitution:Federalism With-

out the Blank Check, in JAMES

MADISON AND THE FUTURE OF LIMITED GOVERNMENT

13, 20

(John Samples ed., 2002).
123
For an overview of the development of conditional-spending doctrine, see Baker,
supra note 23, at 1924-32.
124
See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) (noting that "we need not decide in this case whether [the Twenty-First] Amendment would prohibit an attempt by
Congress to legislate directly a national minimum drinking age," because "[h]ere, Congress has acted indirectly under its spending power to encourage uniformity in the States'
drinking ages. As we explain below, we find this legislative effort within constitutional
bounds even if Congress may not regulate drinking ages directly").
125
Id. at 205.
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"violate [d] the constitutional limitations on congressional exercise of

the spending power .

1..",26

The Court, however, was not persuaded, and rejected South Dakota's arguments. 127 At first, it seemed possible that the Court would
find no limitations on this exercise of the spending power other than
those spelled out in the Constitution, such as those dealing with the
establishment of religion, bills of attainder, and titles of nobility. After all, once it is accepted that Congress's ability to spend in pursuit of
the general welfare in not coextensive with the specific powers
granted in Article I, it is not clear where one would look to find any
constitutional limitations on Congress's ability to make deals with,
rather than fling unencumbered largesse at, the States. Nevertheless,
after reciting the Butler rule--"'the power of Congress to authorize
expenditure of public moneys for public purposes is not limited by
the direct grants of legislative power found in the Constitution"' and
so "objectives not thought to be within Article I's 'enumerated legislative fields' may nevertheless be attained through the use of the spending power and the conditional grant of federal funds"' 2 8-the Dole
Court insisted on several "general restrictions" on piggy-backed
regulation.
First, any exercise of the spending power must-as the Constitution says-aim at the "general welfare." 129 The Court was quick to
concede, though, that this first requirement is more of a toothless exhortation than a judicially reviewable limitation, 130 a point about
which some scholars have complained. 3 1 Second, the Justices observed that "if Congress desires to condition the States' receipt of federal funds, it 'must do so unambiguously...
enabl[ing] the States to
exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of
their participation.' "132 That is, because conditional spending oper126
127

Id.
Id. at 206.

128 Id. at 207 (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65-66
(1936)).
129

Id. It is worth noting, though, that the Court did not say that the regulatory condi-

tions attached to such spending must themselves relate to the general welfare.
130
The Court observed, in fact, that "[t]he level of deference to the congressional
decision is such that the Court has more recently questioned whether 'general welfare' is a
judicially enforceable restriction at all." Id. at 207 n.2 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
90-91 (1976) (per curiam)); see also id. at 207 ("In considering whether a particular expenditure is intended to serve general public purposes, courts should defer substantially to the
judgment of Congress.").
131
See, e.g., Eastman, supra note 22, at 64 n.8 (" [T] he relatedness prong of the [Dole]
test does not carry much water; almost anything can be made to appear 'related."').
132
483 U.S. at 207 (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1,
17 (1981)). See also Bennett v. Ky. Dep't of Educ., 470 U.S. 656, 665-66 (1985) (quoting
Pennhurst's mandate that "Congress must express clearly its intent to impose conditions"
on federal funds). For a recent and detailed essay exploring this clear-statement requirement, see Smith, supra note 109, at 1187. 1 am grateful, on this point, to my colleague, A.J.
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ates like a contract, the State, as a purported party to and obligee
under that contract, must have been given notice of, and actually
agreed to, the terms. Regulation-by-contract, in other words, requires
offer and acceptance. 13 3 Third, the Court found in its precedents, if
not in the Constitution itself, the rule that conditions on federal
spending "might be illegitimate" if "unrelated 'to the federal interest
in particular national projects or programs.' '' 134 Fourth, the Court
noted that, in some cases, other constitutional provisions-again, the
Establishment Clause provides an example' 35-might affirmatively
constrain not only the power to spend, but also the ability to regulate
through conditions attached to such spending. 13 6 And, finally, the
Court suggested that, in some circumstances, "the financial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point at
which 'pressure turns into compulsion.' "137
All that said, the Court concluded quickly that-particularly in
light of Congress's finding that "differing drinking ages in the States
created particular incentives for young persons to combine their desire to drink with their ability to drive"' 3 8-the uniform, twenty-oneyear drinking age Congress had attached to federal highway funds was
"reasonably calculated to advance the general welfare."1 39 There was
no question about the clarity of the conditions, i.e., the terms of the
Bellia, for pointing out to me that, in contract law generally, it is not the case that the
particulars of the obligations that bind parties must be unambiguous. Rather, it is the
assent to that obligation that must be free of ambiguity. E-mail from A.J. Bellia, Associate
Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School, to Richard W. Garnett, Associate Professor of
Law, Notre Dame Law School (Aug. 3, 2003, 11:10:16 EST) (on file with author).
133Cf Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 186 (2003) ("[Wle have been careful not to
imply that all contract-law rules apply to spending clause legislation[.]").
134
483 U.S. at 207-08 (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461
(1978) (plurality opinion)).
135
See, e.g., Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1062, 1066-68 (9th Cir. 2002) (upholding the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 after applying the
Dole criteria and concluding, inter alia, that the spending conditions in question do not
violate the Establishment Clause).
136
Dole, 483 U.S. at 208.
137
Id. at 211 (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)). As Professor Lynn Baker notes, though, the Court provided no guidelines that might help a
judge, legislator, or citizen hoping to identify the line between unconstitutional coercion
and permissible contracting. See Baker, supra note 23, at 1933 (noting that the Court "provided neither a workable definition of these critical standards nor any actual or hypothetical example of their violation"). For a detailed study of the "coercion" aspect of the Dole
test, see, for example, Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without Baselines: UnconstitutionalConditions in Three Dimensions, 90 GEO. L. J. 1 (2001).
138
438 U.S. at 208. The Court noted again the substantial deference that it accords to
Congress's estimations of the "general welfare," insisting that "'the concept of welfare or
the opposite is shaped by Congress."' Id. (quoting Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 645
(1937)).
1319

Id.
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contract, 40 and the State did not even bother to challenge the "germaneness of [the drinking age] to federal purposes. '1 4' All that remained, then, was the question whether the Twenty-first
Amendment-which gives States the authority to regulate alcohol-related matters-was an "independent constitutional bar" to Congress's
indirect-regulation efforts. South Dakota insisted that "'Congress may
not use the spending power to regulate that which it is prohibited
from regulating directly under the Twenty-first Amendment,'- 1 4 2 but
the Court did not accept this invitation to re-open the Madison-Hamilton debate. 43 Because the State was free to reject the funds and
thereby avoid the condition, 144 the Court concluded that there was
140
Id. ("The conditions upon which States receive the funds, moreover, could not be
more clearly stated by Congress.").
141
Id. ("Indeed, the condition imposed by Congress is directly related to one of the
main purposes for which highway funds are expended-safe interstate travel.") In light of
the State's concession on this point, the Dole Court was able to avoid providing either a
defense of the requirement itself, or much guidance for applying it in future cases. As the
Court stated:
Our cases have not required that we define the outer bounds of the "gerinaneness" or "relatedness" limitation on the imposition of conditions
under the spending power. Amici urge that we take this occasion to establish that a condition on federal funds is legitimate only if it relates directly
to the purpose of the expenditure to which it is attached. Because petitioner has not sought such a restriction, and because we find any such limitation on conditional federal grants satisfied in this case in any event, we do
not address whether conditions less directly related to the particular purpose of the expenditure might be outside the bounds of the spending
power.
Id. at 208 n.3 (citations omitted).
142
Id. at 209 (quoting Petitioner's Brief at 52-53).
143
Id. at 210-11. The Court stated:

[Our] cases establish that the "independent constitutional bar" limitation
on the spending power is not.., a prohibition on the indirect achievement
of objectives which Congress is not empowered to achieve directly. Instead,
we think that the language in our earlier opinions stands for the unexceptionable proposition that the power may not be used to induce the States to
engage in activities that would themselves be unconstitutional. Thus, for
example, a grant of federal funds conditioned on invidiously discriminatory
state action or the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment would be an
illegitimate exercise of the Congress' [s] broad spending power. But no
such claim can be or is made here. Were South Dakota to succumb to the
blandishments offered by Congress and raise its drinking age to 21, the
State's action in so doing would not violate the constitutional rights of
anyone.
Id. But see id. at 212 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (dissenting on the grounds that "regulation
of the minimum age of purchasers of liquor falls squarely within the ambit of those powers
reserved to the States by the Twenty-first Amendment" and that because the "States possess
this constitutional power, Congress cannot condition a federal grant in a manner that
abridges this right. The Amendment, itself, strikes the proper balance between federal
and state authority.").
144
Id. at 211-12 ("Here Congress has offered relatively mild encouragement to the
States to enact higher minimum drinking ages than they would otherwise choose. But the
enactment of such laws remains the prerogative of the States not merely in theory but in
fact.").
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nothing "coercive" about the terms of Congress's "offer."145 In the
end, "[e]ven if Congress might lack the power to impose a national
minimum drinking age directly, we conclude that encouragement to
' 14 6
state action found in [the law] is a valid use of the spending power.
In Justice O'Connor's dissenting view, the uniform-drinking-age
condition was "not a condition on spending reasonably related to the
expenditure of federal funds ....[but rather was] an attempt to regu-

late the sale of liquor, an attempt that lies outside Congress' power to
regulate commerce because it falls within the ambit of... the Twentyfirst Amendment."' 147 Though she professed to have no quarrel either
with Butler's embrace of the Hamiltonian position or with the general
project of regulation through conditional spending, 148 she insisted
that "establishment of a minimum drinking age of twenty-one is not
sufficiently related to interstate highway construction to justify so conditioning funds appropriated for that purpose."' 49 She conceded that
"[w]hen Congress appropriates money to build a highway, it is entitled to insist that the highway be a safe one," but at the same time
emphasized that "it is not entitled to insist as a condition of the use of
highway funds that the State impose or change regulations in other
areas of the State's social and economic life because of an attenuated
50
or tangential relationship to highway use or safety."'
145

Id. at 211. The Court noted:
Our decisions have recognized that in some circumstances the financial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point at
which "pressure turns into compulsion." Here, however, Congress has directed only that a State desiring to establish a minimum drinking age lower
than 21 lose a relatively small percentage of certain federal highway funds.
Petitioner contends that the coercive nature of this program is evident
from the degree of success it has achieved. We cannot conclude, however,
that a conditional grant of federal money of this sort is unconstitutional
simply by reason of its success in achieving the congressional objective.
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)); see
also Steward, 301 U.S. at 589-90. In Steward, the Court stated:
[Elvery rebate from a tax when conditioned upon conduct is in some measure a temptation. But to hold that motive or temptation is equivalent to
coercion is to plunge the law in endless difficulties. The outcome of such a
doctrine is the acceptance of a philosophical determinism by which choice
becomes impossible. Till now the law has been guided by a robust common
sense which assumes the freedom of the will as a working hypothesis in the
solution of its problems.
Id.
146 Dole, 483 U.S. at 212.
147
Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
148 Id. at 212-13 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
149 Id. at 213-14 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also id. at 214-15 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (observing that "if the purpose of [the condition] is to deter drunken driving, it is
far too over[-] and under-inclusive," further noting that "[i]t
is over-inclusive because it
stops teenagers from drinking even when they are not about to drive on interstate highways. It is under-inclusive because teenagers pose only a small part of the drunken driving
problem in this Nation.").
150 Id. at 215 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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In a way, Justice O'Connor's dissent foreshadowed the Court's
"limited powers" reminder in Lopez. According to Justice O'Connor,
"'Congress has the power to spend for the general welfare' "-a power
that, she admits, reaches beyond the powers enumerated in Article I'
but "'it has the power to legislate only for delegated purposes.' 151
Thus, the "'appropriate inquiry... is whether the spending requirement or prohibition is a condition on a grant or whether it is regulation."' 1 52 And where is the line between a condition and a
regulation? For Justice O'Connor, the "'difference turns on whether
the requirement specifies in some way how the money should be
spent, so that Congress' [s] intent in making the grant will be effectuated,"' whereas "'[a] requirement that is not such a specification is
not a condition, but a regulation, which is valid only if it falls within
one of Congress' [s] delegated regulatory powers.' "153 In her view,
Congress cannot use the spending power to "regulate" activities that
lie beyond the reach of its enumerated powers. True, its power to
spend is limited only by its own judgment concerning the general welfare (and the acquiescence of the voting taxpayers), but conditions
attached to such spending are not vehicles for additional regulation.
They are, instead, simply directions for use of those funds.154 And so,
while she is apparently resigned in Hamilton's victory, Justice
O'Connor's worries are downright Madisonian:
If the spending power is to be limited only by Congress' [s] notion
of the general welfare, the reality, given the vast financial resources
of the Federal Government, is that the Spending Clause gives
"power to the Congress to tear down the barriers, to invade the
states' jurisdiction, and to become a parliament of the whole people, subject to no restrictions save such as are self-imposed." This,
of course, . . . was not the Framers' plan and it is not the meaning of
155
the Spending Clause.
I will return shortly to Dole's criteria for evaluating regulatory conditions attached to spending, to the question of their applicability in
cases involving federal criminal statutes, and to the implications of
Justice O'Connor's dissent for such cases. For purposes of this Part, it
151
Id. at 216 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Brief of Amici Curiae National Conference of State Legislatures et al., at 19-20).
152
Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Brief of Amici Curiae National Conference
of State Legislatures et al., at 19-20).
153
Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Brief of Amici Curiae National Conference
of State Legislatures et al., at 19-20).
154
See id. ("[T]here is an obvious difference between a statute stating the conditions
upon which moneys shall be expended and one effective only upon assumption of a contractual obligation to submit to a regulation which otherwise could not be enforced.")
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 73 (1936)).
155
Id. at 217 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (quoting Butler, 297 U.S. at

78).
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is sufficient to note that although the Court has shown an increased
willingness-even an undue eagerness 156 -to

enforce the limits on

Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth
Amendment, it has displayed no such enthusiasm for, nor interest in,
policing the regulatory uses of the spending power. 15 7 Nor, for the
most part, have any of the lower federal courts.1 58 It was suggested,
156
See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 121, at 105 ("In the last decade, and particularly
in the last five years, the five most conservative Justices on the Court have engaged in great
judicial activism in limiting Congress's powers, reviving the Tenth Amendment, and expanding sovereign immunity."); Michael C. Dorf, The Good Society, Commerce, and the Rehnquist Court, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2161, 2177 (2001) ("[Tjhe conservatives are activists in
cases involving limits on federal power for the benefit of the States."); Simon Lazarus, Don't
Be Fooled. They're Activists, Too, WASH. PosT, June 3, 2001, at B3 ("In the name of an elaborate if quirky theory of 'federalism,' this group [ofJustices] targets the New Deal, the Great
Society and, above all, Congress itself. Their brand of judicial conservatism is avowedly
activist. ...).
157
See, e.g., Pierce County v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129 (2003); Davis v. Monroe County Bd.
of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999). But see The Supreme Court, 2001 Term-Leading Cases, 116
HARV. L. REV. 200, 313 (2002) ("Last Term, in Barnes v. Gorman, the Court took a potentially significant step toward limiting the reach of Spending Clause legislation.") (footnote
omitted). In Barnes, 536 U.S. 181 (2002), the Court held that punitive damages may not be
awarded in private suits brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act. Id. at 189-90. Justice Scalia noted first that "we have regularly applied the
contract-law analogy in cases defining the scope of conduct for which funding recipients
may be held liable for money damages." Id. at 186. One implication of this "analogy," he
reasoned, is that a "a remedy is 'appropriate relief'only if the funding recipient is on notice
that, by accepting federal funding, it exposes itself to liability of that nature." Id. at 187
(citation omitted) (quoting Franklin v. Cowinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 73
(1992)). And while "[a] funding recipient is generally on notice that it is subject not only
to those remedies explicitly provided in the relevant legislation, but also to those remedies
traditionally available in suits for breach of contract[,]" id., "punitive damages, unlike compensatory damages and injunction, are generally not available for breach of contract." Id.
(citations omitted). At least in the minds of the majority, the decision in Gorman neither
worked nor portends any major changes in conditional-spending doctrine. See id. at 188
n.2 ("Our decision merely applies a principle expressed and applied many times
before.... SinceJustice Stevens is unable to identify any 'far-reaching consequenc[e]' that
might reasonably follow from our decision today, and since we are merely occupying
ground that the Court has long held, we surely do not deserve his praise that we are 'fearless crusaders[.]'") (citations omitted). But see id. at 192-93 (Stevens, J., concurring in
judgment) ("[T]he Court's novel reliance on what has been, at most, a useful analogy to
contract law has potentially far-reaching consequences that go well beyond the issues
briefed and argued in this case.").
158
Although a few courts have sent exploratory volleys, these cases appear to have had
little impact. See, e.g., Bradley v. Ark. Dep't of Educ., 189 F.3d 745, 758 (8th Cir. 1999)
(holding that Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act was not a valid exercise of the Spending Power because the conditions placed on the State's receipt of federal funds were too
broad and therefore coercive), vacated in part by Jim C. v. United States, 235 F.3d 1079,
1081 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc) ("While it appears, as the defendant urges, that the 'financial inducements' employed by Congress can become so 'coercive as to cross the point
where pressure turns into compulsion,' that limit has not been crossed here." (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999))); Va. Dep't of Educ. v. Riley, 106 F.3d 559, 561 (4th Cir.
1997) (en banc) ("Since the plain language of the IDEA [Individuals with Disabilities Act]
does not, even implicitly, condition the receipt of IDEA funding on the continued provi[the federal government had no]
sion of educational services to disabled students ....
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and perhaps even expected, that the Dole exceptions, and received
Spending Power wisdom more generally, would be swept into the
maelstrom of a post-Lopez revolution. 159 Instead, New Federalism notwithstanding, Congress's essentially unquestioned power to spend
money, with regulatory strings attached, continues to provide practically limitless opportunities for the national government indirectly to
160
shape policy at the state and local levels of society and government.
This first Part will conclude, then, with a few observations about
federalism, and federalization, in the context of criminal law. Along
with the preceding overviews of the New Federalism generally, and
authority to condition . . . receipt of IDEA funding on the continued provision of free
education to such students."), superseded by statute as stated in Amos v. Md. Dep't of Pub.
Safety & Corr. Servs., 126 F.3d 589, 603 n.3 (4th Cir. 1997); Koslow v. Pennsylvania, 158 F.
Supp. 2d 539, 544 (E.D. Pa. 2001) ("As plaintiff does not argue that there is any connection between federal funds received by the state and his Rehabilitation Act claim, I hold
that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has not waived its sovereign immunity in this
case."), affd in part, rev'd in part, 302 F.3d 161, 175-76 (3d Cir. 2002) ("Congress has expressed a clear interest in eliminating disability-based discrimination in state departments
or agencies. That interest . . . flows with every dollar spent by a department or agency
receiving federal funds. The waiver of ... immunity from Rehabilitation Act claims by
Department of Corrections employees furthers that interest directly.") (citation omitted);
cf Johnson v. La. Dep't of Educ., 330 F.3d 362 (5th Cir. 2003) (State did not "knowingly
waive its sovereign immunity by voluntarily continuing to receive federal funds conditioned
on waiver"), vacated by 2003 WL 21983251.
159
See, e.g., Baker, supra note 23, at 1914-15. As this Article was being revised, Professors Baker and Mitchell Berman added to their already indispensable work on conditional
spending, and published a rich and provocative critique of Dole's conditional-spending test,
as well as a careful evaluation of the prospects for revisions of that test by the Rehnquist
Court. Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting Off the Dole: Why the Court Should
Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke It to Do So, 78 IND.
LJ.459 (2003). I cannot do justice to their arguments and conclusions here. Essentially,
Professors Baker and Berman contend that the "toothless" Dole test is both "substantively
and conceptually infirm," id. at 461. On the substantive front, it "reduces aggregate social
welfare[,]" id. at 471, by facilitating federal homogenization at the expense of diversity in
matters of policy and values, id. at 471-83. Conceptually, on the other hand, the Dole test
"coheres poorly with the body of current federalism doctrine." Id. at 483. In spite of these
weaknesses, though, and notwithstanding the Rehnquist Court's apparent concern for federalism and enumerated-powers principles, Professors Baker and Berman think it unlikely
that the Justices will revisit or revise Dole anytime soon. Id. at 485-86. Still, they do discuss
several revisions that the Court might entertain, if it were interested in adding New Federalism-inspired teeth to its conditional-spending doctrine, id. at 512-24, as well as several
possible outright replacements, id. at 524-41. In particular, and in addition to Professor
Baker's 1995 proposal-"those conditional offers of federal funds which, if accepted,
would regulate the states in ways that Congress could not directly mandate," should be
presumed invalid, id. at 529-the article suggests that conditional-spending cases, like unconstitutional-conditions problems generally, be resolved in light of the following rule:
"[A] conditional[-spending] proposal [by Congress] is coercive.., if the act conditionally
threatened would be wrongful .. .if carried out." Id. at 535. See also id. at 534-41; Baker,
supra note 23; Berman, supra note 137.
160
Professor Somin has suggested recently that it is not only Congress's power to attach conditions to the money it spends that "poses a threat to constitutional federalism"
Somin, supra note 100, at 488. Rather, in this view, "the very existence of a federal power
to subsidize state governments poses a threat to constitutional federalism." Id.
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the Court's Spending Power doctrine more specifically, these observations provide the necessary background for this Article's arguments
about criminalization and conditional spending.
C.

Federalism, Federalization, and Federal Criminal Law

Nearly fifty years ago, Justice Robert Jackson insisted that "the
safeguard of our liberty lies in limiting any national policing or investigative organization, first of all to a small number of strictly federal
offenses, and secondly to nonpolitical ones. 1

61

In recent years,

though, and in a number of settings, concerns have been voiced about
the "federalization" of crime. "One of the issues of prime concern to
local prosecutors," a publication of the National District Attorneys Association recently observed, "is the trend toward increasing federalization of local crimes. 1

62

A special Task Force convened by the

American Bar Association sounded a similar note, warning of "the
long-range damage to real crime control ... caused by inappropriate
federalization. ' 163 And the Task Force's concerns went beyond practi-

cal worries about law enforcement: Its report suggests that, when it
comes to crime legislation, lawmakers appear largely unconcerned
with abstract questions of constitutional principle. 16 4 Rather, the report claims, Congress responds to high-profile catastrophes with
bursts of symbolic legislative outrage and little regard for constraints
of structural federalism. 1 65 Indeed, the Chief Justice himself in his
1999 Report to Congress warned that "[tihe pressure in Congress to
appear responsive to every highly publicized social ill or sensational
crime needs to be balanced with an inquiry into ...whether we want

most legal relationships decided at the national rather than the local
level."1

66

There is no need here to survey in detail, or even to enter into,
the academic and policy debates over the relative competencies of
161

ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT

71 (1955).
162 Federalizationof Crimes: ChiefJustice Rehnquist on Federalizationof Crimes, PROSECUTOR,
Mar.-Apr. 1999, at 9, 9.
163
TASK FORCE ON THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 13, at 56; see also
James A. Strazzella & William W. Taylor III, Federalizing Crime: Examining the Congressional
Trend to Duplicate State Laws, CRIM.JUST., Spring 1999, at 4, 4 (providing a synopsis of the
ABA's Task Force Report by its two principal authors).
164
See TASK FORCE ON THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAw, supra note 13, at 24-26;
see also, e.g., Neal Devins, Congress as Culprit: How Lawmakers Spurred on the Court's Anti-Congress Crusade,51 DUKE L.J. 435, 436 (2001) (noting Congress's "indifference to the constitutional fate of its handiwork"); Sherry, supra note 92, at 56 ("It is no wonder that the Court
does not give much deference to an institution that seems to care so little about its own
deliberative role in our constitutional regime. Perhaps if Congress started taking its own
responsibilities seriously, the Court might start taking Congress more seriously.").
165
See TASK FORCE ON THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAw, supra note 13, at 14-17.
166
REHNQUIST, supra note 12, at 135.
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state and federal prosecutors, or the relative merits of state and federal crimes. 1 67 It does seem important, though, to note that these debates, and the federalization of crime itself, continue in the midst of
the Rehnquist Court's purported "revolution" in Federalism. And this
is strange, or at least counter-intuitive. t6 1 After all, although the
Court's apparent renewed interest in policing the boundaries of federal-state relations has most often found expression in antidiscrimination, regulatory, and other civil cases, criminal statutes would seem
equally likely to push the limits inherent in a system of enumerated
169
powers and dual sovereignty.
Indeed, probably the most salient, if not the most influential, moment in the "revival" of federalism was the Court's decision in Lopez.
In that case, of course, the Justices held that the Gun Free School
Zones Act-a criminal statute-exceeded Congress's Commerce
Clause power.' 70 The rejection in Lopez of the government's "all for
the want of a horse-shoe nail" argument-that is, the argument that
"possession of a firearm in a school zone may result in violent crime
and that violent crime can be expected to affect the functioning of the
167 For more detailed discussions, see, for example, Sara Sun Beale, FederalizingHate
Crimes: Symbolic Politics,Expressive Law, or Tool for CriminalEnforcement?, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1227,
1236-47 (2000); Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few: New Principlesto Define the Proper
Limits for FederalCriminalJurisdiction,46 HASTINGS L.J. 979 (1995); Blakey, supra note 39, at
1198-1218; Craig M. Bradley, Racketeering and the Federalization of Crime, 22 Am. CpAM. L.
REv. 213 (1984) (presenting a brief history of federal racketeering legislation as a paradigm for the growth of governmental power); Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief: The
FederalizationofAmerican CriminalLaw, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1135, 1146-65 (1995);Jay S. Bybee,
InsuringDomestic Tranquility:Lopez, Federalizationof Crime, and the Forgotten Role of the Domestic Violence Clause, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1, 16-19 (1997); Adam H. Kurland, FirstPrinciples
of American Federalism and the Nature of Federal CriminalJurisdiction, 45 EMORY L.J. 1 (1996);
Thomas J. Maroney, Fifty
Years of Federalizationof CriminalLaw: Sounding the Alarm or "Crying
Wolf?.", 50 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1317 (2000); Thomas M. Mengler, The Sad Refrain of Tough on
Crime: Some Thoughts on Saving the FederalJudiciaryfrom the Federalizationof State Crime, 43 U.
KAN. L. REv. 503 (1995).
168
Some scholars have argued, though, that this is not strange at all. In Professor
Stephen Smith's view, the continued federalization of crime after Lopez is explained, at
least in part, by the fact that "yes, Lopez closed a door, but only after opening every window
in the house." E-mail from Stephen F. Smith, Associate Professor of Law, University of
Virginia Law School, to Richard Garnett (June 11, 2003, 15:33:07 EST) (on file with author). In a different vein, Professor Bill Stuntz has linked this continuing development to
the incentives of federal prosecutors. See William J. Stuntz, The PathologicalPolitics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV.505, 542-46 (2001). And, Professor Richard Fallon has pointed
to the concept of "path dependence," as well as to the substantive "conservativism" of the
Rehnquist Court, as explanations for the New Federalism's relatively anemic impact on the
federalization of crime. See Fallon, supra note 57, at 433-34.
169
See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
170
514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995). Almost immediately, President Clinton assured the
nation that he was "'dete r m in ed to keep guns out of our schools,'" and suggested that
Congress "'encourage states to ban guns from school zones by linking Federal funds to
enactment of school-zone gun bans."' Todd S. Purdum, Clinton Seeks Way to Retain Gun
Ban in School Zones, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1995, at 1.
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national economy"' 7 1 -reflected a reluctance to "pile inference upon
inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional
authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of
the sort retained by the States."'172 The Court reaffirmed that the constitutionally mandated division of authority between the States and
the federal government is neither anachronistic nor accidental, but
instead "'was adopted by the Framers to ensure protection of our fundamental liberties.'"

73

Furthermore, the Court took care to observe

that, in the arena where these "fundamental liberties" are perhaps
most obviously in play, it is the States that "'possess primary authority
for defining and enforcing the criminal law,' 1 74 and that the creeping federalization of crime can, if left unchecked, threaten the "'sensi75
tive relation between federal and state criminal jurisdiction.'"
Recall that, while Congress possesses vast authority, it is also true
that "[e]very law enacted by Congress must be based on one or more
of its powers enumerated in the Constitution.' 1

76

And, our Constitu-

tion simply does not vest in Congress a general power to create, prosecute, and punish crimes. 17 7 That is, the national government does not
U.S.

171

514

172

Id. at 567.

at 563.

Id. at 552 (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991)).
Id. at 561 n.3 (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635 (1993)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
175
Id. (quoting United States v. Emmons, 410 U.S. 396, 411-12 (1973)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000) (emphasizing the limited nature of Congress's Commerce Clause power and noting that the
regulation of most crime "has always been the province of the States"); id. at 616 n.7 ("As
we have repeatedly noted, the Framers crafted the federal system of Government so that
the people's rights would be secured by the division of power."); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564
(noting that criminal-law enforcement, like education, is an area "where States historically
have been sovereign").
176
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607.
177
This is not to say that Article I does not authorize Congress to create, prosecute,
and punish some crimes. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 6 (conferring power "[t]o
provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the
United States"); id. at cl. 10 (conferring power "[t]o define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations"). Further, the
Bill of Rights explicitly regulates federal criminal prosecutions and trials. See, e.g., U.S.
CONST. amends. IV, V, VI, VIII. Still, Thomas Jefferson certainly spoke for many of the
founding generation when he wrote:
[T]he Constitution of the United States, having delegating to Congress that
power to punish treason, counterfeiting the securities and current coin of
the United States, piracies, and felonies committed on the high seas, and
offenses against the law of nations, and no other crimes whatsoever; and it
being true as a general principle, and one of the amendments to the Constitution having also declared, that "the powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to
the States respectively, or to the people," therefore . . . all their other acts
which assume to create, define, and punish crimes, other than those so
enumerated in the Constitution, are altogether void, and of no force; and
that the power to create, define, and punish such other crimes is reserved,
173
174
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enjoy the "police power"-the "authority to provide for the public
health, safety, and morals"17 8-which is commonly regarded as one of
the hallmarks and prerogatives of political sovereignty. 17 9 Put differently, the United States lacks the traditional power of governments to
express moral condemnation, punish blameworthy conduct, deter
harmful behavior and results, and reform wayward citizens by creating
crimes and prosecuting criminals. And yet, it is this power which is
the traditional basis and justification for criminal laws.180
Instead, our national government is granted in Article I of the
Constitution powers to pursue certain specified ends-regulating interstate commerce, delivering the mail, maintaining a currency-and
those powers are generally viewed as including, incidentally, the power
to create, prosecute, and punish crimes as a means of achieving their
specified, limited ends.' 8 ' It follows that every federal criminal statute
must be justified, if at all, as the exercise of a "power" specifically enu18 2
merated in the Constitution-the power to "regulate Commerce,"
to "establish Post Offices and post Roads,"' 8 3 to "establish an uniform
and, of right appertains solely and exclusively to the respective States, each
within its own territory.
THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE KENTUCKY AND VIRGINIA RESOLUTION (1798).
178 Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569 (1991) (plurality opinion).
179
See, e.g., Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618 (noting that "the Founders denied the National
Government [the police power] and reposed [it] in the States"); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566
("The Constitution . .. ,withhold[s] from Congress a plenary police power.... ."); Heath v.

Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 93 (1985) ("Foremost among the prerogatives of sovereignty is the
power to create and enforce a criminal code."); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1,
203 (1824) ("No direct general power over these objects is granted to Congress; and, consequently, they remain subject to State legislation."); see also, e.g., United States v. E.C.
Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 11 (1895) ("It cannot be denied that the power of a State to protect
the lives, health, and property of its citizens, and to preserve good order and public
morals .. .is a power originally and always belonging to the states, not surrendered by
them to the general government...."), disagreement on other grounds recognized by Lopez, 514
U.S. at 554; THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292-93 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) ("The powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects which, in
the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and
the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State.").
That said, Congress does exercise something like traditional police powers in particular
contexts and in certain areas, including so-called "federal enclaves." See U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl.17 (conferring power "[t]o exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever [in
what is now the District of Columbia]," and "to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the
Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings"); 18
U.S.C. § 1152 (2000) (stating that criminal laws applicable in federal enclaves-"any place
within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States"-are also applicable in "Indian country").
180
As the Court noted in Morrison, there is "no better example of the police power...
than the suppression of violent crime and vindication of its victims." 529 U.S. at 618.
See, e.g., supra notes 40, 42.
181
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3.
182
183
Id. at cl.7.
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Rule of Naturalization,"' 1 4 and so forth-or as a measure both "necessary and proper for carrying into Execution" these or some other
power vested by the Constitution in the government of the United
States. 18 5 The question posed in this Article is whether, or to what
extent, the Spending Power is able to justify such statutes, and
whether the federal-program bribery statute is such a measure.
To briefly return to Lopez, the Court's resounding rejection of
congressional omnipotence in the area of crime control does not appear to have slowed, let alone reversed, the federalization of criminal
law. 186 With few exceptions, courts have consistently rebuffed postLopez federalism-based challenges to criminal prosecutions, convictions, and statutes.18 7 Nor has Lopez had any appreciable effect on
Congress. It is not only those legislators with ideological or other objections to the decision who remain unmoved by its claims; neither
party, and no camp, gives any evidence of embracing the Court's enumerated-powers revival.18 8 Moreover, even if, at some point, Lopez's
"first principles" were to intrude upon the calculations of Congress, it
would still be true-as the Justices noted in Alden-that legislators
may accomplish through conditional spending grants what they cannot do directly, including, perhaps, the federalization of traditional
state offenses. If this is true, though, it has important implications for
federalism and individual liberty. As Justice Kennedy has noted, "the
Spending Clause power ...has the potential to obliterate distinctions
between national and local spheres of interest and power by permitting the Federal Government to set policy in the most sensitive areas
of traditional state concern, areas which otherwise would lie outside
its reach."'18 9 In the Parts that follow, I ask whether this potential has
been realized with Section 666.

184
185

Id. at cl. 4.
Id. at cl. 18.

186 The case was received with great excitement, and some alarm, in the academic
community. See, e.g., Symposium, Reflections on United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 533
(1995); id. at 541 (exploring "the ambiguity of what the majority have wrought" in Lopez).
187
See generally, e.g., Reynolds & Denning, supra note 16 (examining the analysis of
Lopez in the lower courts); Andrew Weis, Note, Commerce Clause in the Cross-Hairs: The Use of
Lopez-Based Motions to Challenge the Constitutionality of Federal Criminal Statutes, 48 STAN. L.
REV. 1431, 1444-62 (1996) (discussing the lower courts' post-Lopez categorization of federal statutes and the interpretive problems associated with applying Lopez).
188
Cf TASK FORCE ON THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 13, at 14
("Writer after writer has noticed the absence of any underlying principle governing Congressional choice to criminalize conduct under federal law that is already criminalized by
state law.").
189 Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 654-55 (1999) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
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II
THE NEW FEDERALISM AND FEDERAL-PROGRAM BRIBERY

So far, this Article has provided context for the question whether
190
and how the Spending Power may serve as the "jurisdictional hook"'

for the creation, prosecution, and punishment of federal crimes. We
have seen that, despite warnings of "revolutions,"' 9' the Rehnquist
Court's renewed interest in enumerated-powers and structural-federalism questions has left untouched the decisions and doctrine dealing
with regulatory conditions on federal spending. 92 Congress may still
reach far beyond the goals explicitly delineated in Article I by attaching conditions to the money it spends. 93 Still, the important question
remains whether the criminal jurisdiction of the United States is necessarily coextensive with the dramatically expanded zone of federal
influence created by the validation, in South Dakota v. Dole, of stringsattached spending and regulation-by-contract.
Again, few doubt that Article I of the Constitution authorizes,
even if not explicitly, the creation and application of any number of
criminal statutes. 194 This being the case, Congress has rarely needed,
or bothered, to look beyond the several tried-and-true bases for federal criminal jurisdiction, e.g., the Commerce Clause or the power
over the mails, for the power to spend in pursuit of the general welfare (and the accompanying regulatory influence). However, there is

little reason to expect this reticence to continue for long.

95

19o See Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 722-23 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("The law does not establish a general federal remedy against fraudulent conduct, with use
of the mails as the jurisdictional hook.. . ."); see also Richard W. Garnett, Once More Into the
Maze: United States v. Lopez, Tribal Self-Determination, and Federal Conspiracy Jurisdictionin
Indian Country, 72 N.D. L. REv. 433, 449 (1996) ("Congress's ability to extend its criminal
jurisdiction is limited both by its enumerated powers and by the States' reserved powers.
Congress can expand its jurisdiction when it wishes, but it needs a 'hook' upon which to
hang its ambitions.").
191
See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
192
See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 6, at 1058.
At least up to now, the Court's federalism decisions have more struck an
ideological blow for limited federal government than truly put a significant
damper on federal regulatory power. As scholars on both the right and left
have demonstrated, a Court truly committed to reinvigorating state autonomy must engage in far more active monitoring of conditional federal
spending, the series of doctrines through which the federal government
can get states to do things by threatening to withhold federal funds.
Id. (footnote omitted).
193
See supra note 24 and accompanying text; see also McGinnis, supra note 53, at 522
("Under current doctrine, Congress clearly has the authority to accomplish almost any
objective it wants under its conditional spending authority.").
194
See supra text accompanying note 181. This is one reason why, as a colleague of
mine has observed, legislative restraint and prosecutorial discretion, no less than renewed
appreciation for enumerated-powers principles, will be required to slow or undo the federalization of criminal law. See Blakey, supra note 39, at 1216.
195
See, for example, Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Printz v. United States:
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To help determine whether or to what extent the Spending
Power can be used as the "hook" for criminal jurisdiction, this Part
examines the text and history of one particular statute and some of
the interpretive disputes it involves. It canvasses the courts' responses
to federalism-inspired attacks on- the statute and its application, and
reviews those (surprisingly) few cases in which litigants have explicitly
framed their challenges in conditional-spending terms. This Part is,
96
therefore, a kind of "case study."'
A.

The Text, History, and Initial Construction of Section 666

As noted above, 18 U.S.C: § 666 federalizes certain bribes and
thefts involving the agents of "organization [s] "-public and privatethat receive "benefits in excess of $10,000 under a Federal program. ''1 9

7

To be clear: The statute says nothing about federal prop-

[The Court's] holding .. . does not spell the end of the objectives of the
Brady Act .... [because] Congress is . . .free to amend the interim program to provide for its continuance on a contractual basis with the States if
it wishes, as it does with a number of other federal programs.
521 U.S. 898, 936 (1997) (O'Connor, J.,concurring).
196
The case study is an odd one, admittedly, given that it involves what is for practical
purposes the only available case. See United States v. Morgan, 230 F.3d 1067, 1075 (8th Cir.
2000) (Bye, J., concurring) ("Section 666 is, I believe, the only federal crime whose supposed constitutional basis is the Spending Clause. That may speak volumes."). But see
Engdahl, supra note 1, at 91-92 & n. 381 (suggesting 18 U.S.C. § 1014-which establishes
the federal crime of making false statements to institutions whose accounts are insured by
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation-as another example); Terrence M. Messonnier, Neo-Federalism, PopularSovereignty, and the CriminalLaw, 29 AKRON L. REV. 549, 577-78
(1996) (suggesting that the spending power supports federal criminal statutes aimed at
fraud perpetrated against the United States); 18 U.S.C. § 1020 (2000) (prohibiting false
statements and claims relating to federally approved highway projects). One other statute
is worth mentioning here. The federal bank-robbery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (2000),
targets robberies of, inter alia, "any institution the deposits of which are insured by the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation." Id. § 2113(f). Although federal insurance of a
bank is perhaps analogous to federal spending directed at a bank, no cases treat Section
2113(f) as a Spending Power statute. Rather, this provision has repeatedly been upheld as
a valid use of the Commerce Clause. See, e.g., United States v. Watts, 256 F.3d 630, 632-34
(7th Cir. 2001).
197
18 U.S.C. § 666(b). More generally, Section 666 provides, in relevant part:
(a) Whoever, if the circumstance described in subsection (b) of this section
exists(1) being an agent of an organization, or of a State, local, or Indian tribal
government, or any agency thereof(A) embezzles, steals, obtains by fraud, or otherwise without authority
knowingly converts to the use of any person other than the rightful owner
or intentionally misapplies, property that(i) is valued at $5,000 or more, and
(ii) is owned by, or is under the care, custody, or control of such organization, government, or agency; or
(B) corruptly solicits or demands for the benefit of any person, or accepts
or agrees to accept, anything of value from any person, intending to be
influenced or rewarded in connection with any business, transaction, or
series of transactions of such organization, government, or agency involving
any thing of value of $5,000 or more; or
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erty, employees, or enclaves; it is silent about the wires and the mails;
and it does not require the United States to prove any effects on, or
connections to, interstate commerce. All that distinguishes Section
666 from a naked exercise of the general police power-a power that,
again, Congress lacks' 98 -is its purported jurisdictional element; that
is, its requirement that the bribe involve the agent of an organization
that receives the specified amount of federal-program funds. 199 In
other words, the Spending Power is offered as the necessary jurisdictional basis for Section 666.200 The jurisdictional theory of the statute
(2) corruptly gives, offers, or agrees to give anything of value to any person,
with intent to influence or reward an agent of an organization or of a State,
local or Indian tribal government, or any agency thereof, in connection
with any business, transaction, or series of transactions of such organization, government, or agency involving anything of value of $5,000 or more;
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.
(b) The circumstance referred to in subsection (a) of this section is that the
organization, government, or agency receives, in any one year period, benefits in excess of $10,000 under a Federal program involving a grant, contract, subsidy, loan, guarantee, insurance, or other form of Federal
assistance.

(c) This section does not apply to bona fide salary, wages, fees, or other
compensation paid, or expenses paid or reimbursed, in the usual course of
business.
(d) As used in this section(1) the term "agent" means a person authorized to act on behalf of another
person or a government and, in the case of an organization or government,
includes a servant or employee, and a partner, director, officer, manager,
and representative;
(2) the term "government agency" means a subdivision of the executive,
legislative, judicial, or other branch of government, including a department, independent establishment, commission, administration, authority,
board, and bureau, and a corporation or other legal entity established, and
subject to control, by a government or governments for the execution of a
governmental or intergovernmental program;
(3) the term "local" means of or pertaining to a political subdivision within
a State;
(4) the term "State" includes a State of the United States, the District of
Columbia, and any commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United
States; and
(5) the term "in any one-year period" means a continuous period that commences no earlier than twelve months before the commission of the offense or that ends no later than twelve months after the commission of the
offense. Such period may include time both before and after the commission of the offense.
18 U.S.C. § 666.
198
See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
199
See 18 U.S.C. § 666(b).
200 See Fischer v. United States, 529 U.S. 667, 689 n.3 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
("Section 666 was adopted pursuant to Congress' [s] spending power." (citation omitted));
see also United States v. Lipscomb, 299 F.3d 303, 318 (5th Cir. 2002) (discussing "whether
[Section] 666 is necessary and proper to the spending power"); United States v. Dub6nOtero, 292 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2002) (discussing Section 666 and the Spending Clause);
United States v. Suarez, 263 F.3d 468, 489 (6th Cir. 2001) (same); United States v. Phillips,
219 F.3d 404, 414 (5th Cir. 2000) ("Congress' authority to enact [Section] 666 rests on the
Spending Clause of the Constitution."); Morgan, 230 F.3d at 1073 (Bye, J., concurring)
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is that a corrupt transaction is "federalizable" if it involves a person
who is, or transacts with, the agent of an organization that in some way
receives federal-program funds. If the Spending Power is not up to
20 1
this task, then Section 666 is unconstitutional on its face.
At first blush, Section 666 might appear more redundant than
"stealth[y]." After all, bribery is and has long been a federal
crime 2 02-Section 201 of Title 18 prohibits bribing any "officer or employee or person acting for or on behalf of the United States, or any
department, agency, or branch of Government thereof. ... "203 By the
early 1980s, though, the federal courts had divided over Section 201's
application to state and local government officials-not of "the
United States"-who administer programs that receive and disburse
federal-program funds. 20 4 One court insisted, in light of its "healthy
("Every court that has addressed the issue has concluded that Congress adopted [Section]
666 pursuant to its Spending Clause power."); United States v. Wright, 206 F. Supp. 2d 609,
622 n.8 (D. Del. 2002) (discussing Section 666 and the spending power); United States v.
McCormack, 31 F. Supp. 2d 176, 186 n.18 (D. Mass. 1998) ("Courts have held that
[S]ection 666 was passed pursuant to Congress' [s]tax and spending power as set forth in
Article I, Section 8."); United States v. Roberts, 28 F. Supp. 2d 741, 743 (E.D.N.Y. 1998)
("Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 666 pursuant to its spending power."); United States v.
Ferrara, 990 F. Supp. 146, 152 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) ("Section 666 was apparently passed pursuant to Congress's tax and spending power as set forth in Article I, Section 8."); United
States v. Cantor, 897 F. Supp. 110, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("The parties agree that Congress
enacted 18 U.S.C. § 666 pursuant to its spending power."). Of course, this does not mean
that the Spending Power is the only possible means of reaching and criminalizing much of
the corrupt conduct that is presently targeted by Section 666. Certainly, under current
doctrine, there are any number of constitutionally permissible anti-corruption statutes.
201
See Morgan, 230 F.3d at 1073 (Bye, J., concurring) (noting that "Congress may not
pass laws unless it acts pursuant to an express grant of power or authority in Article I of the
Constitution," and concluding that "Section 666 cannot properly be linked to any grant of
Congressional power in the Constitution," so therefore "Congress exceeded its proper authority in enacting [section] 666; the law is unconstitutional, void ab initio"). In United
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987), the Justices observed that "[a] facial challenge to
a legislative Act is .. .the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be
valid." The claim here is certainly not that no corrupt transaction covered by Section 666
could ever be prosecuted under a constitutionally valid criminal statute. It is, instead, that
Section 666, in all cases, permits conviction in the absence of proof of a constitutionally
sufficient jurisdictional element. In other words, the problem is not that the conduct
targeted by Section 666 is categorically beyond the reach of federal prosecutors, but that
the statute itself fails, as a constitutional matter, to create federal criminal jurisdiction.
202
For a wonderful study, executed in truly awesome detail, of the history of the practice and crime of bribery, see JOHN T. NOONAN, Jr., BRIBES (1984). See also G. Robert
Blakey, Book Review, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1255 (1985) (reviewing NOONAN, supra).

203 18 U.S.C. § 201 (a) (1) (2000) (defining, for federal-bribery purposes, "public
official").
204 For a more detailed discussion of this disagreement, see Rosenstein, supra note 35,
at 679-83. For further historical background on the federal role in prosecuting corruption
at the state and local levels, see, for example, Andrew T. Baxter, Federal Discretion in the
Prosecution of Local Political Corruption, 10 PEPP. L. REv. 321 (1983); George D. Brown, New
Federalism's Unanswered Question: Who Should ProsecuteState and Local Officials for PoliticalCorruption?,60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 417 (forthcoming 2003) (on file with author) [hereinafter
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regard for the federal system of divided powers" and the plain text of
the bribery statute, that even municipal employees responsible for administering federal programs and spending federal funds were not
"public officials" "acting for or on behalf of the United States" within
the meaning of Section 201.205 Another court concluded, though,
that state or local officials whose salaries, and the programs they administered, were "funded by the federal Government for federal
objectives," were, in effect, "substitute Es] for . . . federal em20 7
ployee [s] ,"206 and therefore within the statute's reach.
It is clear that this interpretive split involving Section 201 was the
occasion for, and its resolution was the purpose of, Section 666.208
Section 666 was designed "to augment the ability of the United States
to vindicate significant acts of theft, fraud, and bribery involving Federal monies," even though no federal officials are involved, and
thereby "to protect the integrity of the vast sums of money distributed
through Federal programs .... -209
As it happened, Section 666 became law even as the Supreme
Court was considering a case presenting the very dispute that had
prompted the statute in the first place. In law, as in life, timing is
everything: The Court concluded, in Dixson v. United States,2 10 that
even non-federal employees, if they "occup[y] a position of public
trust with official federal responsibilities," are "public officials" within
Brown, New Federalism]; Brown, supra note 36, at 253-66; Charles F. C. Ruff, Federal Prosecution of Local Corruption:A Case Study in the Making of Law Enforcement Policy, 65 GEO. L.J. 1171
(1977).
205
United States v. Del Toro, 513 F.2d 656, 662 (2d Cir. 1975), superseded by statute as
stated in Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 58 (1997); see also United States v. Loschiavo,
531 F.2d 659, 665-66 (2d Cir. 1976) (following Del Toro). For additional treatment of these
cases, see, for example, United States v. Hoskins, 520 F. Supp. 410 (N.D. Ill. 1981); United
States v. Gallegos, 510 F. Supp. 1112 (D.N.M. 1981).
206
United States v. Mosley, 659 F.2d 812, 815 (7th Cir. 1981).
207 See United States v. Hinton, 683 F.2d 195, 197-200 (7th Cir. 1982) (following Mosley), affd sub nom. Dixson v. United States, 465 U.S. 482 (1984), superseded by statute as stated
in Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 58 (1997); United States v. Hollingshead, 672 F.2d
751, 754 (9th Cir. 1982) (following Mosley). For an early discussion of the disagreement,
see RandyJ. Curato et al., Government Fraud, Waste, and Abuse: A Practical Guide to Fighting
Official Corruption, 58 NOTRE DAME L. Rrv. 1027 (1983).
208
See Salinas, 522 U.S. at 58 ("Congress enacted [Section] 666 and made it clear that
federal law applies to bribes of the kind offered to the state and local officials in Del Toro, as
well as those at issue in Mosley and Hinton."); S. REp. No. 98-225, at 369-70 (1984), reprinted
in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3510-11 (discussing the split of authority and noting that the
purpose of Section 666 is "to reach thefts and bribery in situations of the types involved in
the Del Toro, Hinton, and Mosley cases"); Brown, supra note 36, at 276-81.
209
See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 369-70; see also, e.g., Salinas, 522 U.S. at 57-58 (noting
legislative history and statute's stated purpose); United States v. Zwick, 199 F.3d 672, 684
(3d Cir. 1999) (same); United States v. Grubb, 11 F.3d 426, 433-34 (4th Cir. 1993) (same);
United States v. Coyne, 4 F.3d 100, 109-10 (2d Cir. 1993) (same).
210 465 U.S. 482 (1984), revg United States v. Hinton, 683 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1982),
superseded by statute as stated in Salinas, 522 U.S. at 58.
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the reach of Section 201.211 This was not to say, the Court cautioned
that "the mere presence of some federal assistance brings a local organization and its employees within the jurisdiction of the federal
bribery statute"; rather, the Justices insisted, "an individual must possess some degree of official responsibility for carrying out a federal
program or policy." 2 12 Interestingly, this reading of Section 201
seems consonant with, if it does not echo, Congress's stated hope for
Section 666, namely, to "augment the ability of the United States to
vindicate significant acts of theft, fraud, and bribery involving Federal
monies." 2 13 Both Congress and the Dixson Court appear to have disclaimed any extravagant ambitions, and instead to have envisioned a
limited federal power to prosecute specific corrupt acts that threaten
the integrity of federal programs and the funds disbursed through
2 14
them.
Nonetheless, it is now clear that the new statute's text invited
more creative, expansive, and perhaps aggressive efforts to expose and
root out corruption generally. 2 15 At first, Section 666 was-like many
criminal statutes, perhaps-little more than window dressing, and
rarely used. 216 But even in the early cases, prosecutors tested, defendants attempted to rein in, and courts struggled to identify, the stat217
ute's reach and bounds.
In United States v. Westmoreland, for example, a county supervisor

was convicted under Section 666 for receiving kickbacks in connec211 Dixson, 465 U.S. at 496; see also id. ("Congress' long-standing commitment to a
broadly drafted federal bribery statute .... and the House Report's endorsement of the
Second Circuit's reasoning in Levine, combine to persuade us that Congress never intended section 201 (a)'s open-ended definition of 'public official' to be given the cramped
reading proposed by petitioners.").
212
Id. at 499.
213
S. REP. No. 98-225, at 369 (emphasis added).
214
See Brown, supra note 36, at 280 (noting that Section 666's legislative history "support[s] the interpretation that Congress intended to deal with a relatively narrow problem,
[namely,] specified forms of malfeasance in connection with the administration of federal
assistance"); see also S. REI. No. 98-225, at 370 ("[N]ot every Federal contract or disbursement of funds [is] covered.").
215
As one commentator observed, "in eliminating the problems caused by the narrow
boundaries of the earlier statutes, Congress enacted a general federal criminal statute of
potentially limitless scope and effect." Rosenstein, supra note 35, at 674. See id. at 700
("Although section 666 symbolizes Congress' [s] intent to close the gaps left open by sections 641 and 201, the statute's broad language is amenable to interpretations that create a
potentially limitless scope." (footnote omitted)); see also Salinas, 522 U.S. at 56 (noting the
statute's "expansive, unqualified language"); cf.Salvatoriello, supra note 44, at 2396 ("Section 666 was developed with a broad purpose ... ").
216
By 1990, there were still only nine published opinions dealing with the law. See
Rosenstein, supra note 35, at 690 n.152. Since then, though, prosecutors' use of Section
666 has increased steadily and dramatically. ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 39, at 252 ("[The
statute's] development has been explosive.").
217
See generally Rosenstein, supra note 35, at 690-96 (canvassing cases); Salvatoriello,
supra note 44, at 2397-99 (same).
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tion with the County's contract awards.2 18 All agreed that the County
had received the required $10,000 in federal-program funds, but the
defendant insisted that Section 666 requires the government to prove
that the transactions to which the kickbacks were related themselves
involved federal funds. 21 9 In other words, she argued that the prosecutor must "trace" the precise connection between federal-program
dollars, on the one hand, and her own corrupt conduct, on the other.
To be sure, this argument might reasonably be thought to enjoy support, if not obvious endorsement, from the relevant legislative history, 220 and more indirectly from the Court's cautionary statements in
Dixson.22 ' But the Fifth Circuit rejected it, emphasizing instead the
"broad net" cast by the statute's text and terms. 222 And that court
evidently heard a different message in the legislative history as well; it
concluded that fidelity to the legislators' stated purpose of
"preserv[ing] the integrity of federal funds by assuring the integrity of
the organizations or agencies that receive them" required it to reject
22 3
the proposed "tracing" construction.
Another interpretive lesson concerned the meaning of the term
"benefits." Section 666 requires the prosecutor to establish that the
defendant's corrupt conduct involve the agent of an organization that
receives at least $10,000 in federal-program "benefits."2 24 But are all
disbursements from the federal treasury "benefits"? Once disbursed,
218

841 F.2d 572, 572 (5th Cir. 1988).
Id. at 575-76.
220
See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 369 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3510 (aim
of statute is to "augment the ability of the United States to vindicate significant acts of
theft, fraud, and bribery involving Federal monies") (emphasis added).
221
See Dixson v. United States, 465 U.S. 482, 500-01 (1984) ("The federal government
has a strong and legitimate interest in prosecuting petitioners for their misuse of government funds.")
222
Westmoreland, 841 F.2d at 577.
223
Id. at 578. Nearly a decade later, the United States Supreme Court endorsed this
conclusion. See Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 61 (1997) ("[A]s a matter of statutory
construction, § 666(a) (1) (B) does not require the Government to prove the bribe in question had any particular influence on federal funds ..
"). For other non-Supreme Court
decisions rejecting the tracing argument, see, e.g., United States v. Zwick, 199 F.3d 672, 679
(3d Cir. 1999) ("By its terms, § 666... imposes no title or tracing requirements and covers
non-federal employees."); United States v. Paradies, 98 F.3d 1266, 1288-89 (11th Cir.
1996) (declining the "invitation to include the suggested 'connection to federal funds'
element"); United States v. Foley, 73 F.3d 484, 490 (2d Cir. 1996) ("[I]n order to establish
the more-than-$10,000 jurisdictional amount set out in § 666(b), the government need not
trace the federal funds received by an organization to the project in connection with which
its employee received a bribe."), overruled in part by Salinas, 522 U.S. 52; United States v.
Coyne, 4 F.3d 100, 108-10 (2d Cir. 1993) (rejecting any tracing requirement); United
States v. Simas, 937 F.2d 459, 463 (9th Cir. 1991) (same); United States v. Genova, 167 F.
Supp. 2d 1021, 1042-43 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (same).
224
More specifically, the "benefits" must be received "under a Federal program involving a grant, contract, subsidy, loan, guarantee, insurance, or other form of Federal assistance." 18 U.S.C. § 666(b) (2000).
219
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and then spent, and perhaps spent again, do federal-program funds
retain forever their character as "benefits"? 2 25 United States v. Rooney

involved the general partner of a construction company that had received Farmers Home Administration (FHA) loan funds to construct a
rural senior-citizens' housing project.2

26

The defendant had agreed

with his contractor to apply for an additional $300,000 in FHA funds if
the contractor built, for nothing, a pond on the property next door to
the project site. 2 2 7 In the government's view, Section 666's federalprogram-benefits requirement was satisfied by the construction company's receipt of the FHA monies. Rooney insisted, though, that
these funds were "loans" and not "benefits."2 28 The district court
agreed, reasoning that the statute does not apply "when the government receives something in return for its money-a situation of quid
pro quo,"2 2 9 but the Second Circuit rejected Rooney's position. The
loans were received, that court reasoned, through a "program" and
were best thought of as "benefits"-or as "Federal assistance"-even if
their recipient eventually had to pay the government back. 2 30 The
court conceded that the text and purpose of the statute excluded
pure government-contractor cases, in which "'a government agency
lawfully purchases more than $10,000 in equipment from a supplier," 23 1 but noted that they just as clearly denied Rooney the bene225 The Supreme Court would confront these questions nearly a decade after Rooney,
in Fischer v. United States, 529 U.S. 667, 676-77 (2000) (holding that Medicare payments
received by a municipal hospital authority were "benefits" within the meaning of Section
666). See infta text accompanying notes 269-85.
226 986 F.2d 31, 32 (2d Cir. 1993).
227

Id. at 32-33.

228

Id.

229

Id.

230

at 33.

Id. at 33-35.
Id. at 34 (quoting S. REP. No. 98-225, at 370 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3182, 3511); see also 18 U.S.C. § 666(c) ("This section does not apply to bona fide salary,
wages, fees, or other compensation paid, or expenses paid or reimbursed, in the usual
course of business."). In United States v. Copeland, 143 F.3d 1439 (lth Cir. 1998), for example, the court concluded that "organizations engaged in purely commercial transactionswith
the federal government," such as a prime contractor for the United States Department of
Defense, "are not subject to § 666." Id. at 1441 (emphasis added). While conceding that
punishing the corrupt activities of such entities "might further the statute's goal of protecting the integrity of federal funds," the court insisted that, given the text and history of the
statute, "it is not the role of this Court to expand the scope of § 666 to encompass such
behavior." Id. at 1442. See also, e.g., United States v. Dub6n-Otero, 292 F.3d 1, 8 n.8 (1st
Cir. 2002). The First Circuit noted:
A number of cases... support the proposition that, while purely commercial payments made by the government "as a commercial entity, such as
payments for supplies or equipment," do not constitute benefits under
§ 666, the mere presence of quid pro quo does not preclude a finding of
federal benefits. Those cases distinguish purely commercial transactions
from "monies distributed through Federal programs, for which there is a
specific statutory scheme authorizing the Federal assistance in order to promote or achieve certain policy objectives."
231
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fit of that exclusion. "[I] n light of the statute's purpose, we think that
Congress only intended to exclude money spent by the government as
232
a commercial entity, such as payments for supplies or equipment."
It is noteworthy-and surprising, in light of contemporary New
Federalism controversies-that the parties in these and other early efforts to interpret and narrow the reach of Section 666 did not invoke
federalism and enumerated-powers principles and precedents. Indeed, for the most part, the Constitution appears to have played no
explicit role in framing and deciding these cases. 23 3 Even Dole's conditional-spending requirements went entirely unnoticed, in both the
cases and commentary. Instead, the defendants in these cases tended
to invoke the statute's text, in light of its stated purpose and history, as
reason enough to restrain its use. This was not true, though, after

Lopez.
B.

The Federalism Revival and New Challenges to Section 666

Lopez emboldened the federal criminal-defense bar. 23 4 Armed
with "first principles," and inspired by a perhaps newfound appreciation for Article I, lawyers representing defendants in criminal cases
began to seize on the Court's apparent renewed interest in policing
the bounds of Congress's enumerated powers and of the many criminal statutes predicated on them. 23 5 More specifically, defendants
turned to the themes sounded in Lopez and other structural-federalism
decisions to bolster their claims about how Section 666 should be read
and applied. In at least one case, for instance, a defendant unsuccessfully invoked Lopez to support his argument that his prosecution exceeded the scope of the power conferred on the national government
Id. (quoting Rooney, 986 F.2d at 33-35) (citations and internal quotations omitted)).
232
Rooney, 986 F.2d at 34.
233 In a few early cases, defendants' half-hearted vagueness and overbreadth comUnited States v. Little, 687 F. Supp. 1042, 1051 (N.D.
plaints fell on deaf ears. See, e.g.,
Miss. 1988) ("In novel fashion, defendants assert that Section 666 is somehow unconstitutionally vague, ambiguous, and overbroad. This assertion is unsupported by any controlling or persuasive authority.... ."); see also United States v. Urlacher, 979 F.2d 935, 939 (2d
Cir. 1992) (rejecting vagueness challenge); United States v. Peery, 977 F.2d 1230, 1233 n.2
(8th Cir. 1992) (same); United States v. Shelton, 816 F. Supp. 1132, 1137 (W.D. Tex. 1993)
(same); cf United States v.Jackowe, 651 F. Supp. 1035, 1036 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (interpreting
statute to avoid possible due-process and equal-protection problems). More recently, the
Eleventh Circuit also concluded that Section 666 is not constitutionally vague. United
States v. Edgar, 304 F.3d 1320, 1327-28 (11th Cir. 2002).
234
See Weis, supra note 187, at 1462 ("Since April, 1995, federal defenders have aggressively attacked commerce-based criminal laws, deluging the lower courts with Lopez-inspired motions.").
235
As others have observed, however, litigants' post-Lopez enthusiasm has yielded little
in the way of results. See, e.g., Reynolds & Denning, supra note 16; Victoria Davis, Note, A
Landmark Lost: The Anemic Impact of United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995), on the
Federalizationof Criminal Law, 75 NEB. L. REv. 117 (1996).
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by the Commerce Clause. 236 In others, parties pressed more ambitious and sweeping claims, insisting that the statute or its use was an
unwarranted federal incursion into local affairs, in violation of the
2 37
Tenth Amendment.
Fairly quickly, a consistent line of constitutional argument developed. Defendants would contend that the Constitution, if not the
plain language of the statute itself, required the government to prove
some kind of connection or "nexus" between the conduct at issue, on
the one hand, and federal funds, programs, or "interests," on the
other. By and large, this purported requirement was grounded in
these defendants' claims about the Spending Power, its reach, and its
limits. For example, in United States v. Ferrara,a defendant argued that
a Section 666 prosecution was too far removed from the federal interest in the integrity of federal spending programs to be justified under
the Court's conditional-spending doctrine. 238 Sometimes, the argument took the form not of a direct constitutional attack, but of a delicate hint, or a gentle reminder, employing one or another of the
various interpretive canons that recommend avoiding constitutionally
troubling readings of statutes 239 and counsel against interpretations
that might upset the delicate federal-state "balance" in an area traditionally recognized as the province of the States. 240 Although such
236

See United States v. Roberts, 28 F. Supp. 2d 741, 743 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) ("Roberts

urges this Court to find that the present application of § 666 is... [an] unconstitutional
extension of Congressional power. Specifically, he argues that the Commerce Clause's
constitutional limitations, as delineated by .. .Lopez, should apply to the facts of this case.
This Court does not agree." (citation omitted)).
237 The Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that "[t]he powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CoNsT. amend. X. See, e.g.,
United States v. Russo, No. 96-1394, 1997 WL 168276, at **2 (2d Cir. Apr. 8, 1997) ("Section 666 does not violate the Tenth Amendment. While [appellant] argues that the
criminalization of bribery is traditionally a state function, the Tenth Amendment 'does not
prohibit the federal government from enforcing its laws, even where there are state laws
addressing the same criminal act.'" (quoting United States v. Bailey, 990 F.2d 119, 126 (4th
Cir. 1993))); United States v. Ferrara, 990 F. Supp. 146, 152 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) ("[E]ach
jurisdiction-state and federal-may prosecute offenders consistent with their respective
interests. This circumstance is not violative of the Tenth Amendment."); Roberts, 28 F.
Supp. 2d at 744; United States v. Cantor, 897 F. Supp. 110, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); United
States v. Bigler, 907 F. Supp. 401, 402 (S.D. Fla. 1995); see also United States v. Lipscomb,
299 F.3d 303, 318 (5th Cir. 2002) ("The Tenth Amendment .. . is not [that] great an
obstacle to the necessity and propriety of § 666 ....").
238 990 F. Supp. at 151; see also Cantor,897 F. Supp. at 113 ("Nor is the conduct prohibited by § 666 so remote from the federal interest in protecting federal funds from the
effects of local bribery schemes as to exceed the scope of Congressional spending
power ... ").
239 For a detailed analysis of the "avoidance canon," or the rule of "constitutional
doubt" see Kelley, supra note 63.
240 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 620 (2000) ("[T]he language and
purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment place certain limitations on the manner in which
Congress may attack discriminatory conduct. These limitations are necessary to prevent
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arguments met with limited success, courts did periodically sound cautionary, federalism-inspired notes regarding the use of Section 666 in
cases concerning purely local matters and involving only tenuous con24 1
nections to federal funds.

In the mid-1990s, though-and notwithstanding the earlier rejection, in Westmoreland and elsewhere, of the "tracing" argument-a
split began to develop over the question whether some connection was
required, by the statute, the Constitution, or both, between federalprogram funds and a defendant's conduct. In United States v. Foley, the
Second Circuit conceded that the actions of an influence-peddling
state legislator "affected neither the financial interests of the protected organization [the State of Connecticut] nor federal funds directly." 2 42 Without addressing any constitutional requirements, the
court read the legislative history to suggest that the statute has a "specific federal interest, namely, safeguarding the integrity of federal
funds that are intended to serve legislatively defined policy objectives ... "243 It was not, the court insisted, "designed for the prosecution of corruption that was not shown in some way to touch upon
244
federal funds."

245
The Fifth Circuit rejected this view in United States v. Marnoljo.
It emphasized that Section 666 "does not require the government to
prove that federal funds were directly involved in a bribery transac-

tion, or that the federal monies funded the corrupt transaction.

'246

Like the Second Circuit, though, the court did not take up the relevant constitutional questions. 247 When the United States Supreme
Court took the opportunity presented in Marmolejo to consider
the Fourteenth Amendment from obliterating the Framers' carefully crafted balance of
power between the States and the National Government."); United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549, 561 n.3 (1995) ("When Congress criminalizes conduct already denounced as
criminal by the States, it effects a 'change in the sensitive relation between federal and state
criminal jurisdiction.'") (quoting United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 411-12 (1973)
(internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971)
("[U]nless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to have significantly
changed the federal-state balance.... [W] e will not be quick to assume that Congress has
meant to effect a significant change in the sensitive relation between federal and state
criminal jurisdiction.").
241
See, e.g., United States v. Frega, 933 F. Supp. 1536, 1542 (S.D. Cal. 1996); see also
United States v. Marmolejo, 89 F.3d 1185, 1201 (5th Cir. 1996) (JollyJ, concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (warning of Section 666's "virtually unlimited expansion"), affd sub
nom. Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52 (1997); Brown, supra note 36, at 283-84.
242
73 F.3d 484, 493 (2d Cir. 1996), overruled in partby Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S.
52 (1997).
243
Id. at 490.
244
Id. at 493.
245
89 F.3d 1185 (5th Cir. 1996), affd sub nom. Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52
(1997).
246
Id. at 1191.
247
For more on this disagreement, see, for example, Brown, supra note 36, at 286-89.
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whether "the federal bribery statute codified at 18 U.S.C. Section 666
[is] limited to cases in which the bribe has a demonstrated effect
upon federal funds [,]248 some thought that the Court might use the
case as a vehicle for continuing the work begun in Lopez of beating
back the expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction, this time by limiting Congress's ability to create crimes through conditional
249
spending.
Mario Salinas (Marmolejo's co-defendant) was a deputy county
sheriff in Hidalgo County, Texas. He had accepted two designer
watches and a pickup truck in exchange for his help in arranging
"contact visits" with a federal prisoner who was being housed in the
county jail and, as a result, was charged under Section 666.250 Although the County had received well over $10,000 in federal-program
funds during the relevant years, 25 1 Salinas contended, among other
things, that "the Government must prove the bribe"-i.e., the receipt
of the watches in exchange for the contact visits-"in some way affected federal funds, for instance by diverting or misappropriating
252
them, before the bribe violates Section 666(a) (1) (B).
The Justices unanimously rejected this argument, on four separate grounds. First, the Court found no support for Salinas's proposed construction in the statute's "expansive, unqualified
language." 253 Second, the Court disagreed with Salinas's reading of
the legislative history, noting that Section 666 was enacted to "make it
clear" that federal bribery law applies to certain bribes offered to state
and local officials. 254 In other words, the Court stated, the law "was
designed to extend federal bribery prohibitions to bribes offered to
state and local officials employed by agencies receiving federal funds,"
and it would therefore be "incongruous to restrict [Section] 666 in
the manner Salinas suggests." 2 55 Third, the Justices declined Salinas'

Salinas, 522 U.S. at 54.
See Brown, supra note 36, at 250-51 ("The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in
Salinas v. United States . . . . A decision could be the source of considerable guidance,
although it may not be necessary to consider the outer limits of § 666, given the substantial
federal interest present in the case." (footnotes omitted)).
250
Salinas, 522 U.S. at 54-55.
251
Id. at 54.
252
Id. at 55-56; see also Petitioner's Brief at 4, Salinas (No. 96-738) ("No Federal funds
248
249

were impinged upon[.]"); id. at 16 ("[N]o protected Federal funds could have been unduly influenced.").
Salinas, 522 U.S. at 56-57 ("The enactment's expansive, unqualified language, both
253
as to the bribes forbidden and the entities covered, does not support the interpretation
that federal funds must be affected .... The word 'any,' which prefaces the business or
transaction clause, undercuts the attempt to impose this narrowing construction.").
254
Id. at 58.
255
Id.
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invitation to follow Gregory v. Ashcroft256 and McNally v. United States257
in requiring a "plain statement of congressional intent" before con258
struing Section 666 to apply to bribes not affecting federal monies.
True, "[s]tatutes should be construed to avoid constitutional questions, but this interpretative canon is not a license for the judiciary to
rewrite language enacted by the legislature. Any other conclusion,
while purporting to be an exercise in judicial restraint, would trench
upon the legislative powers vested in Congress .... *259
Finally, the Court turned to Salinas's argument from constitutional structure: because "'[t] he States possess primary authority for
defining and enforcing the criminal law,"' 260 and because Section 666
could be employed to expand the federal government's power at the
expense of the States, 2 6 ' the law should therefore not be read to apply
except in cases in which "[flederal funds are impinged upon, i.e., unduly influenced." 262 In response, the Court observed that Salinas's
conduct had, in fact, threatened the integrity of a federal program:
[T]here is no serious doubt about the constitutionality of
§ 666(a) (1) (B) as applied to the facts of this case.... The preferential
treatment . . . was a threat to the integrity and proper operation of the
federal program. Whatever might be said about § 666(a)(1)(B)'s application in other cases, the application of § 666(a) (1) (B) to Salinas
263
did not extend federal power beyond its proper bounds.
While Salinas did not provide the constitutional fireworks that
some had anticipated, the matter of the "proper bounds" of "federal
power" seemed still to weigh on the minds of the Justices. The Court
was careful to make clear that, while the text "does not require the
501 U.S. 452 (1991) (interpreting the Age Discrimination in Employment Act).
483 U.S. 350 (1987) (interpreting the mail-fraud statute), superseded by statute as
stated in United States v. Berlin, 707 F. Supp. 832, 835 (E.D. Va. 1989).
258
Salinas, 522 U.S. at 59.
259
Id. at 59-60 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (quoting United
States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 680 (1985)). See also id at 59 ("No rule of construction...
requires that a penal statute be strained and distorted in order to exclude conduct clearly
intended to be within its scope." (quoting United States v. Raynor, 302 U.S. 540, 552
(1938) (emphasis added)); cf Kelley, supra note 63, at 834 ("[T]he [avoidance] canon
seriously intrudes upon the roles of both Congress and the Executive in the constitutional
scheme. Indeed, it is the role of the Executive which the avoidance canon most seriously
threatens.").
260
Petitioner's Brief at 12, (No. 96-738) Salinas (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507
U.S. 619, 635 (1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Also, the National Association
of Criminal Defense Lawyers submitted an amicus curiae brief in which it argued that Section 666, as applied in Salinas's case, was an unconstitutional exercise of Congress's Spending Power violating "principles of federalism inherent in the structure of the Constitution
itself' because Salinas's conduct did not implicate "the integrity of federal funds." Brief of
Amicus Curiae National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers at 23-25, (No. 96-738).
261
Petitioner's Brief at 14, (No. 96-738).
262
Id. at 15.
263
Salinas, 522 U.S. at 60-61 (emphasis added).
256
257
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Government to prove the bribe in question had any particular influence on federal funds, ' 264 it might still require "some other kind 26of5
connection between a bribe and the expenditure of federal funds.
With respect to Salinas's constitutional claims, the Justices held only
that "under this construction the statute is constitutional as applied in
this case." 26 6 That is, the Court left open the question whether a de-

fendant in another case might succeed in challenging the constitutionality of a Section 666 prosecution.
The question remains open even after the Court's second decision concerning the statute's meaning and reach. United States v.
Fischerpresented the question whether and how the statute applied in
cases where the "organization" in question is only an indirect recipient
of federal-program funds. 26 7 What if, for example, the bribed agent's
"organization" is one to which various individuals have paid over government benefits such as food stamps, Social Security, or student-loan
monies? What if, in other words, Mrs. Murphy receives $10,000 in
food stamps and spends it at Al's Grocery Store-has Al's Grocery re268
ceived "benefits . . .under a Federal program"?
In Fischer, the Government alleged that Jeffrey Fischer paid kickback "consulting fees" in exchange for a loan from the West Volusia
Hospital Authority to his own company, "QMC." 269 On the Government's theory, Section 666 was triggered by the fact that the hospital
had collected ten to fifteen million dollars in Medicare reimbursements in the relevant year. 2 70 The Eleventh Circuit had rejected (with
little analysis) Fischer's argument that the Medicare funds received by
271
the hospital were not "benefits" within the meaning of the statute.
What mattered was not whether the Hospital Authority had received
the Medicare funds directly or as an assignee, 272 or whether the funds
were paid to the organization directly or indirectly, but whether the
Id. at 61.
Id at 59. Again, in Salinas's case "the bribe was related to the housing of a prisoner
in facilities paid for in significant part by federal funds themselves." Id. "[T] hat relationship," the Court insisted, "is close enough to satisfy whatever connection the statute might
require." Id.
266
Id. at 61.
267
529 U.S. 667, 669 (2000). I should note that I was a co-author of the amicus brief
filed by the National Association of Defense Lawyers in support of the petitioner in Fischer.
268
See United States v. LaHue, 998 F. Supp. 1182, 1192 (D. Kan. 1998) (rhetorically
asking whether "Congress intended grocery store [c]hains that accept food stamps to fall
within section 666's reach").
United States v. Fischer, 168 F.3d 1273, 1275 (11th Cir. 1999).
269
270
Id. at 1277.
271
Id. at 1278.
272 Id. ("[E]ven if WVHA received funds as an assignee, the plain language of § 666(b)
does not distinguish between an organization, government, or agency that receives 'benefits' directly under a federal program and an organization, government, or agency that
receives 'benefits' as an assignee under a federal program.").
264
265
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payment arose out of "an 'assistance' program, rather than a purely
commercial transaction.

'2 73

Although the Tenth Circuit, when con-

fronted with similar facts, had embraced the precise argument pro27 5
pounded by Fischer, 2 74 the Supreme Court affirmed.
Notwithstanding the Court's ruling, and although the Court
agreed with the Eleventh Circuit that the term "benefits" covered payments made to Medicare providers, it rejected explicitly the Government's contention that an organization receives "benefits" anytime it
receives funds of which the government is the ultimate source. 2 76 Indeed, the Court echoed, and reinforced, its cryptic suggestion in Salinas that Section 666 can constitutionally be applied only to conduct
that threatens the integrity of federal funds:
273

Id.

274
See United States v. LaHue, 170 F.3d 1026 (10th Cir. 1999). Doctors Robert C. and
Ronald H. LaHue concocted a scheme whereby they referred Medicare patients to various
hospitals in return for a referral fee. The district court had dismissed the Section 666
charges, agreeing with the LaHues that "their ultimate receipt, in payment for medical
services, of money whose origin is from Medicare ... does not make them recipients of
'benefits ...under a Federal program...' as contemplated by the statute." United States
v. LaHue, 998 F. Supp. 1182, 1185 (D. Kan. 1998). "Once a federal program benefit
reaches its target recipient," the court reasoned, "it simply loses its character as a 'benefit.'"
Id. at 1186. The Tenth Circuit agreed, noting that

[u]nder the government's [contrary] interpretation of section 666(b), any
organization that is assigned $10,000 in a year in funds initially disbursed
under a federal program source would fall within the statute. Thus, when
funds have passed to the beneficiary and she assigns the funds further to
any number of organizations which may assign them even further, the government's theory suggests that these monies are all considered benefits as
long as they originated under a federal benefits program. Presumably
under this interpretation, if the recipient physician endorsed Medicare
checks to pay a supplier of medical goods, the supplier would be receiving
benefits from a federal program.
170 F.3d at 1029. However, the Tenth Circuit emphasized, citing Salinas, that "[t]he purpose of section 666 to prevent the diversion of federal program funds on the distribution
path to the intended beneficiaries is fulfilled once the funds have been received by the
actual beneficiary." Id. at 1031.
A few other courts, before the LaHue and Fischerdecisions, had confronted this same
question. Compare, e.g., United States v. Wyncoop, 11 F.3d 119, 121 (9th Cir. 1993) ("Congress did not intend, however, to make misappropriations of money from every organization that receives indirect benefits from a federal program a federal crime.... The statute
clearly does not reach all entities that benefit from federal programs or expenditures. . . ."), with United States v. Zyskind, 118 F.3d 113, 116 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting that
Section 666 "was designed broadly to prevent diversions of federal funds not only by agents
of organizations that are direct beneficiaries of federal benefits funds, but by agents of
organizations to whom such funds are 'disbursed' for further 'distribut[ion]' to or for the
benefit of the individual beneficiaries" and that "[n]othing in the language of § 666 suggests that its reach is limited to organizations that were the direct beneficiaries of federal
funds").
275
See Fischer v. United States, 529 U.S. 667, 682 (2000).
276 Fischer, 529 U.S. at 677 ("We reject petitioner's reading of the statute but without
endorsing the Government's broader position.").
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Our discussion should not be taken to suggest that federal funds
disbursed under an assistance program will result in coverage of all
recipient fraud under § 666(b). Any receipt of federal funds can, at
some level of generality, be characterized as a benefit. The statute
does not employ this broad, almost limitless use of the term. Doing
so would turn almost every act of fraud or bribery into a federal
2 77
offense, upsetting the proper federal balance.
Instead, "an examination must be undertaken of the program's structure, operation, and purpose. ' 278 After conducting just such an examination, the Court concluded that Medicare "payments are made for
significant and substantial reasons in addition to compensation or reimbursement" associated with ordinary contractual exchanges. 2 79
Those reasons-namely, "assist[ing] the hospital in making available
and maintaining a certain level and quality of medical care"-are, the
Court held, "suffic[ient] to make the payment a benefit within the
meaning of the statute." 28 0 Moreover, the Court commented,
28
Fischer's acts had, in fact, "threaten[ed] the program's integrity." '
The seven-Justice majority ended the opinion, as the Court had in
Salinas, with the caveat that the same might not be true in other, fu282
ture "benefits" cases.
But Fischer, unlike Salinas, was not unanimous. Justice Thomas,
joined by Justice Scalia, dissented, making explicit the federalism concerns at which the Court had hinted. While it was enough for the
Fischer majority to caution that reading Section 666 to encompass
"[a] ny receipt of federal funds," resulting "in coverage of all recipient
fraud," could run afoul of constitutional limits, 28 3 Justice Thomas insisted that " [w]ithout a jurisdictional provision that would ensure that
in each case the exercise of federal power is related to the federal interest in a federal program, [Section] 666 would criminalize routine
acts of fraud or bribery, which, as the Court admits, would 'upse[t]
the proper federal balance."' 284 This assertion-that a 'Jurisdictional
provision" capable of ensuring a "federal interest" is required in "each
case"-suggests that, for at least two Justices, the cautious intimation
in Salinas that Section 666 might require "some other kind of connection between a bribe and the expenditure of federal funds" 285 left
much unsaid.
at 681.

277

Id.

278

Id.

279

Id. at 679.
Id. at 679-80.

280
281
282
283
284
285

Id. at 681.
Id. at 682.
Id. at 681.
Id. at 689 n.3 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 681).
Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 59 (1997).
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In any event, in both Fischerand Salinas all of the Justices assumed
both that Section 666 itself is consistent with the Constitution, and
also that the idea of a "proper federal balance" could constrain the
statute's application. 286 In both cases, they acknowledged that respect
for this "balance," which is grounded in the Constitution, could require some kind of "connection" between local corruption and the
integrity of federal funds, programs, or interests. But the location of
2 87
that point, and the nature of that connection, remain unidentified.
Immediately after Salinas, courts and litigants returned to the task
of identifying them. United States v. Santopietro,for example, involved a
prosecution of the Mayor of Waterbury, Connecticut and two other
city officials for accepting cash bribes and bank loans from real estate
developers in exchange for influencing decisions by various city agencies. 28 8 The Second Circuit had to consider whether its above-mentioned decision in United States v. Foley-in which, again, the court had
read Section 666 as applying only to cases involving corruption that
"in some way . . . touch [es] upon federal funds" 2 8g9-possessed "continued validity" after Salinas.290 To the extent possible, the court held
to its earlier interpretation, observing that "Salinas may be read to indicate that the 'threat to the integrity and proper operation of [a]
federal program' created by the corrupt activity is necessary to assure
that the statute is not unconstitutionally applied."291 Thus, Section 666
"would not permit the Government ... to prosecute a bribe paid to a
city's meat inspector in connection with a substantial transaction just
because the city's parks department had received a federal grant of
'

$10,000. 292

As was mentioned earlier, though, the courts of appeals are
clearly and sharply split on this matter. Several circuits, in the wake of
Salinas and Fischer, agree with the Santopietro court and hold that the
286 See, e.g., United States v. Wright, 194 F. Supp. 2d 287, 300 (D. Del. 2002) ("'[T]he
best reading of the Fischerand Salinas cases seems to be that the Supreme Court does not
want' an interpretation of [Section] 666 that would make it a 'generalized anti-corruption
statute under the spending power."' (quoting United States v. Suarez, 263 F.3d 468, 489
(6th Cir. 2001))).
287 A recent decision by the Eleventh Circuit suggests that at least for that court, that
point is remote indeed. See United States v. Edgar, 304 F.3d 1320, 1329 (11th Cir. 2002)
(noting that "further elucidation may be required to identify the point at which [Section]
666's application will transgress the outer boundary of Congress's spending power").
288
166 F.3d 88, 91 (2d Cir. 1999).
289 73 F.3d 484, 493 (2d Cir. 1996).
290
166 F.3d at 90.
291
Id. at 93 (quoting Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 61 (1997)) (emphasis added). The Second Circuit did conclude that Foley's requirement that a bribe "directly affect the disbursement or other use of federal funds" had been overruled by Salinas. Id. at
92. "However," the court continued, "to the extent that Foley requires at least some connection between the bribe and a risk to the integrity of the federal funded program, nothing
in Salinas disturbs such a requirement." Id. at 93.
292
Id. at 93.
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Constitution requires a connection between the bribe of a state or
local official charged under Section 666 and the federal interest in
program integrity. 29 3 Several others, though, have concluded that, a
few cryptic comments in Salinas notwithstanding, Section 666 "requires no relationship between the illegal activity and the federal
funding." 29 4 The point here is not to canvass in detail the conflicting
decisions, but rather to note that, in these conflicting cases, the question is posed, as it was in Justice Thomas's Fischer dissent, 29 5 not so
much as a query about text or legislative history, but as a matter of the
extent and limits of the Spending Power. 29 6 That said, in neither Salinas nor Fischer did the Court discuss whether or how the South Dakota
v. Dole criteria for permissible regulation-by-contract should apply in
the Section 666 context or in criminal law generally.

293 See, e.g., United States v. DeLaurentis, 230 F.3d 659, 661-62 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding
that a conviction of a public official for bribery must be based on "some connection between the defendant's bribery activities and the funds supplied by the federal government"); United States v. Naiman, 211 F.3d 40, 48 (2d Cir. 2000) ("Without proof of the
nexus between the alleged bribes and the integrity of federally funded programs, Naiman's
conviction cannot stand."); United States v. Zwick, 199 F.3d 672, 687 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that Section 666 "requires that the government prove a federal interest is implicated by
the defendant's offense conduct"); cf United States v. Cabrera, 328 F.3d 506, 510 (9th Cir.
2003) (declining to decide whether a federal nexus is required because "the facts
presented here [would] satisfy any [such] requirement"); United States v. Bynum, 327 F.3d
986, 992 (9th Cir. 2003) (concluding that "evidence was sufficient to demonstrate a federal
nexus, if one is required"); United States v. Ganim, 225 F. Supp. 2d 145, 163-64 (D. Conn.
2002) (rejecting facial challenge to Section 666 and following Santropietro in imposing a
"nexus requirement," but concluding that "the indictment's allegations are adequate").
294 United States v. Dakota, 197 F.3d 821, 826 (6th Cir. 1999); see also United States v.
Fernandez, 282 F.3d 500, 510-511 (7th Cir. 2002) ("Defendants assert that the government
failed to establish a necessary element of the offense, the requisite link between a federal
interest and the defendants' fraud. We do not believe that it is necessary for the government to establish such a link."); United States v. Suarez, 263 F.3d 468, 489-91 (6th Cir.
2001) (refusing to require minimal nexus); United States v. Grossi, 143 F.3d 348, 350 (7th
Cir. 1998) (refusing to require that "the program or activity that was touched by bribery
itself received $10,000 in federal funds").
295 Fischer v. United States, 529 U.S. 667, 689 n.3 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Justice Thomas stated:
Section 666 was adopted pursuant to Congress' [s] spending power. We
have held that the spending power requires, at least, that the exercise of
federal power be related 'to the federal interest in particular national
projects or programs.' Arguably, if Congress attempted to criminalize acts
of theft or bribery based solely on the fact that.., the victim organization
received federal funds as payment for a market transaction, this constitutional requirement would not be satisfied.
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987)).
296 The Third Circuit, for example, in Zwick held that "[a]pplying [Section] 666 to
offense conduct, absent evidence of any federal interest, would appear to be an unconstitutional exercise of power under the Spending Clause." 199 F.3d at 687. And so, invoking
the "avoidance" canon, the court interpreted the statute to preclude such applications. Id.
("[W]hen a statute is unclear, we will construe it so as to avoid constitutional concerns,
assuming that such construction does not amount to a rewriting of the statute.").
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Conditional Spending, South Dakota v. Dole, and Section 666

Although a few courts in Section 666 cases had mentioned the
Court's decision in Dole,29 7 the first case in which Dole's litany of conditional-spending requirements were analyzed and applied in any detail
was United States v. McCormack.29 8 In McCormack, as was mentioned at
the outset of this Article, the defendant had been indicted under Section 666 for giving cash payments to a city police officer in Malden,
Massachusetts, to persuade the officer not to investigate him for various state-law offenses. 299 The Government's theory was built on the
fact that the Malden Police Department, "like scores of departments
across the country," received over $10,000 in federal funds.3 0 0 The
prosecution characterized Section 666 simply as a "general federal
anti-corruption statute" and insisted that "any and all bribes, about
any aspect of the entity's business, so long as they reach a certain
level

. . .

may be prosecuted as federal offenses."3 0 1 On this view, "[i] t

does not matter if federal funds were threatened, either directly or
indirectly, or if a federal program was implicated in any way. The federal link is essential only to determine which programs and entities
fall under federal protection; once there, any significant corruption
30 2
can be federally prosecuted."
Citing Salinas, the district court rejected McCormack's contention that the text itself requires a connection between the bribe in
question and the federal funds that satisfy the statute's jurisdictional
element.3 0

-

In the court's view, Salinas had definitively established-

at least as a matter of statutory construction-that a bribe need not
"involve federal funds or jeopardize the financial integrity of a federal
program" in order to violate Section 666.304 Still, the court recog-

nized that the Justices in Salinas seemed to have left open the possibility that particular applications of Section 666 might unconstitutionally
297
See, e.g., United States v. Russo, No. 96-1394, 1997 VWL
168276, at *2 (2d Cir. Apr. 8,
1997); Un ted States v. Roberts, 28 F. Supp. 2d 741 (E.D.N.Y. 1998); United States v. Cantor, 897 F. Supp. 110, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); see also Brown, supra note 36, at 294-99 (suggesting that Dole be used in Section 666 cases).
298
31 F. Supp. 2d 176, 187-89 (D. Mass. 1998).
299
Id. at 177.
300
Id. at 178.
301

Id.

Id.
See id. at 185; see id. at 184 (concluding that Section 666 does not require the government to "trace[ ] the route of federal monies from Congress to the local agency and
out again as a result of the charged offense").
304
Id. at 185. Although some courts, motivated both by constitutional concerns and
by their reading of Section 666's legislative history, have "transformed the statutory language so as to require a federal connection[,]" the McCormack court insisted that "Salinas
has shut off this avenue of analysis.... The language is clear, and the reach of the statute is
clearly broad." Id. at 186 (citation omitted).
302
303

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89:1

extend federal power. 30 5 For help in identifying such applications,
306
the McCormack court turned to Dole.

In Dole, the Court had observed that although "objectives not
thought to be within Article I's 'enumerated legislative fields' may
nevertheless be attained through the use of the spending power and
the conditional grant of federal funds . .. [t]he spending power is of
course not unlimited.

' 30 7

For instance, the Court continued, "our

cases have suggested (without significant elaboration) that conditions
on federal grants might be illegitimate if they are unrelated 'to the
federal interest in particular national projects or programs.' ,,308 Nor,

according to the McCormack court, had the Justices provided any significant elaboration in the years since Dole.30 9 Nevertheless, the district court took the Dole Court at its word in treating the relatedness
requirement as more than a rhetorical flourish. 3 10 And so, the McCormack court reasoned, questions of text and legislative history aside,
Dole requires that Section 666 prosecutions bear some relation to the
"federal interest" that the statute was intended to promote and protect, namely, the "integrity" of federal funds and funding programs. 3 11
But what about Salinas? Had not the Court just decided that no
such "relation" was required? The McCormack court noted that, although Salinas states that the Government need not connect a bribe
directly to federal funds, it also suggests that the Government must
show at least that the bribe threatened the integrity of those funds, or
the federal program through which the funds were disbursed. 31 2 In
McCormack, the local police department-the "organization" in ques305 The court noted how little explanation the Supreme Court had provided, emphasizing the language of Salinas- '"Whatever might be said about section 666(a)(1)(B)"s application
to other cases, the application of section 666(a) (1) (B) to Salinas did not extend federal
power beyond its proper bounds."' Id. at 185 (emphasis added by the McCormack court)
(quoting Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 61 (1997)).
306
Id. at 187-88. The court also relied on the avoidance canon, and on the Court's
decision in United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971), in which the Court, expressing concern for the federal-state "balance" in criminal law, had adopted a narrow reading of an
ambiguous federal criminal statute outlawing the possession and transportation of a firearm in order to save it from constitutional demise. McCormack, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 186-87 &
n.19.
307
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (citation omitted) (quoting United
States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936)); see also McCormack, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 187-88 (discussing Dole).
308
Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461
(1978) (plurality opinion)).
309
See McCormack, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 188 (noting that since Dole, the court is "[g]uided
only by [the] general princip[le]s" of subsequent cases in interpreting Section 666).
310
See id. But see Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 632-33 (1999)
(holding that a school district may be held liable under Title IX for student-on-student
sexual harassment when, as a "funding recipient," it "acts with deliberate indifference to
known acts of harassment in its programs or activities.").
311
See McCormack, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 189.
312
See id. The court further noted:
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tion-had received several federal grants, relating to (among other
things) community revitalization, a drug-use prevention project, and
domestic violence. 31 3 In the court's view, though, there was no reason
to believe that the defendant's corrupt activities posed any real threat
to the federal programs through which these grants were disbursed,
or to the various projects themselves. It is not enough, the court insisted, that a bribe involve a police department, which in turn receives
federal funds; the Government must prove that the bribe itself was
"related" to the "integrity" of the federal grants. 3 14 Because the bribes
McCormack paid to local police officers to prevent further investigation of state-law crimes were not "'related to a legitimate national
problem,"' and did not threaten the integrity of any of the various
federal grants or programs, the court concluded that it would be unconstitutional to prosecute the defendant under Section 666.315

Since McCormack, several other courts have looked to Dole's conditional-spending test for guidance when determining what, if any, kind
of connection is required between a defendant's conduct and an identifiable federal interest. 31 6 These decisions illustrate courts' continued willingness to consider the claim, flagged in Salinas, that Section
666 could, in some cases, be employed in a way that exceeds Congress's power to regulate indirectly through conditional federal
spending. The common theme that emerges is that in Section 666
cases, the Constitution requires some nexus between a defendant's
bribe and the integrity of the federal funds implicated by that bribe.
Put differently, these courts have responded to federal-program-bribDirected by the concerns expressed in Salinas about applying § 666(a) to
conduct that has no connection with the federal funds or programs, and
the broader concerns of Lopez and Bass, I find that "integrity" must be more
carefully construed to provide for at least some nexus with the federal
funds or programs. Establishing such a requirement is consistent with the
limits the Supreme Court has placed on the spending power. In particular,
it gives meaningful content to the "relatedness" standards as applied to this
statutory scheme.
Id. (citations omitted).
313
See id. at 178.
314
See id. at 189.
315 Id.
316 In United States v. Zwick, for example, the Third Circuit followed McCormack in observing that "[aipplying § 666 to offense conduct, absent evidence of any federal interest,
would appear to be an unconstitutional exercise of power under the Spending Clause."
199 F.3d 672, 687 (3d Cir. 1999). In Zwick, however-unlike McCormack-the Third Circuit determined that the statute itself must be read to require such a connection, in accord
with the avoidance canon. Id. In other words, because a no-relation reading could bring
Section 666 into conflict with the Constitution (and with Dole), the Zwick court eschewed
such a reading. See also United States v. Lipscomb, 299 F.3d 303, 328-32 (5th Cir. 2002)
(surveying decisions of district and appellate courts on issue of federal-interest requirement); United States v. Morgan, 230 F.3d 1067, 1073-74 (8th Cir. 2000) (Bye, J., concurring) (discussing Congress's power under Dole); United States v. Phillips, 219 F.3d 404,
414-15 (5th Cir. 2000) (same).
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ery prosecutions that appear to lack any real connection to federal
interests by using the "relatedness" portion of the Dole inquiry-perhaps in conjunction with the avoidance canon-to police the "federalstate balance" in criminal law. What is still missing, though, is an argument that prosecution and punishment under Section 666 should be
regarded as a "condition" attached to federal spending, or that it
should trigger the Dole analysis at all. The aim of Part III is to show a
conclusion cannot be drawn.
III
CRIMINALIZATION BY CONTRACT?

THE DOCTRINAL CASE(S)

AGAINST "HUNGRY DOG JURISDICTION"

Part II traced the gradual and continuing constitutionalization of
arguments concerning the reach of Section 666. In the wake of the
post-Lopez federalism revival, the claim that Section 666 by its terms
and legislative history requires the government to establish a connection, relation, or nexus between a defendant's corrupt conduct on the
one hand, and the integrity of federal funds or programs on the
other, has been re-cast in terms of constitutional avoidance and conditional spending. In other words, it appears that the question in Section 666 cases is no longer "how far Congress has gone," but how far,

"under the Constitution, [it] may go," in federalizing anticorruption
3
law. 17

At first blush, this move-from arguing for a statutory federalconnection element to invoking the "relatedness" requirement set out

in South Dakota v. DoLe3 1 -seems

consonant with the themes and max-

ims of the New Federalism. In fact, though, it misses the point entirely. The shift rests on a fundamental mistake: Its premise is that the
prosecution of an individual by the United States is analogous to a
regulatory condition attached to federal spending and imposed upon
(or agreed to by) the funds' beneficiaries. Under this analogy, federal

criminal jurisdiction over conduct that Congress could not or simply
has not yet criminalized via its power to regulate commerce is, constitutionally speaking, no different from the powerfully persuasive effect
of program funds and grants on the States' own policies and priorities. But persons prosecuted under Section 666 are not the federal
government's contracting partners, and the requirement that they
avoid bribery is in no way a condition attached to their receipt of federal-program funds. Nor are fund recipients obliged, as a condition
317 McCormack, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 177.
318 See483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) ([O]ur cases have suggested (without significant elaboration) that conditions on federal grants might be illegitimate if they are unrelated 'to
the federal interest in particular national projects or programs'" (quoting Massachusetts v.
United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978) (plurality opinion)).
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of such receipt, to prosecute violations of the statute. 31 9 Thus, the
320
analogy fails, and the premise remains unjustified.

A. The Dole Test in the Criminal Context
As was mentioned above, in McCormack, a United States district
court, citing Dole, dismissed an indictment charging violations of Section 666 on the ground that there was "no connection between the
conduct at issue ... and the federal funds, or the federal program to
warrant a federal rather than a state prosecution of these matters.

32 1

Since then, a few other courts and litigants have followed suit, and
framed their arguments concerning the statute's validity and scope
around Dole's criteria.3 22 Recall that in Dole, the Justices reaffirmed
Congress's power "'to further broad policy objectives by conditioning
receipt of federal moneys upon compliance by the recipient with federal statutory and administrative directives.' "323 At the same time, the
Court recounted "several general restrictions" on this power: "[T]he
exercise of the spending power must be in pursuit of 'the general welfare' "; conditions must be "'unambiguously"' attached to the receipt
of federal funds; conditions should not be "unrelated" to the "'federal
interest in particular national projects or programs,'' nor should the
"financial inducement offered by Congress" be coercive; 324 and any
conditions must comply with other applicable constitutional
provisions.

325

For a court resolved to employ Dole's conditional-spending criteria in a Section 666 case, the analysis would proceed as follows: First, is
the expenditure to which the prosecution points for satisfaction of
Section 666(b)'s "benefits" element 32 6 an expenditure "in pursuit of
the general welfare"? Of course, the answer to this question will always be "yes." 32 7 Second, was it made "unambiguously" clear to the
319
See United States v. Sabri, 326 F.3d 937, 946 (8th Cir. 2003) ("Unlike typical Spending Clause enactments, [Section] 666 imposes no affirmative obligation on the recipient of
federal funds . . . . Nor does [Section] 666 proscribe conduct of the recipient of the
federal funds."), cert. granted, No. 03-44, 2003 WIL 21692658 (U.S. Oct. 14, 2003).
320
But see, e.g., United States v. Bynum, 327 F.3d 986, 991 (9th Cir. 2003) (asserting
that "[iun Salinas, the Court specifically refuted the argument that [Section] 666 exceeds
Congress's Spending Clause powers").
321
31 F. Supp. 2d at 189; see supra Part II.C.
322
See supra note 318 and accompanying text.
323
Dole, 483 U.S. at 206 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980)).
324
Id. at 208.
325
Id. at 207-08 (citations omitted).
326
See 18 U.S.C. § 666(b) (2000) ("The circumstance referred to in subsection (a) of
this section is that the organization, government, or agency receives, in any one year period, benefits in excess of $10,000 under a Federal program involving a grant, contract,
subsidy, loan, guarantee, insurance, or other form of Federal assistance.").
327
See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 n.2 ("The level of deference to the congressional decision
is such that the Court has more recently questioned whether 'general welfare' is ajudicially
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government agencies or organizations receiving these benefits that, by
accepting them, they were consenting to the sweeping reach of Section 666, that is, to corruption prosecutions of third parties whose
conduct in some way touches upon those or other State agencies' business? Third, is the condition-federal power to prosecute and punish corruption under Section 666-"related" to the interest of the
United States in "particular national projects or programs"? Finally, is
federal jurisdiction under Section 666 otherwise consistent with the
Constitution?
It should be clear that, if Section 666 is a "condition" to be analyzed and evaluated in accord with Dole, the statute's use in many localcorruption cases should and will flunk the "relatedness" test. The
prosecutions ofjunior varsity hoodlums like McCormack, for diverting
through bribes the attention of a small-town police officer, are hardly
"related" either to the "integrity of federal funds given to the Malden
police department or even to the programs those funds were intended
to support." 328 Dole seems, at first blush, to provide a convenient vehi-

cle for salvaging the foundering statutory-text-based arguments for a
"federal connection" or "nexus" requirement: Instead of asking
whether Section 666 requires the government to prove a connection
between the defendant's corruption and the federal program funds
and whether, in a particular case, that requirement is satisfied, courts
may now ask whether the prosecution of a defendant for corruption
is, in a particular case, "unrelated" to the interest of the United States
in the "particular national projects or programs" through which or for
which the statutorily required funds were disbursed. 329
But Dole's usefulness as a translator for these federal-nexus claims
is overstated, and Dole-based challenges to Section 666 and its applications are misplaced. Properly understood, the issue is not whether the
statute or its uses satisfy that case's four criteria, but whether those
criteria apply at all. Recall the doctrine that "legislation enacted pursuant to the spending power is much in the nature of a contract: in
enforceable restriction at all."). But see Eastman, supra note 22, at 87 ("For the first eightyfive years of our nation's history, under both the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution, the language of 'general welfare' was viewed as a limitation on the powers of Congress, not as a grant of plenary power.").
328
United States v. McCormack, 31 F. Supp. 2d 176, 189 (D. Mass. 1998).
329
Other Dole-inspired arguments are possible as well. In United States v. Sabri, for
example, the district court noted that, even if Section 666 could be considered a regulatory
condition, and the federal funds disbursed to the City of Minneapolis a mere "'inducement' by which Congress bargained for federal jurisdiction over offenses traditionally
within the purview of state and local governments, that bargain surely is 'so coercive as to
pass the point at which pressure turns into compulsion."' 183 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1156 (D.
Minn. 2002) (quoting Dole, 483 U.S. at 211), afffd in part, revd in part,326 F.3d 937 (8th Cir.
2003), cert. granted, No. 03-44, 2003 WL 21692658 (U.S. Oct. 14, 2003). The court of appeals, reversing the district court's decision, had no occasion to address this suggestion.
326 F.3d at 945-48.
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return for federal funds, the States agree to comply with federally imposed conditions.

' 330

In the Section 666 context, there simply is no

federal-spending "contract" to which those whose conduct is being
regulated and punished are parties. Even if the "program" employed
to satisfy the appropriate statutory element is fairly regarded, as in the
typical regulatory-condition case, as a "contract" between the United
States and the relevant organization or agency, Section 666 does not
purport to govern the conduct of these "contracting" parties; rather,
the statute "reaches beyond punishment of the state and local governments who receive those funds to proscribe the conduct of third persons who are not parties to the funding contract.

' 33 1

Neither Section

666 itself, nor its employment in particular cases, can helpfully be
compared to a regulatory "condition" attached to federal funds disbursed to promote the general welfare. 3 32 Turning this point around,
while the General Welfare Clause might well authorize the disbursal
of funds, it does not authorize the enactment of laws. 3 33 Regulatory

strings, which, of course, Congress is free to attach to its program
funds, are not laws, 33 4 but Section 666 certainly is.

To continue further in this vein, South Dakota v. Dole held that the
United States may achieve indirectly, through conditional spending,
what it might not be able to achieve directly, through legislation or
regulation. For instance, in the Dole situation itself, Congress might
well lack the power to impose a national drinking age; nonetheless, it
can simply cajole even the more hard-living States to embrace the federally preferred standard by making its adoption a condition for the
receipt of federal highway funds. 335 In so doing, the theory goes, Congress does not regulate so much as it "generates legislation 'much in
the nature of a contract: in return for federal funds, the States agree
to comply with federally imposed conditions.'" 336 Criminal jurisdicPennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
United States v. Morgan, 230 F.3d 1067, 1074 (8th Cir. 2000) (Bye, J., concurring).
332
Cf McCoy & Friedman, supra note 26, at 116 ("[A]thy time that Congress finds itself
[it] need only attach a condition on a
limited by . . . delegated regulatory powers ....
federal spending grant that achieves the same (otherwise invalid) regulatory objective.").
333
Morgan, 230 F.3d at 1073 (Bye, J., concurring).
334
Id. at 1073--74 (Bye, J., concurring) (citing Engdahl, supra note 1, at 71).
335
See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 205 (1987). True, in Dole, South Dakota
contended that the "'Twenty-first Amendment grants the States virtually complete control
over whether to permit importation or sale of liquor and how to structure the liquor distri' Id. (quoting Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum,
bution system ...
Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 110 (1980)). The Court avoided resolving the matter of that Amendment's scope, though, stating "we need not decide in this case whether that Amendment
would prohibit an attempt by Congress to legislate directly a national minimum drinking
age," because "[h]ere, Congress has acted indirectly under its spending power to encourage uniformity in the States' drinking ages. ... [W]e find this legislative effort within
constitutional bounds even if Congress may not regulate drinking ages directly." Id. at 206.
336
Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 640 (1999) (quoting Pennhurst
State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)).
330
331
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tion and prosecutions under Section 666, though, are not "conditions"
within the meaning of Dole, they cannot be analogized to the terms of
a contract-real or imagined-between Congress and the agency in
question. Nor is the statute itself a "condition" attached to a grant, or
the term of a hypothesized federal-state contract. It is, rather, a generally applicable criminal statute: a law. And, as Judge Bye observed in
Morgan, notwithstanding Dole, "Congress lacks the power under the
Spending Clause to enact criminal, laws governing third-party
conduct. 337

Nonetheless, in United States v. Sabri, the government argued that
Section 666 "is merely a 'condition' which Congress may attach (inci' 338
dent to its spending power) on an entity's receipt of federal funds.
The facts alleged in Sabri were typical of Section 666 cases: Basim
Omar Sabri, a Minneapolis developer and landlord, on several occasions in 2001 gave or offered money to Brian Herron, a city councilman and local leader, to secure Herron's political and other help with
a variety of lucrative development projects. 3 39 Because both the city of
Minneapolis and the Minneapolis Neighborhood Revitalization Program-of whose boards Herron was, ex officio, a member-received
and administered upwards of $20 million in federal-program funds
during that year, the United States contended that the scheme fell
squarely within the scope of Section 666 (a) (2) .340 The government
did not allege, however, any particular connection between the corrupt dealings of Herron and Sabri and the program funds or their
administration.

34

1

Sabri moved to dismiss on the ground that the "statute is unconstitutional on its face," that is, it "lies outside the scope of Congress's
authority to enact laws under the Spending Clause," because "it does
not require a connection between the alleged criminal conduct-the
giving or offering of a bribe-and the federal funds distributed by
Congress." 342 Sabri's claim, then, was not the more common one discussed above: that the government had failed to allege or prove such a
230 F.3d at 1073 (Bye, J., concurring).
183 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1155 (D. Minn. 2002), affd in part, rev'd in part, 326 F.3d 937
(8th Cir. 2003), cert. granted,No. 03-44, 2003 WL 21692658 (U.S. Oct. 14, 2003). It should
be noted that, as this Article was being revised, I co-authored a brief amicus curiae,filed by
the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, in support of Sabri's petition for a
writ of certiorari.
-39
See id. at 1146-47.
340
See id. at 1147. Recall that Section 666 criminalizes bribery involving agencies that
receive, "in any one year period, benefits in excess of $10,000." 18 U.S.C. § 666(b) (2000).
341
See Sabri, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 1154 n.9 (dismissing as "irrelevant" the "government's
argument ... that it could establish a connection between the bribes.., and the expenditure of federal funds" because "[tihe statute does not require proof of such a
connection").
342
Id. at 1147.
337

338
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connection, and that such a connection is required by the statute itself. Instead, Sabri proceeded from the premise that the statute does
not require such a connection. And it is precisely for this reason, he
insisted, that the statute is unconstitutional.
. The bulk of the trial court's opinion was devoted to a close examination of Sabri's interpretive premise. 343 Again, as the court observed, the Justices in Salinas were content to leave unresolved the
question whether Section 666(a) (1) (B) "'requires some ... kind of
connection between a bribe and the expenditure of federal
funds,'- 34 4 leaving the door open for those courts of appeals who have
since decided that such a link is necessary.3 45 However broad the statute might be, and however intrusive its reach, the Sabri trial court concluded that the statute requires only the coexistence of the bribe and
the specified financial inflow to the relevant agency-not any connection between the two. "[T]he remaining issue," then, was "whether
the statute, as now construed ....is a constitutional exercise of Con34 6
gress's powers under the Spending Clause."
The court concluded that it was not. Section 666 contains no
"express jurisdictional element" of the kind discussed in Lopez, 34 7 nor
is federal jurisdiction over third-parties' bribes through Section 666 a
"condition" attached to the funds disbursed to agencies through federal programs. 348 After all, Section 666 "'neither requires a state's
compliance with federal regulatory or administrative directives, nor
prevents state action."' 349 It is no part of a "contract" between the
United States and the agencies receiving or administering federal-program funds; instead, the court concluded, it is simply "an 'unbargained-for' intrusion into state criminal jurisdiction. '350 Thus, the
federal-program bribery statute is "an unconstitutional exercise of
343
See, e.g., id. at 1147-48 ("This Court begins its analysis by construing [Section]
666(a) (2) to determine whether it does or does not require a connection between the
bribe and the expenditure of federal funds.").
344 Id. at 1149 (quoting Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 59 (1997)).
345
See supra notes 289-95 and accompanying text.
346
183 F. Supp. 2d at 1154.
347
Id. at 1154-55 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995)) (noting
that the statute in question, Section 922(q), lacked a "'jurisdictional element which would
ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in question affects interstate commerce"').
348
Id. at 1155.
349
Id. at 1155-56 (quoting United States v. Cantor, 897 F. Supp. 110, 113 (S.D.N.Y.
1995)).
350
Id. at 1156; see Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)
("[L]egislation enacted pursuant to the spending power is much in the nature of a contract ....
").Judge Kyle observed that, even if it were possible to conceive of criminal jurisdiction under Section 666 as a regulatory string of the kind addressed in Dole, the statute
would still be invalid. Given that the city and the MCDA [Minneapolis Community Development Agency] would have to forego over 99% of the federal-program funds they receive
in order to avoid this cut this "string," any "bargain" would be "'so coercive as to pass the
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Congress's legislative power under the Spending Clause of Article I of
the United States Constitution.

'35 1

In sum, it is settled law that Congress can, in effect, regulate activities and subjects otherwise outside the scope of the grants of power
enumerated in Article I by attaching conditions and regulatory
"strings" to the money it spends. 3 52 It is not at all clear, though, that
the money flowing from the national treasury may serve as a constitutional vehicle for creating and invoking federal criminal jurisdiction
over the conduct of third parties who have not entered into any kind
of conditional-spending "contract" with the federal government. 35 3 In
other words, it is one thing for Congress to condition States' receipt of
federal highway funds on their adoption of a particular drinking age;
it is quite another for this receipt of funds to authorize the enactment
of a federal law punishing jaywalking. In effect, Section 666-as construed by the courts thus far-operates as though the highway-funds
grant in Dole authorized federal prosecutions for underage drinking.
However, even given South Dakota v. Dole, the Constitution does not
permit federal criminal law, prosecutors, and punishments to-in one
commentator's evocative words-"tag along after federal money like a

point at which pressure turns into compulsion."' Sabri, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 1156 (quoting
South Dakota v.Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987)).
351
Sabri, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 1158; see also id. at 1156 ("Section 666 plainly is not a
'condition' statute within the reasoning of Dole and cannot be justified under that decision
as a valid exercise of Congress's power under the Spending Clause."). As has already been
noted, Judge Kyle's decision in Sabri was reversed by the Eighth Circuit. United States v.
Sabri, 326 F.3d 937 (8th Cir. 2003), cert. granted,No. 03-44, 2003 WL 21692658 (U.S. Oct.
14, 2003). It should be emphasized, though, that nothing in Judge Hansen's opinion for
the Court of Appeals undermines or calls into question Judge Kyle's conclusion that Section 666 is not a conditional-spending statute. On the contrary, the Court of Appealsechoing Judge Kyle, as well as Judge Bye's concurring opinion in Morgan, see supra note
331--noted that "[Section] 666 imposes no affirmative obligation on the recipient of federal funds[,]" id. at 946, that the statute does not "proscribe conduct of the recipient of
[such] funds[,]" id.; and that it "has no contractual 'terms' with which the recipient of
federal funds must comply[,]" id. The court concluded, accordingly, that "[Section] 666 is
not a conditions statute at all and that the traditional Dole analysis is [therefore] inapplicable," id. at 946-47. Cf United States v. Lipscomb, 299 F.3d 303, 321 (5th Cir. 2002)
(" [A] lthough we may debate whether the [Section] 666 peg fits the conditional-grant hole,
I shall test it under the four prongs of Dole."); id. at 366 ("The Dole test is inappropriate to
analyze the constitutionality of [Section] 666, however, because the section does not qualify as a conditional-grant statute.").
352
See, e.g.,
Dole, 483 U.S. at 206 ("Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of
federal funds, and has repeatedly employed the power 'to further broad policy objectives
by conditioning receipt of federal moneys upon compliance by the recipient with federal
statutory and administrative directives.'" (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474
(1980))).
353
Cf United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 123 S. Ct. 2297, 2303 n.2 (2003) (noting that
the Child Internet Protection Act "does not directly regulate private conduct" and, therefore, that "Dole provides the appropriate framework for assessing [the Act's]
constitutionality").
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hungry dog. '3

54

Congress can buy the States' cooperation in further-

ing its policy objectives,3 55 but it cannot buy a national police power,
or spend its way to criminal jurisdiction that is not otherwise tethered
3 56
to its few, enumerated, and defined powers.

But even if Section 666 were thought, as in McCormack, to go beyond the kind of "conditioning" permitted by Dole, or even, as in Sabri,
to not implicate the Court's regulation-by-contract doctrine at all, the
question would remain whether the statute is a valid and permissible
exercise of Congress's broad power to "carry[ ] into Execution" 357 its
power to "provide for the . . . general 'Welfare. ' 358 In other words,
perhaps the entire (and ongoing) debate about spending conditions
and regulation-by-contract is, in the end, a distraction.
B.

Is Criminal Jurisdiction over Individuals "Necessary and
Proper" for "Carrying into Execution" the Spending
Power?

The final, "sweeping"3 59 clause of Article I, Section 8, states
broadly that Congress has the power "[t]o make all Laws which shall
be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing
Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States .... ,,360 Some have argued that Section
666, and any other criminal statutes whose purported jurisdictional
hook is the flow of federal dollars in pursuit of the general welfare,
are constitutional, not because they are "contractual conditions" attached to money grants to state and local governments, but because
they are "Laws ...

necessary and proper for carrying into Execution"

another of Congress's Article I powers, namely, the Spending Power
itself.361 The question here would be not whether the Dole criteria are
354
Engdahl, supra note 1, at 92; see also id. ("Money cannot infect the recipient with
the germ of generalized federal governing control, or an infectious virus capable of spreading that disease to anyone who touches the recipient or its property."). As this Article was
being revised, the foregoing conclusion-that Section 666 is not a conditional-spending
statute and should not, therefore, be analyzed using Doe-found additional support. See
Sabri, 326 F.3d at 945-48; Baker & Berman, supra note 159, at 487-88 n.133.
355
See Dole, 483 U.S. at 206.
356
See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000) ("Every law enacted by
Congress must be based on one or more of its powers enumerated in the Constitution.").
357
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
358
Id. at cl. 1; see, e.g., United States v. Bigler, 907 F. Supp. 401, 402 (S.D. Fla. 1995)
("Article I, § 8 gives Congress the power to 'provide for the ... [g]eneral Welfare.' This
power, in conjunction with the necessary and proper clause, gives Congress the power to
enact Section 666.").
359

See, e.g.,
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No. 33, at 203 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter

ed., 1961) (referring to "the sweeping clause, as it has been . . . called").
360
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
361
See United States v. Lipscomb, 299 F.3d 303, 318 (5th Cir. 2002) ("My solo review
here will focus on whether [Section 666] is necessary and proper to the spending
power . . . ."); United States v. Sabri, 326 F.3d 937, 953 (8th Cir. 2003) ("[W]e hold that
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satisfied, or even whether they are applicable. Rather, it would be
whether the ability to prosecute individuals whose corruption touches
upon federal-grant-receiving institutions, agencies, and governments
is "necessary and proper for carrying into execution" the "power" to
"provide for . . . the general Welfare" through spending directed at
3 62
these institutions, agencies, and governments.
This question was examined in some detail recently by two disagreeing judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit in United States v. Lipscomb.363 Albert Lipscomb, a former Dallas city councilman, was convicted under Section 666 for taking bribes
offered to secure his support for local policies favorable to the Yellow
Cab company. 364 The evidence at trial established that the City of Dallas received, through a variety of programs, more than $40 million per
year in federal funds. 3 65 On appeal, Lipscomb argued, among other
[Section] 666 is a legitimate exercise of Congress's undisputed power to make a law that is
necessary and proper for the carrying out of its enumerated power to provide for the general welfare of the United States."), cert. granted, No. 03-44, 2003 WL 21692658 (U.S. Oct.
14, 2003); Bigler, 907 F. Supp. at 402 ("[The Spending Power], in conjunction with the
necessary and proper clause, gives Congress the power to enact Section 666."); see also
ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 39, at 234 (observing, with respect to Sections 201 and 666,
that "bribery of federal officials is punishable under the necessary and proper clause because it interferes with the conduct of the federal program in question"); Brown, supra
note 36, at 266, noting that:
One might assume that the role of the statute is to protect the federal funds
that trigger its application. If this were the case, § 666 would simply be a
law 'necessary and proper for carrying into [e]xecution' the power to
spend the money in the first place, that is, the power to provide for the
general welfare, generally referred to as the spending power.
(footnote omitted); id. at 290 ("Congress has the power to spend the funds that constitute
the federal assistance. It can take the steps necessary and proper to protect those funds.").
But see Lipscomb, 299 F.3d at 370 (Smith, J., dissenting) ("I am aware of no court that has
dealt with the issue of what uses of [Section] 666 are necessary and proper to effect the
spending power.") .
362
Cf., e.g.,Jinks v. Richland County, 123 S. Ct. 1667, 1671 (2003) ("We agree ... that
§ 1367(d) is necessary and proper for carrying into execution Congress's power '[t] o constitute Tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court' . . . and to assure that those tribunals may
fairly and efficiently exercise '[t]he judicial Powers of the United States[.]"') (citations
omitted).
363
299 F.3d 303 (5th Cir. 2002). Of the three opinions, Judge Wiener's opinion is the
majority opinion in its fact section, procedural-background section, and section VII, dealing with venue. See id. at 349 (opinion of Duhd, J.) (listing sections with which Judge Duh6
concurs). While both Judge Duh6 andJudge Smith dissented from the remaining sections
ofJudge Wiener's opinionJudges Duh and Smith did not reach the same result, and thus
did not create a majority opinion. See id. at 360-61 (Smith, J., dissenting).
364
Id. at 306-07 (opinion of Wiener, J.).
365
Id. at 307-08 (opinion of Wiener, J.). The court stated:
During Lipscomb's second period of council service, the City, through
many of its agencies and departments, received substantial federal funds.
In the year ending in September 1996, Dallas received $44.3 million and
spent $48.1 million in federal financial assistance which funded a wide
range of joint priorities: community development, farmer's market infrastructure, emergency shelter, housing, community policing, airport and
freeway improvements, arts development, pollution control, emergency
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things, that the mere money flow to Dallas and its agencies was not
enough. He claimed, as others have, that Section 666 should be read
to require an identifiable connection between his corrupt conduct
and the federal spending and that, so interpreted, the statute did not
36
cover his own conduct.

6

The three judges on the panel wrote three separate opinions.
Judge Wiener concluded that Lipscomb had raised constitutional arguments with respect to the construction and reach of Section 666
that should be confronted. 36 7 In his view, however, both the statute
and its application were constitutional because Section 666 is "rationally related to a federal interest-that is, to effecting Congress's
spending power.

'368

Judge Duh6 agreed that Lipscomb was entitled

to a new trial, but insisted that his constitutional arguments were not
before the court and should not have been addressed. 369 Judge Smith
rounded out the group. He disagreed with Judges Duh6 and Wiener
on the matter of venue, 370 but nonetheless concluded that that the
conviction should be reversed and the charges dismissed with
prejudice.3 7 1 In Judge Smith's view, Section 666 and its applications
were not justified under Dole,372 nor was the prosecution of Lipscomb
for accepting bribes by a local taxi company "'necessary and proper'
3 73
for carrying out Congress's spending power."

As Judge Smith pointed out, neither his norJudge Wiener's contrasting view on the constitutionality of Section 666 was the majority

management, interlibrary cooperation, child immunization,
health care, and substance abuse control, among others.

homeless

Id.
366
See id. at 309 (opinion of Wiener, J.) ("He proposes that we construe the statute to
require a nexus between his offense conduct and federal funds-or, put differently, that
his conduct implicate a tangible federal interest. He also contends that, when so construed, the statute does not reach his conduct. Neither contention succeeds."). As it happened, the court reversed Lipscomb's conviction, and remanded for a new trial, but not
for this reason. The trial court had, shortly before trial and over Lipscomb's objections,
transferred the trial from Dallas to Amarillo. The court of appeals concluded that the
district court had abused its discretion in doing so. Id. at 337-49 (opinion of Wiener, J.).
367
See id. at 317 (opinion of Wiener, J.).
368
Id. at 336 (opinion of Wiener, J.).
369
Id. at 360 (opinion of Duh6,J.) ("Because the constitutionality of [Section] 666 was
not argued at trial or on appeal, and there is no legal justification for our reaching it, I
must respectfully dissent from the entire discussion of constitutionality found in the opinions of both Judge Wiener and Judge Smith."). Judge Duh also noted that "[i] t is quite
likely that a case will someday arise that squarely challenges the constitutionality of [Section] 666, but this is not that case." Id.
370
Id. at 377-78 (Smith, J., dissenting).
371
Id. at 360 (Smith, J., dissenting).
372
See id. at 365-66 (Smith, J., dissenting).
37-1
Id. at 367-74 (Smith, J., dissenting).
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view. 37 4 Still, their exchange is illuminating. Putting aside the question, addressed just above, whether Section 666 should be analyzed,
and can be justified, using the Dole line of conditional-spending cases,
the issue is squarely joined in these opinions whether Section 666 and
its use is constitutional because it is, or could rationally have been
considered, necessary and proper to the exercise of the Spending
Power.
Judge Wiener framed the inquiry in light of Chief Justice Marshall's now-canonical statement in M'Culloch: "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means
which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which
are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional. 3 7 5 He added that Chief Justice Marshall
had stated specifically in that case that the power to punish, while not
itself set out in Article I, was one of those powers "'necessary,"' i.e.,
"'needful, requisite, essential, or conducive to,"' 3 7 6 the exercise and
effectiveness of those powers that are so enumerated.3 77 "Congress's
postal power," Judge Wiener observed, "carried with it the ability to
impose criminal penalties to protect federal interests advanced by that
power."3 78 By the same token, then, the validity of Section 666 "depends on Congress's intent in enacting the statute, as well as on the
nature of the federal interest embodied in this case and the relation3 79
ship between that interest and Lipscomb's conduct."
Judge Wiener's defense of the statute's constitutionality proceeded in two steps. First, noting that "[h]istory often tells us why
Congress deemed a statute necessary and proper," he canvassed its
legislative history in some detail, concluding that what existed was
"multilayered, sparse, equivocal, and even mysterious."' 38 0 That said,
he concluded, contraJudge Smith, that neither the statute's history,
nor its interpretation in other federal courts, justified a conclusion
that "'Congress did not find it necessary that [Section] 666 be applied
in cases not involving federal funds or programs."381
Next, Judge Wiener turned to the "traditional, rational-relationship test for whether a statute is necessary and proper to an enumer374 See id. at 364 (Smith, J., dissenting) ("Despite the caption of this opinion as a dissent, this part [concerning the constitutionality of Section 666] is not a dissent, because
there is no majority decision, on this issue, from which to dissent.").
375 Id. at 324 (opinion of Wiener, J.) (quoting M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819)).
376 Id. (opinion of Wiener, J.) (quoting M'Culloch, 17 U.S. at 418).
377 Id. (opinion of Wiener, J.) (quoting M'Culloch, 17 U.S. at 416-17).
378 Id. (opinion of Wiener, J.).
379
Id. (opinion of Wiener, J.).
380 Id. (opinion of Wiener, J.).
381
Id. (opinion of Wiener, J.) (quoting id. at 369 (Smith, J., dissenting)). For Judge
Wiener's review of the statute's history and interpretation, see id. at 324-32.
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ated federal power." 38 2 He asserted that Congress could rationally
have believed that the integrity of the, tens of millions of dollars received by Dallas in the relevant years "suffice[d] as a federal interest
weighty enough to justify federal criminal jurisdiction over Council
members who are bribed with respect to local issues." 3 83 In addition,
he found an important federal interest in the "integrity vel non of federal programs and funds," and stated that such integrity is threatened
by the corruption of local officials who participate in those funds' administration and allocation "even if [the funds] are not actually or
directly infected by [the] corruption.

'38 4

He conceded, in response

to Judge Smith, that Congress might well have "deluded itself' in
thinking that Section 666 prosecutions of corrupt city councilmen
might promote the federal interest in the integrity of federal programs. 38 5 Still, "'a law can be both economic folly and
386
constitutional.' -

In the end, Judge Wiener concluded that the Necessary and
Proper Clause requires only that Section 666 prosecutions be "rationally related to a federal interest-that is, to effecting Congress's
Spending Power." 3 7 He did suggest, though, that even this rationalrelationship test has some bite, and that there might be cases where
prosecutions under Section 666 are not "necessary and proper to the
spending power." 38 8 Still, "[a]s courts can require of Congress nothing more than ... a rational relationship to the spending power, [Sec38 9
tion] 666 is constitutional as applied here."

Id. at 332 (opinion of Wiener, J.).
Id. at 333 (opinion of Wiener, J.); see also id. at 332 ("In the private sector, what
would a reasonable funding partner who has advanced $56 million do after learning that
its service partner takes kickbacks, albeit regarding matters not within the partnership's
scope?") (opinion of Wiener, J.).
384
Id. at 333 (opinion of Wiener, J.). Judge Wiener continued, noting that "Congress
may legitimately view as necessary and proper the imposition of federal criminal liability
for bribery, so as to ensure the honesty of state and local officials who have federal funds in
their purview or federal programs under their authority." Id.
385
Id. at 335 (opinion of Wiener, J.).
386 Id. (quoting CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 96-97 (1987)
(Scalia, J., concurring)).
387
Id. at 336 (opinion of Wiener, J.). See also United States v. Edgar, 304 F.3d 1320,
1326 (lth Cir. 2002) ("(Section] 666 may be upheld if the availability of federal criminal
jurisdiction over the specified offense conduct bears a reasonable relationship to exercise
of the Congressional spending power.").
388
299 F.3d at 336. Moreover, Judge Wiener noted that "[f]or today's purposes it is
sufficient to note that if there are such categories, Lipscomb is far removed from them."
Id. at 336 (opinion of Wiener, J.). In response to Lipscomb's argument that under his
theory there are "no limits to [Section 666's] sweep," Judge Wiener clarified that his opinion addressed only "Lipscomb's constitutional challenge to the statute as it applies to him"
and that he would "not determine here whether there is a constitutional limit on [Section]
666's reach." Id. at 335-36 (opinion of Wiener, J.).
389
Id. at 337 (opinion of Wiener, J.). Judge Wiener bolstered his finding by adding:
382

383
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Judge Smith, in what he insisted was mislabeled a dissent,3 91' supplied an opposing view. He agreed, at the outset, with Judge Wiener
that it was appropriate to "examine the relevant legislative history":
"[A] lthough Congress is not the final judge of what is necessary and
proper to carry out its powers, it is likely to have an informed opinion
on the matter." 39 ' In his view, however, the relevant history shows that
Congress had only limited ambitions for Section 666 and, thus, "we
should be hesitant to conclude that the Necessary and Proper Clause
permits the legislation to reach further than Congress felt necessary
or proper to carry out its delegated powers." 392 Instead, "[a]rmed
with knowledge of Congress's purpose in enacting [Section] 666,"
Judge Smith turned to the issue of the "minimum factors that must be
present to make a prosecution under [Section] 666 'necessary and
393
proper' under the spending power[.]"
After reviewing the decisions of those courts of appeals that have
read Section 666 to require a connection between corrupt conduct
and federal funds, so as to avoid the constitutional questions that
would, in their view, otherwise arise, 39 4 Judge Smith proposed one
such minimum:
[I]t cannot be necessary and proper to executing the spending
power for the government to prosecute local crimes that have no
relationship whatsoever to federal funds and programs.

Any argument that it is "necessary" to protect the spending power
by passing legislation that regulates conduct totally unrelated to federal spending is meritless on its face. Accepting this proposition
would allow [Section] 666 to become a general federal police power
statute that criminalizes corruption in all local governments and pri39 5
vate agencies receiving federal funds.
Congress could have believed, quite legitimately, that preventing federal
funds from passing through state and local legislative bodies whose members are corrupt, and to do so with the deterrent of criminalizing the legislators' corruption, even with respect to purely state or local issues, was
necessary and proper to the federal spending power.
Id. at 336-37. See supra text accompanying notes 381-83; see also Edgar, 304 F.3d at 1327
("It is reasonable for Congress to conclude that any corruption of... recipient organizations, regardless of whether the corruption involves the misappropriation of specifically
federal funds, endangers . . . the effective exercise of the Congressional spending
power .... ).
390
Lipscomb, 299 F.3d at 364 (Smith, J., dissenting) ("Despite the caption of this opinion as a dissent, this part [discussing the constitutionality of Section 666] is not a dissent,
because there is no majority decision, on this issue, from which to dissent.").
391
Id. at 367 (Smith, J., dissenting).
392
Id. (Smith,J., dissenting). ForJudge Smith's discussion of the statute's history and
treatment in the courts, see id. at 368-70 (Smith, J., dissenting).
393
Id. at 369 (Smith, J., dissenting).
394
See id. at 370-71 (Smith, J., dissenting).
395
Id. at 372 (Smith, J.,dissenting).
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This proposed "minimum factor" is, in a way, a restatement of
what some have called the "non-infinity" principle. 39 6 That is, because
"a general police power is denied the federal government by constitutional design," and because Judge Wiener's reading of the Sweeping
Clause-one that authorizes the federalization of local bribery as
"necessary and proper" for the execution of the power to spend in
pursuit of the general welfare-would result in the creation of such a
power, that interpretation cannot be accepted.3 97 True, the United
States "has an interest in the honesty of all officials," but then, "[t] he
government has a similar interest in a great many things that are, how398
ever, beyond its power to regulate directly.
Judge Smith concluded by disagreeing with Judge Wiener's evaluation of the government's claim that Lipscomb's prosecution was
"necessary," and therefore constitutional, because of the large amount
of federal-program funds the City of Dallas received and because the
United States has an interest in ferreting out dishonesty among powerful local officials, like Lipscomb, who, if left in place, might "administer federal funds in the same corrupt fashion that they administer
local matters." 399 After all, he suggested, there is no reason to think
that local prosecutors would have declined to pursue Lipscomb's case,
nor is there good reason to believe that the federal prosecution of
Lipscomb would deter other local officials from corruptly mismanaging federal funds. 400 "Instead, allowing the double prosecution of
local, but not federal, corruption might tend to cause dishonest local
396
See Reynolds & Denning, supra note 16, at 376 (discussing the "non-infinity principle"); see also Stuart Minor Benjamin, ProactiveLegislation and the FirstAmendment, 99 MIcH.
L. REv. 281, 329 (2000) ("[A] clever lawyer can always say that '[flor want of a nail the
kingdom was lost,' and soon we may find ourselves with an interpretation that seems inconsistent with basic constitutional principles." (quoting MOTHER GooSE's NURSERY RHYMES
191 (L. Edna Walter ed., A&C Black, Ltd. 1922) (1903))).
397
Lipscomb, 299 F.3d at 372 (Smith, J., dissenting); see also id. at 373-74:
[T]he government's argument that no connection need be shown between
federal funds or programs and the local corruption prosecuted under [Sectijr] 666 confuses a connection to a federal interest in federally-funded
programs with the federal government's generalized interest in everything
that occurs within its borders....

Such an analysis turns the accepted understanding of the Necessary and
Proper Clause on its head and, in effect, asserts that because Congress may
pursue the general welfare through the Spending Clause, all laws that are
necessary and proper to the general welfare must be considered constitutional under the Spending Clause. This argument, if followed, would overturn the accepted meaning of the Spending and the General Welfare
Clauses that has existed for nearly two centuries.
(Smith, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted)).
398 Id. at 373 (Smith, J., dissenting). To illustrate his point, judge Smith noted that
"Congress has no more power directly to criminalize local burglaries than it does to regulate marriage directly."
399
Id. at 376 (Smith, J., dissenting).
400
Id. (Smith, J., dissenting).
...
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officials to abuse federal dollars rather than local funds." 40 1 In the
end, because Section 666, "if applied to purely local crimes, should
actually cause an increase in the criminal misuse of federal funds [,]"
then "it cannot be said that prosecution of local crimes under [Section] 666 is necessary and proper to carry into execution the spending
power, and the application of [Section] 666 to Lipscomb on the facts
'40 2
of this case is, accordingly, unconstitutional.
A panel of the Eighth Circuit was able to speak with a united
voice to Section 666's validity under the Sweeping Clause. Writing for
a majority in United States v. Sabri,40 3 Judge Hansen first rejected the
argument that the statute's text requires a "connection between the
offense conduct and the federal funds[,]" 40 4 and then turned to the
question "whether Congress had the power to enact [Section] 666."405
Although he agreed with those courts and commentators who have
concluded that Section 666 is not a conditional-spending statute to be
analyzed under Dole,4 0 6 Judge Hansen concluded that the statute
should nonetheless be upheld as "a legitimate exercise of Congress's
undisputed power to make a law that is necessary and proper for the
carrying out of its enumerated power to provide for the general wel40 7
fare of the United States.
Like Judge Wiener in Lipscomb,408 Judge Hansen built his analysis
on Chief Justice Marshall's articulation in M'Culloch of the "relationship between constitutional means and ends[.]" 40 9 And, asJudge Wiener had done in Lipscomb,4 1 0 Judge Hansen concluded that "[Section]
666 is a means plainly adapted, i.e., rationally related, to achieving the
efficacious expenditure of federal funds and is, therefore, a law necesId. (Smith, J., dissenting).
Id. at 377 (Smith, J., dissenting). On this point, Judge Wiener's reply is persuasive.
See id. at 335 (opinion of Wiener, J.) ("Judge Smith's second contention against high-official liability is a law-and-economics argument that, in my opinion, does not hold water and
affords courts little basis, if any, on which to pronounce a statute unconstitutional, whether
facially or as applied."). It is persuasive not so much because of any flaws in the law-andeconomics analysis, but because, once it is conceded-as Judge Smith appeared to do, for
the sake of argument-that the Necessary and Proper Clause requires merely a rationalbasis inquiry into the connection between a particular law or prosecution and some federal
"interest" that is within the scope of the Spending Power, the game is up. Again, "'a law
can be both economic folly and constitutional."' Id. (opinion of Wiener, J.) (footnote
omitted).
403
326 F.3d 937 (8th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, No. 03-44, 2003 1AL 21692658 (U.S. Oct.
14, 2003).
404
Id. at 945. See also supra Part II.B.
405
Id.
406
Id. at 945-48. See also supra Parts II.C and III.A.
407
Id. at 953.
408
See supra note 375 and accompanying text.
409
Sabri, 326 F.3d at 948.
410
See supra note 389 and accompanying text.
401

402
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sary and proper to the execution of the spending power." 4 11 The statute was designed, he observed, to "protect the integrity of the vast
sums of federal monies disbursed through federal programs ' 41

2

and-

even if "Section 666 could have been more narrowly crafted to more
directly advance this goal" 4 13 -the fact remains that "Congress has
made a determination that the most effective way to protect the integrity of federal funds is to police the integrity of the agencies administering those funds." 4 14 The court saw no reason or warrant to revise
this determination.

41

5

Building on his concurring opinion in an earlier case involving
Section 666,416 Judge Bye argued in dissent that the majority's validation of the statute flew in the face of the Supreme Court's New Federalism decisions. 417 For Judge Bye, the court's invocation of the
Necessary and Proper Clause served only to illustrate Justice Scalia's
observation that the Clause too often serves as "the last, best hope of
those who defend ultra vires congressional action[ .] ' 418 What is more,
411
412

Sabri, 326 F.3d at 950.
Id. at 951.

Id.
Id.
415
Id. ("[T]he Constitution has never been regarded as denying to the Congress the
necessary resources of flexibility and practicality . .. to perform its function.") (quoting
Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425 (1944)). The court found additional support for
its deferential conclusion in Westfal v. United States, 274 U.S. 256 (1927), in which the
Supreme Court upheld a statute criminalizing the misapplication of funds held by state
banks that were members of the Federal Reserve System. Sabri, 326 F.3d at 952 ("As in
Westfall the government here has an interest in ensuring that the system of subnational
agencies that administer federal funds remains strong even where there is not a direct loss
to the federal funds themselves."). It is difficult to square Justice Holmes's sweeping assertions in Westfall with this Article's analysis, premises, and claims, or, indeed, with the New
Federalism generally. For example, Justice Holmes responded to the complaint that the
statute in question "applie[d] indifferently whether there is a loss to ...Reserve banks or
not" with the breezy assertion that "every fraud like the one before us weakens the member
bank and therefore weakens the System." 274 U.S. at 258-59. "Moreover," he continued,
"when it is necessary in order to prevent an evil to make the law embrace more than the
precise thing to be prevented, it may do so." Id. at 259 (Nearly fifty years later, the Justices
re-embraced this contention in Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971) (quoting
Westfall)). That said, the underlying premise of the fraud statute at issue in Westfallwas that
the relevant state banks were, "with their consent, . . . instrumentalities of the United
States." 274 U.S. at 259. The even broader premise underlyingJudge Hansen's defense of
Section 666, on the other hand, appears to be that the federal government's interest in
protecting the "integrity of federal funds" disbursed in the general direction of the General Welfare authorizes the criminalization of all corrupt transactions touching on agencies
through which those funds pass. Sabri, 326 F.3d at 951.
416
See United States v. Morgan, 230 F.3d 1067, 1071-75 (8th Cir. 2000) (Bye, J.,specially concurring).
417
Sabri, 326 F.3d at 953 (Bye, J., dissenting) ("[T]he majority's decision to uphold
[Section 666] ...swims against the tide of governing law. A wave of recent Supreme Court
decisions emphasizes Congress' [s]limited ability to federalize criminal conduct, and to
interfere in matters traditionally left to state governance." (citations omitted)).
418
Id. at 954 (quoting Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923 (1997)).
413
414
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having invoked the Sweeping Clause as authority for the statute, the
majority "fail[ed] to ask-let alone resolve-whether the statute is
also 'proper." 419 In Judge Bye's view, even conceding the "received
wisdom" that "Congress enjoys broad powers to select the means of
enacting its objectives," 420 Section 666 represents an unconstitutional
exercise of power because it so "upsets the delicate balance between
421
federal and state authority that animates our Constitution."

At some point, the Supreme Court will have to resolve this disagreement, and decide whether Section 666 may be justified as a necessary-and-proper means of exercising- i.e., "carrying into execution"the Spending Power. 422 That resolution will turn on a prior, and
more difficult, decision concerning the history, meaning, and scope
of the Sweeping Clause itself.
There is a rich, provocative, and growing literature devoted to the
Necessary and Proper Clause. 4 23 The canonical, even "talismanic," account of the Clause remains the one provided in M'Culloch:4 24 "Let the
end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the [C] onstitution, and
all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that
end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of

419
420
421
422

Id.
Id.
Id. at 956.
Not only the Eighth Circuit in Sabri, but also the Eleventh and Ninth Circuits have
expressed agreement with Judge Wiener's conclusion in Lipscomb that the Necessary and
Proper Clause provides a valid constitutional basis for Section 666. See United States v.
Bynum, 327 F.3d 986, 991 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Edgar, 304 F.3d 1320, 1325-26
(11th Cir. 2002).
423
See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Necessary and Proper,44 UCLA L. REv. 745 (1997) [hereinafter Barnett, Necessary and Proper]; Randy E. Barnett, The OriginalMeaning of the Necessary
& Proper Clause, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. (forthcoming October 2003) (on file with author),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=410542 [hereinafter Barnett, Original Meaning]; J. Randy Beck, The New Jurisprudence of the Necessary and Proper
Clause, 2002 U. ILL. L. REv. 581; David E. Engdahl, The Necessary and Proper Clause as an
Intrinsic Restraint on FederalLawmaking Power, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 107 (1998); Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional Federalism, 74 TEX. L. REv. 795, 803-19 (1996)
(discussing the Clause as a source of congressional authority to preempt state law and
arguing that many, preemption cases are actually Necessary and Proper Clause cases); Lawson & Granger, supra note 47.
424
See Gardbaum, supra note 423, at 814. According to Gardbaum,
[M'Culloch] is, of course, one of the handful of foundational decisions of
the Supreme Court that are automatically cited as original sources for the
propositions of constitutional law that they contain. But [M'Culloch] has
the further (and even rarer) distinction of being treated as providing a full
and complete interpretation of a particular clause of the Constitution.
Analysis of the Necessary and Proper Clause has historically begun and ended with [M'Culloch] ....
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the [C]onstitution, are constitutional." 425 Once again, the broad
Hamiltonian understanding appears to have won out over a more narrow view: here, Jefferson's. 42 6 Notwithstanding Jefferson's worry that
an expansive reading "would swallow up all the delegated powers, and
reduce the whole to one phrase [, ] "427 it was sufficient for Chief Justice

Marshall that the means employed by Congress be "needful," "requisite," "essential," or "conducive to" a specific, enumerated power. 428
Subject to contemporary solicitude for "principle[s] of state sover430
eignty,"4 29 it also seems to be enough for the Court today.

Nevertheless, several scholars have argued that the Necessary and
Proper Clause, correctly understood, imposes more demanding obligations on federal legislators than the talismanic view supposes. Professor Beck, for instance, claims that the Clause "regulate [s] the
relationship between congressional means and constitutional ends,"
even if it does not speak directly to whatever substantive limits on federal ends might derive from constitutional structure or from principles of "state sovereignty." 43 1 Professor Tribe's treatise explores in
some detail the question whether the Clause and its exposition in
M'Culloch warrant scrutiny of the "legislative motive" behind "necessary and proper" regulations, notwithstanding the usual irrelevance of
43
congressional purpose.

2

425
M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819). Again, this statement
provided a starting point for Judge Weiner in Lipscomb. See United States v. Lipscomb, 299
F.3d 303, 324 (5th Cir. 2002) (opinion of Wiener, J.).
426
See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 121, § 5-3, at 799 ("The Necessary and Proper Clause
provided a focus for one of the great debates of early constitutional law. .. Hamilton's
view ultimately prevailed.").
427
Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the Constitutionality of the Bill for Establishinga National
Bank, in 19 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 275, 278 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1974).
428
M'Culloch, 17 U.S. at 418 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Lipscomb, 299
F.3d at 324 (opinion of Wiener, J.) (discussing M'Culloch).
429
See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923-24 (1997), noting that "[w]hen a
'La[w] ... for carrying into Execution' the Commerce Clause violates the principle of state
sovereignty.. . , it is not a 'La[w] ... proper for carrying into Execution the Commerce
Clause,' and is thus. .. 'merely [an] ac[t] of usurpation' which 'deserve[s] to be treated as
such."' (third and fourth quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 33, at 204 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
430
SeeJinks v. Richland County, 123 S. Ct. 1667, 1671 (2003) (citing M'Culloch and
observing that "we long ago rejected the view that the Necessary and Proper Clause demands that an Act of Congress be 'absolutely necessary' to the exercise of an enumerated
power" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
431
Beck, supra note 423, at 584, 632.
432
TRIBE, supra note 121, § 5-3, at 802-04 ("In M'Culloch, Chief Justice Marshall spoke
not only of a required nexus between means and ends, but also of a requirement that
Congress not abuse its authority by enacting laws beyond its constitutionally entrusted powers 'under the pretext' of exercising powers actually granted to it."); see also Engdahl, supra
note 423, at 118 (noting that "[w]hen Congress rationally makes such a judgment, the
judgment should be honored by the courts even if it is wrong; for a court to step in and
displace it would be to tread improperly on legislative ground," but that "a court likewise
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For Lawson and Granger, the Clause can only be correctly understood if the term "proper" is allowed to do its own work. 433 That is,
"necessary and proper" ought not to be treated as a unitary concept,
as if the Clause required one, not two, inquiries and one, not two,
standards.4 34 In their view, despite the fact that the term "proper" is
often regarded as a redundant sidekick, indicating nothing more than
the drafting habits of late Eighteenth Century lawyers, 4 35 a "proper"
law is "one that is within the peculiarjurisdiction or responsibility of the
relevant governmental actor."4 36 Finally, and perhaps even more ambi-

tiously, Professor Barnett contends that, rightly understood, the Necessary and Proper Clause supports a "general presumption of liberty,"
with "liberty's" content . . . supplied not only by the Constitution's

explicit guarantees, but also by its endorsement, through the Ninth
Amendment, of the natural-rights tradition437- "which places the burimproperly enters the legislative domain when it posits a telic connection that is not demonstrably the premise upon which Congress acted").
433
See Lawson & Granger, supra note 47, at 291 ("There is ... good reason to think
that the word 'proper' adds meaning to the Sweeping Clause rather than merely emphasis
to the word 'necessary."'); see also Bybee, supra note 167, at 31 (asking "what limitations are
there on Congress's power to define crime" and concluding that the "Sweeping Clause
itself suggests a limitation: the crime must be not only 'necessary,' but also 'proper' to
executing the narrow scope of Congress's enumerated powers. Thus, the Sweeping Clause
both grants and limits Congress's power."). Justice Scalia, writing for a unanimous court in
finks, seemed to endorse the idea that the inquiry into a measure's propriety is distinct
from the analysis of its necessity. finks, 123 S. Ct. at 1671-72 (conducting separate analysis
of the necessity and the propriety of a federal regulation).
434
For one example of such a case merging the requirements into a single test, see
United States v. Lipscomb, 299 F.3d, 310, 332 (5th Cir. 2002) (opinion of Wiener, J.) ("My
own review is guided by the traditional, rational-relationship test for whether a statute is
necessary and proper to an enumerated federal power.").
435
See, e.g., Lawson & Granger, supra note 47, at 289 (noting that "Daniel Webster,
arguing on behalf of M'Culloch and the Bank, suggested [that] '[tihese words, "necessary
and proper," in such an instrument, are probably to be considered as synonymous.'").
436
Id. at 291. See also id. at 297 ("[T]he word 'proper' was often used during the
founding era to describe the powers of a governmental entity as peculiarly within the province orjurisdi'ction of that entity."). Judge Bye relied extensively on the work of Professors
Granger and Lawson in his Sabri dissent. See United States v. Sabri, 326 F.3d 937, 954-55
(8th Cir. 2003) (Bye, J., dissenting), cert. granted,No. 03-44, 2003 WL 21692658 (U.S. Oct.
14, 2003).
437
Barnett, Necessary and Proper,supra note 423, at 793; see also Randy E. Barnett, Getting
Normative: The Role of Natural Rights in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 93,
113-21 (1995) (discussing powers of Congress and natural rights); Randy E. Barnett, Reconceiving the Ninth Amendment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 12-16 (1988) (examining how constitutional rights can constrain abuses of power as may happen under the Necessary and Proper
Clause). See generally RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY: JUSTICE AND THE RULE
OF LAW (1998) (arguing that solving problems of knowledge requires a system of rights and
procedures). In a forthcoming article, Professor Barnett returns to the Necessary and
Proper Clause, offering a detailed originalist account of its history and meaning. Barnett,
Original Meaning, supra note 423. He concludes that the original meaning of "necessity"
was neither mere "convenience," or "absolute[ ]" necessity, but rather ajustifiable requirement of "means-end-fit somewhere between these two extremes." Id. at 30. In addition,
Professor Barnett argues that even a "necessary" law could be improper-and therefore
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den on the government to establish the necessity and propriety of any
438
infringement on individual or associational freedom."
The Necessary and Proper Clause is best understood as speaking
both to the "fit" between Congress's chosen means and desired ends,
and to the permissibility-particularly in light of Article I-of those
means and ends. The Clause invites and authorizes a meaningful, if
deferential, 439 inquiry by all those charged with interpreting the Constitution 440 not only into the question "could means X reasonably be
thought to facilitate end Y?", but also "are means X and end Y-wholly
and apart from their compatibility-permitted by our Constitution,
which creates a federal government of limited powers?" The Clause is
not authority for otherwise ultra vires government actions; 44 1 rather, it
forms part of the structural boundary constraining such actions. Put
differently, the Clause contains both a "telic ''44 2 and a 'jurisdictional" 443 component.
For present purposes, though, it is necessary neither to settle on
444
the requisite closeness of the fit required between means and ends,
unconstitutional-if it transgressed "background rights of the people," id. at 39, or were
.enacted to accomplish an improper end," id. at 42 (emphasis omitted).
438
Barnett, Necessary and Proper,supra note 423, at 787; see also Lawson & Granger,
supra note 47, at 273 ("The Ninth Amendment potentially does refer to unremunerated
substantive rights, but the Sweeping Clause's requirement that laws be 'proper' means that
Congress never had the delegated power to violate those rights in the first instance."); id. at
297 ("[U]nder a jurisdictional construction of the Sweeping Clause, executory laws must
be consistent with principles of separation of powers, principles of federalism, and individual rights." (footnote omitted)).
439
See, e.g., Lipscomb, 299 F.3d at 367 (Smith, J., dissenting) ("[A]lthough Congress is
not the final judge of what is necessary and proper to carry out its powers, it is likely to have
an informed opinion on the matter.") (Smith, J., dissenting).
440
See Lawson & Granger, supra note 47, at 276 (noting that the Clause "does not
explicitly designate Congress as the sole judge of the necessity and propriety of executory
laws"); id. at 281 ("There was widespread recognition during and shortly after the ratification debates on the Constitution that the Sweeping Clause placed cognizable limits on
Congress's discretion to determine the necessity and propriety of executory laws.").
441
Cf Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923 (1997) (asserting that the Necessary
and Proper Clause is the "last, best hope of those who defend ultra vires congressional
action").
442
Lawson & Granger, supra note 47, at 287-88 ("Necessity, on this understanding,
refers to the telic relationship, or fit, between legislative means and ends-that is, the extent to which the means efficaciously promote the ends.").
443
Id. at 274 ("The Sweeping Clause, when properly understood as a jurisdictional
limitation on the scope of federal power, is a vital part of the constitutional design. That
understanding has largely been lost in modern times."); id. at 297-326 (making the historical case for a 'jurisdictional meaning of the Sweeping Clause"). But see Beck, supra note
423, at 636-40 (analyzing, and criticizing, the jurisdictional account).
444
Cf Barnett, Necessary and Proper,supra note 423, at 757. According to Barnett:
The word "necessary" is said to be a synonym[ ] of "needful." But both
these words are defined "indispensably requisite;" and most certainly this is
the sense in which the word "necessary" is used in the constitution. To give
it a more lax sense, would be to alter the whole character of the government as a sovereignty of limited powers.
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nor to identify precisely those subject matters and policy goals that
might lie beyond Congress's reach or the regulatory methods and activities that might be prohibited by a correct understanding of the
Clause. 445 It is enough, instead, to propose that the content, reach,
and application of the Clause-whatever they are-must be consistent
both with what the majority of the Justices in Lopez insisted are "first
principles" of constitutional law-i.e., that our "Constitution creates a
Federal Government of enumerated powers" and "' [t] he powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few
and defined' " 446 -and with the "non-infinity" constraint these principles compel. 44 7 As Madison put it, "[w]hatever meaning this clause
Id. (quoting M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 1, 366-67 (1819)); id. at 792 (commenting that "[t] his is not to say that scrutiny must be strict. A standard of review that no
statute can pass is as hypocritical as a standard of review that every statute can pass[,]" and
arguing that "[r]ather, some form of intermediate means-ends fit indicating necessity...
would be an important step towards both restoring legitimacy to legislation and protecting
the liberties of the people."); Beck, supra note 423, at 613 (identifying "directness, good
faith, and plainness" as the requirements of the means-end relationship, and suggesting
that these criteria "leave Congress with ample flexibility to accomplish the Framers'
goals"); Lawson & Granger, supra note 47, at 288. Professors Lawson and Granger observe:
The only dispute over the term [necessary] has concerned how tight the
means-ends fit must be to comply with the requirements of the Sweeping
Clause. Although we take no firm position on this dispute, we acknowledge
the force of Chief Justice Marshall's claim that something less than strict
indispensability is sufficient.
Id.
445
For some examples of possible boundaries, or lack thereof, see Barnett, Necessary
and Proper,supra note 423, at 786-88 (noting that the "Necessary and Proper Clause may be
made effectual in a manner that does not require us to enumerate all the enumerable
liberties retained by the people .... The principled alternative ... is to shift the presumption of constitutionality when legislation [a]ffects any exercise of liberty."); Beck, supra
note 423, at 584 ("Careful analysis suggests that the propriety limitation should instead be
understood to regulate the relationship between congressional means and constitutional
ends, rather than as a repository for implied principles of federalism."); id. at 638 ("[Ilt
must be said that the historical evidence for treating the propriety requirement as an external limitation on congressional power seems relatively thin."); Lawson & Granger, supra
note 47, at 297 (
In view of the limited character of the national government under the Constitution, Congress's choice of means to execute federal powers would be
constrained in at least three ways: first, an executory law would have to conform to the "proper" allocation of authority within the federal government;
second, such a law would have to be within the "proper" scope of the federal government's limited jurisdiction with respect to the retained prerogatives of the states; and third, the law would have to be within the "proper"
scope of the federal government's limited jurisdiction with respect to the
people's retained rights. In other words, under a jurisdictional construction of the Sweeping Clause, executory laws must be consistent with principles of separation of powers, principles of federalism, and individual rights.
446

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (quoting

THE FEDERALIST

No. 45,

at 292 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
447
See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615-16 (2000); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567
(refusing to "pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert
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may have, none can be admitted, that would give an unlimited discretion to Congress. '44 8 Putting aside the more ambitious arguments
sketched above, and even accepting that the Necessary and Proper
Clause serves as a deep repository of implied power, it must still be the
case, at the very least, that any action taken or legislation enacted pursuant to the Clause "neither conflict[ ] with external limitationssuch as those of the Bill of Rights and of federalism-nor render[ ]
Congress' powers limitless.

'449

Section 666, however, cannot withstand even this relatively undemanding level of constitutional scrutiny. Put differently, the understanding of the Sweeping Clause employed by Judge Wiener in
upholding the statute is deficient even when held up to the nearly
toothless minimum standard proposed in the previous paragraph. In
United States v. Lipscomb, remember, Judge Wiener regarded the
Clause as requiring no more than an extremely deferential, rationalcongressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort
retained by the States"); Reynolds & Denning, supra note 16, at 376.
448
2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1898 (1791). It might be worth recalling how common this
"whatever else," or "at the very least" mode of interpretation and argument is in the Supreme Court's decisions. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515
U.S. 819, 868 (1995) (Souter,J., dissenting) ("[I]f the [Establishment] Clause was meant to
accomplish nothing else, it was meant to bar this use of public money."); Maryland v.
Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 862 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Whatever else it may mean in
addition, the defendant's constitutional right 'to be confronted with the witnesses against
him' means, always and everywhere, at least what it explicitly says ..
"); County of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 593-94
(1989) ("The Establishment Clause, at the very least, prohibits government from appearing
to take a position on questions of religious belief or from 'making adherence to a religion
relevant in any way to a person's standing in the political community."' (quoting Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring))); id. at 669 (opinion of
Kennedy, J.) ("I take it as settled law that, whatever standard the Court applies to Establishment Clause claims, it must at least suggest results consistent with our precedents and the
historical practices that, by tradition, have informed our First Amendment jurisprudence."); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977) ("Whatever else it may mean, the
right to counsel granted by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments means at least that a
person is entitled to the help of a lawyer at or after the time that judicial proceedings have
been initiated against him. . . ."); United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528,
534 (1973) ("[Ihf the constitutional conception of 'equal protection of the laws' means
anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest." (emphasis added)); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) ("If the fight of privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child." (emphasis added)); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565
(1969) ("If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business
telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may
watch.");Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 15 (1948) ("If the officers in this case were
excused from the constitutional duty of presenting their evidence to a magistrate, it is
difficult to think of a case in which it should be required."); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330
U.S. 1, 15 (1947) ("The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means
at least this ....
(internal citation omitted)).
449
TRIBE, supra note 121, § 5-3, at 798-99 (emphasis omitted).
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basis inquiry into the connection between Section 666's applications
and the federal interest, broadly conceived, in the program funds disbursed by Congress in pursuit of the general welfare, also broadly conceived. 450 In this context, however-that of Spending Power-based
challenges to federal criminal laws and prosecutions-this view of the
Clause simply cannot be reconciled with the non-infinity principle.
Recall that the Spending Power permits Congress to promote
through spending the General Welfare (as it comprehends this concept), subject to practically no judicial review. That is, any decision to
direct federal-program monies, as opposed to regulation, toward a
particular policy goal is constitutionally permissible unless affirmatively prohibited by some other constitutional provision. Then consider the claim that the Sweeping Clause authorizes direct
regulation-even regulation not explicitly authorized elsewhere in Article I-provided that it is rationally related to the federal interest in
the unlimited policy goals and preferences it is permitted to promote
through spending. It is difficult to see how the extent of federal regulatory power authorized by this doubly deferential scrutiny is anything
but "limitless." If, under the Spending Power, Congress can spend
beyond the confines of Article I to promote the General Welfare; and
if, under the Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress's amorphous "interest" in the flow of once-federal dollars toward what is unreviewably
identified by Congress as the General Welfare is sufficient to support
any regulation or prohibition that is rationally related to that "interest"; then Congress can regulate or outlaw anything. Such a conclusion, however, would be inconsistent with everything the Court has
ever said on the subject of congressional power. Even in Garcia, for
example-a case not often associated with New Federalism-style enthusiasm for structural constraints on Congress-Justice Blackmun
conceded the "limitation on federal authority inherent in the delegated nature of Congress' [s] Article I powers."'4 5 1 From Chief Justice
Marshall in M'Culloch-"We admit, as all must admit, that the powers
of the government are limited, and that its limits are not to be tran-

450 See 299 F.3d 303, 336 (5th Cir. 2002) (opinion of Wiener, J.) (asserting that the
"necessity" required by the Sweeping Clause boils down to "whether prosecution would be
rationally related to ... effecting Congress's spending power"); id. ("Reduced to the bare
essentials, application of [Section] 666 to Lipscomb's conduct is indeed reasonably related to
a federal interest, and thus is necessary and proper to Congress's exercise of its spendingpower.");
see also Thomas B. McAffee, Federalism and the Protection of Rights: The Modern Ninth Amendment's Spreading Confusion, 1996 BYU L. REV. 351, 365 (endorsing the "traditional understanding" of the Necessary and Proper Clause, under which the Clause "performs the
mundane task of affirming the fundamental idea that Congress has the authority to exercise reasonable discretion in choosing the means by which to implement the goals set forth
in the legislative powers granted by Article I, Section 8.").
451 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Trans. Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550 (1985).
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scended"4 52-to Chief Justice Rehnquist in Lopez-who refused to
"conclude that the Constitution's enumeration of powers does not
presuppose something not enumerated" 453-the Justices have agreed
both that the Constitution is not a "splendid bauble" 45 4 and that the

federal government it authorizes is not rendered omnipotent by the
Necessary and Proper Clause. 455 It would be, to say the least, "strange
if a 'proper' executory law-a law that is distinctively and peculiarly
within the jurisdiction of the national government-could regulate
subjects outside the careful, precise enumeration of regulable subjects
456
found elsewhere in the Constitution."
The inability of the Necessary and Proper Clause to carry Section
666 over even the low bar set by the non-infinity principle is highlighted, and perhaps exacerbated, by the fact that Section 666 cannot
be regarded as a funding condition governed by Dole's regulation-bycontract criteria. After all, under Dole, Congress's power to control
the conduct of state officials, or to require as a condition of program
funds that States directly regulate their citizens, is at least theoretically
constrained by the rule that "if Congress desires to condition the
States' receipt of federal funds, it 'must do so unambiguously . .. ,
enabl [ing] the States to exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of
457
the consequences of their participation.' ,,
But if Section 666 isjus-

tified simply as a necessary-and-proper "means" of pursuing General
Welfare "ends," then even the minimal check that might be provided
by a notice requirement, or by the States' own political processes, is
eliminated. On this view, Congress may direct money toward the public good, as Congress understands it, and protect that enterprise
M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995).
454
M'Culloch, 17 U.S. at 421.
455
See, e.g.,
Engdahl, supra note 423, at 120-21 n.75 ("[T]he Necessary and Proper
Clause simply does not provide a constitutional justification for utilizing means directed
to ... constitutionally extraneous ends."); Engdahl, supra note 1, at 42 (characterizing as
"mistaken" the view that "the Necessary and Proper Clause authorizes even nonfiscal, avowedly coercive measures to more fully effectuate any policy about anything that Congress
tries to influence somewhat through spending-obliterating the principle of enumerated
powers" and that "the Supremacy Clause gives priority to every federal policy about anything, producing comprehensive, supreme governing power in the federal government").
But see, e.g., NAGEL, supra note 22, at 30 ("What Lopez confirms is that the national government is for all practical purposes already a government of general regulatory powers....").
456
Lawson & Granger, supra note 47, at 331; see also, e.g., Bybee, supra note 167, at 31
("If one assumes that the Sweeping Clause comprehends the possibility of criminal sanctions as a means of regulating matters within Congress's enumerated powers, what limitations are there on Congress's power to define crime?"); Lawson, supra note 2, at 1234
(" [T] he Necessary and Proper Clause, which the founding generation called the Sweeping
Clause, [does not] grant general legislative powers to the national government." (footnote
omitted)).
457
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. &
Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)).
452

453
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through whatever direct regulation and prosecution measures it finds
reasonable, without resorting at all to the contract-law analogy relied
on in Dole.
The aim of this Part has been to show that the debate
over the
scope of Section 666 has thus far been beside the point. It does not
matter whether Section 666 is best read as requiring a connection or
"nexus" between federal-program funds, on the one hand, and an accused's corruption, on the other; the statute exceeds Congress's
power and is therefore unconstitutional. In other words, Section 666
fails to define an offense that, as described, Congress has the power to
prosecute and punish. Nothing in Article I authorizes the United
States to criminalize bribery merely because the corrupt transaction in
question involves an agent of an organization that, somewhere, receives federal-program funds. Nor does the well established rule that
Congress may, in effect, regulate the recipients of such funds through
the attachment of conditions undermine this conclusion. Those prosecuted under Section 666 are not Congress's contracting partners for
purposes of conditional-spending doctrine, nor are Section 666 prosecutions of corrupt individuals obligations to which the recipients of
federal-program funds could possibly be said to have agreed. Finally,
notwithstanding the Sweeping Clause's sometime role as a constitutional catch-all, the argument cannot be sustained, consistent with
"first principles" of constitutional law, that Section 666 and its uses are
valid as "necessary and proper" to the smooth functioning of federal
programs aimed at promoting the General Welfare.
CONCLUSION

The previous Part set out the doctrinal cases against Section 666
specifically and, more generally, against the conflation of regulationvia-conditional-spending, on the one hand, and the creation and prosecution of federal crimes, on the other. It is worth emphasizing the
unremarkable nature of the conclusions reached. This Article has arrived at the judgment that Section 666-like other similar statutes,
extant or hypothetical-is unconstitutional. But there should be
nothing particularly unsettling about this conclusion. No Supreme
Court precedents need to be overturned, 45 nor any settled doctrines
458 To be sure, the conclusions reached here run contrary to the Supreme Court's
assumption in Salinas-and also the holdings of several lower courts-that Section 666
itself is constitutional, even if, perhaps, some of its applications are not. See Salinas v.
United States, 522 U.S. 52, 60-61 (1997) ("There is no serious doubt about the constitutionality of [Section 666] as applied to the facts of this case.... Whatever might be said
about [Section 666's] application in other cases, [its] application ... to Salinas did not
extend federal power beyond its proper bounds."). See also, e.g., United States v. Bynum,
327 F.3d 986, 990-91 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that several courts of appeals have concluded, in light of Salinas, that Section 666 is not unconstitutional on its face). However,

2003]

THE NEW FEDERALISM

abandoned. Whether or not Dole was correctly decided, and whether
or not Butlerwas right, the conclusionsiremain the same. Even if Congress's power to spend in pursuit of the General Welfare reaches beyond the confines of those powers specifically enumerated in Article I,
and even if Congress's power to regulate indirectly, by attaching conditions to the money it spends, is as expansive as Dole seems to permit,
Section 666 is still unconstitutional, and the theory on which it relies
should be rejected. Remember, the claim here is not so much that
Dole is wrong as it is that Dole does not apply. The argument is not that
Section 666 is a coercive or un-germane regulatory condition, or a
condition about which the States were given insufficient notice, but
rather that it is not a condition at all.
Nor should the doctrinal arguments' substantive implications
cause much worry even to critics of the New Federalism. No subject
matters or spheres of activity are removed from Congress's oversight,
or placed beyond the limits of its regulatory efforts. 459 Nothing in this
Article would require courts to identify, let alone protect, "integral" or
neither in Salinas nor in Fischerdid the Court have occasion squarely to consider the arguments presented here. Rather, for purposes of the interpretive questions presented in
those cases, the facial constitutionality of Section 666 could be taken as given, because the
statute's validity was not clearly called into question. Cf., e.g., United States v. L.A. Tucker
Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 38 (1952) (observing that the Court is not bound by an
earlier exercise of jurisdiction "where it was not questioned and it was passed sub silentio"
(footnote omitted)); United States v. More, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 159, 172 (1805) (Marshall,
C.J.) ("No question was made in that case as to the jurisdiction. It passed sub silentio, and
the Court does not consider itself as bound by that case.").
459
Cf United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995) (rejecting view that would
result in conclusion that "Congress could regulate any activity that it found was related to
the economic productivity of individual citizens: family law (including marriage, divorce,
and child custody), for example[J" and noting that, under this view, "it is difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power, even in areas such as criminal law enforcement or
education where States historically have been sovereign[,]" with the result that if the Court
"were to accept the Government's arguments, we are hard pressed to posit any activity by
an individual that Congress is without power to 'regulate."). It is also worth emphasizing
here that, in all likelihood, entirely constitutional federal criminal statutes-consider 18
U.S.C. § 371 (2000), which broadly prohibits conspiracies to "defraud the United States"would permit the prosecution of almost any conceivable Section 666 defendant.
Another way to make this point is to insist that this Article's claims do not requireeven if they permit-an endorsement of "categorical federalism." SeeJudith Resnik, CategoricalFederalism:Jurisdiction, Gender, and the Globe, 111 YALE L.J. 619, 620 (2001). Professor
Resnik writes:
Categorical federalism's method first assumes that a particular rule of law
regulates a single aspect of human action: Laws are described as about "the
family," "crime," or "civil rights" as if laws were univocal and human interaction similarly one-dimensional. Second, categorical federalism relies on
such identification to locate authority in state or national governments and
then uses the identification as if to explain why power to regulate resides
within one or another governmental structure. Third, categorical federalism has a presumption of exclusive control-to wit, if it is family law, it
belongs only to the states.
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"traditional governmental functions" 460 or the "essentials of state sovereignty." 4 61 No quixotic line-drawing between, say, "commercial"
and "non-commercial" activities, 462 or between "direct" and "indirect"
regulations of commerce, is required. 463 Decisionmakers are not
asked to gauge the "substantial"-ness of the "effects" their decisions
might have on commerce, the General Welfare, or anything else. 464
Even if the Commerce Clause is understood to convey sweeping, almost plenary, regulatory authority to Congress, 465 and even if that authority permits Congress to outlaw and punish, through appropriate
legislation, all or most corrupt transactions that until now have been
prosecuted under Section 666, it would remain true that the power of
the purse is not the power to police, that a generally applicable federal criminal statute cannot reasonably be regarded as a "condition"
on funds disbursed by the United States, and that not even the
"Sweeping Clause" is a license for "hungry dog" criminal
jurisdiction.

466

Furthermore, the arguments offered here do not necessarily require a wholesale embrace of the "consequentialist values" that many
believe result from our federal structure. 46 7 These asserted "values"
460
Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852, 855 (1976), overruled by Garcia v.
San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
461
Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 205 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting), overruled by
Usery, 426 U.S. at 833.
462
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566 (admitting that "a determination whether an intrastate activity is commercial or noncommercial may in some cases result in legal uncertainty" but
insisting that "so long as Congress' [s] authority is limited to those powers enumerated in
the Constitution, and so long as those enumerated powers are interpreted as having judicially enforceable outer limits, congressional legislation under the Commerce Clause always will engender 'legal uncertainty'" (citation omitted)); see also United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610 (2000) (noting that "the noneconomic, criminal nature of the
conduct at issue was central to [the] decision in [Lopez]"); cf TRIBE, supra note 121, § 5-4,
at 819 (suggesting that, post-Lopez, the Court's attention in Commerce Clause cases will be
on "whether there is a colorable claim that the intrastate activity itself is 'commercial' or
,economic"') (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567).
463
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 548 (1935) (characterizing the "distinction between direct and indirect effects of intrastate transactions upon
interstate commerce" as "a fundamental one, essential to the maintenance of our constitutional system").
464
See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609 ("'Congress' commerce authority includes the power
to regulate those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce, . . . i.e.,
those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce."' (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at
558-59)); id. at 611 ("Lopezs review of Commerce Clause case law demonstrates that in
those cases where we have sustained federal regulation of intrastate activity based upon the
activity's substantial effects on interstate commerce, the activity in question has been some
sort of economic endeavor.").
465
See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 615-31 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (surveying the Court's
expansive Commerce Clause jurisprudence during the preceding fifty years).
466
See Engdahl, supra note 1, at 92 (arguing that "federal regulatory power should
[not] tag along after federal money like a hungry dog").
467
Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinancy:May Congress Commandeer State
Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. L. Rsv. 1001, 1074 (1995). For a detailed
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include political accountability, policy diversification and decentralization, political participation, and individual liberty. 4 68 (It is, of course,
no accident that this canonical list of federalism's values overlaps substantially with the general themes that, this Article has contended, run
through the Rehnquist Court's New Federalism cases. 4 6 9 ) While these
values are indeed meaningful, and are substantially advanced and protected by the doctrinal and normative content of the Rehnquist
Court's work,47 0 this Article does not need to show either that the
unconstitutionality of Section 666 follows from its incongruence with
these values, or that they would be advanced by the statute's invalidation. 47 1 It concedes wide room for reasonable disagreement over the
questions whether, for example, the federalization of anticorruption
effort to "value" federalism and its contributions to the common good, see Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317 (1997). For other comprehensive evaluations of "the normative case for federalism," see Calabresi, supra note 57, at 756-90;
Michael W. McConnell, Federalism:Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484
(1987)
468
For a recent and thorough treatment of these values, see, for example, DAVID L.
SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE (1995); Bellia, supra note 6, at 997-1001 (critiquing
such values and considering them in the context of new federal regulation). See also
Caminker, supra note 467, at 1074-81 (noting that the purported "values" of federalism
"includ[e] greater political liberty from tyrannical regimes, greater rates of personal participation in political affairs and self-governance, and greater local tailoring and aggregate
diversity of policies throughout the nation"); cf George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity
Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 331,
339-43 (1994) (discussing shared values of subsidiarity and federalism, including accountability, liberty, flexibility, preservation of identities, and diversity); Garnett, supra note 190,
at 479 ("Like American Federalism, the subsidiarity principle protects individual liberties
through the diffusion of coercive power and the 'clearing out' of space for individual and
community self-definition and flourishing at the local level." (citations omitted)).
469
See supra Part I.A.
470
But see, e.g., DavidJ. Barron, A Localist Critique of the New Federalism,51 Du KE L.J. 377,
382 (2001) (arguing that "the current law of federalism . . . constitutes a poor way of
promoting the values associated with localism"); Erwin Chemerinsky, Does FederalismAdvance Liberty?, 47 WAYNE L. REV. 911, 912 (2001) (stating "[t]he idea expressed is simply
that limiting federal power means restricting the ability of the federal government to enact
laws inimical to individual freedom," and arguing that "[tihe problem with this claim is
that the federal government could use its authority to advance liberty or to restrict it. The
Court's assumption is that the latter is more likely than the former. The Court never has
justified this premise; neither it nor scholars have even tried to show this"); Roderick M.
Hills, Jr., The PoliticalEconomy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and
"DualSovereignty"Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 828 (1998) (contending that the "political
accountability arguments" for federalism "overlook the complexity inherent in any system
of federalism that always has the potential to confuse voters and thereby undermine political accountability").
471
Professor Brown has explored this matter-the extent to which federalism values
are promoted or undermined by federal anticorruption efforts-in great and careful detail. See generally Brown, supra note 15 (arguing that Lopez and Morrisondemand a constitutional analysis of federal criminal law); Brown, New Federalism, supra note 204; George D.
Brown, Putting Watergate Behind Us-Salinas, Sun-Diamond, and Two Views of the Anticorruption Model, 74 TUL. L. REV. 747 (2000) (exploring the effect of the Court's recent decisions
concerning federal anticorruption laws on federalism); George D. Brown, Should Federalism
Shield Corruption?-Mail Fraud, State Law and Post-Lopez Analysis, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 225
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efforts undermines political accountability at the state and local level;
or whether policy diversity, decentralization, and experimentation is
either possible or desirable when it comes to bribery; or whether, as a
general matter, prosecutions by the national government threaten or
intrude upon individual liberties in any meaningful sense.
That said, it does seem that the conclusions reached here about
the Spending Power, the Sweeping Clause, and criminal statutes resonate with the best of the New Federalism, and at the same time owe
little to its more controversial aspects. For instance, the argument
that criminal statutes such as Section 666 are not spending conditions
to be evaluated under Dole does not depend on metaphysical or
"mythical" notions of state sovereignty. 4 72 The same is true for the
contention that the Necessary and Proper Clause does not authorize
the creation and prosecution of crimes to protect the government's
asserted interest in General Welfare spending. Section 666 and other
spurious regulatory conditions are invalid not because of anything relating to the "dignity" or immunity of the States, but rather because
ours is a federal government of limited and specifically enumerated
powers.
Still, if the arguments set out in this Article require so little, can
they matter very much? Even if the arguments convince, should anyone care? The answer is "yes." As was mentioned at the outset, there
are rich connections between this Article's arguments about conditional spending, the Necessary and Proper Clause, and criminalization, on the one hand, and important contemporary developments
4 73
and debates in areas such as First Amendment law, on the other.
Recall, for example, that in the First Amendment context, government spending can be framed in two very different ways. 4 7 4 The outflow of government funds, for the purchase of items or services with
an expressive component, may in some cases be regarded as "government speech." In other cases, though, public spending that funds expression is treated not as the government's speech, but instead as
government subsidization of others' speech, i.e., as the creation of a
"forum."
Many of the more interesting, and controversial, Supreme Court
decisions in recent years have involved judicial efforts to distinguish
(1997); Brown, supra note 36 (discussing the rise of Section 666 and suggesting possible
limitations on its growth).
472 See supra text accompanying notes 79-81.
473
See supra text accompanying notes 66-70 (observing that decisions in a number of
areas reflect similar commitments and priorities to those constituting the prominent New
Federalism developments).
474
See generally EUGENE VOLORIH, THE FiRsT AMENDMENT: PROBLEMS, CASES AND POLICY
ARGUMENTS 435-37 (2001) (discussing and distinguishing the government's roles as "subsidizer" and "speaker").
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these situations from one another. For example, the Court allowed
Congress to prohibit family-planning,.agencies that received federal
funds from providing counseling relating to abortion services, because
the prohibition was treated as part of the government's effort to con47 5
trol its own speech, not as an effort to squelch others' messages.
On the other hand, the University of Virginia's policy of denying
funds to otherwise-eligible student newspapers that "primarily promote [d] or manifest[ed] a particular belie [f] in or about a deity or an
ultimate reality" 4 76 was invalidated as a viewpoint-discriminatory restriction on the group's speech in a publicly funded forum. 477 More

recently, the Court determined that funds distributed through the Legal Services Corporation to organizations providing legal assistance to
indigent clients, and the activities of lawyers paid for with those funds,
were not government speech but were instead, as in Rosenberger, pri4 78
vate expression in a government-subsidized forum.
The point here is not to reconcile or unravel the Court's linedrawing efforts in these and similar cases. 4 79 It is merely to note that
in both the "government speech" and the "public forum" cases, public
money ends up paying for speech. However, the rules constraining
what is said, and what the government may prevent from being said,
with that money vary dramatically depending on how the cash-tospeech transition is framed. The government may, for the most part,
480
say whatever it wants when it is speaking-and spending-for itself,
and may also regulate the conduct of those to whom it contracts out
the task of promulgating its own message. But when public funds are
seen not as paying for the government's message, but for the creation

475 See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192-93 (1991).
476 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 822-23 (1995)
(internal quotations omitted); cf Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569,
598-99 (1998) ("Rosenberger,as the Court explains, found the viewpoint discrimination unconstitutional, not because funding of 'private' speech was involved, but because the government had established a limited public forum .. ) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment)
(internal citation omitted).
477 See Rosenberger,515 U.S: at 845-46.
478 See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 546-47 (2001) (noting that "there
is no alternative channel for expression of the advocacy Congress seeks to restrict").
479 For an entertaining overview of public-forum law, see, for example, Michael Stokes
Paulsen, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Limited Public Forum: Unconstitutional
Conditions on "EqualAccess" for Religious Speakers and Groups, 29 U.C. DAVis L. Rv. 653
(1996).
480
See VOLOKH, supra note 474, at 435; Abner S. Greene, Government Speech on Unsettled
Issues, 69 FORDHAM L. REv. 1667, 1667 (2001). But see, e.g., FCC v. League of Women Voters
of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 375-76 (1984) (striking down an FCC regulation because "the expression of editorial opinion on matters of public importance ...is entitled to the most exacting degree of First Amendment protection").
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of a forum-tangible or metaphysical 4 8 t-then the government may
not leverage its largesse into regulation of the speech of those who
482
take advantage of that forum.

Turn back now to Dole, and to the question whether General Welfare spending justifies direct regulation of those other than the government's contracting partners. The premises of the "virus '483 or
"hungry dog" 484 justifications for a criminal statute like Section 666

are, first, that the government has an interest in increasing the odds
that the money it directs toward the General Welfare will, no matter
how circuitous the route, end up actually promoting that end; and,
second, that this interest provides sufficient constitutional reason for
protecting that route through the federal criminal law. 4 85 The United

States might well lack a general "police power," 486 the argument goes,
but it can nonetheless create through spending a regulable sphere
that reaches as far as its funds. As was just discussed, though, these
premises and arguments are rejected in the First Amendment context.

48 7
They should be rejected with respect to the Spending Power as well.

481
See Rosenberger,515 U.S. at 830 ("The [Student Activities Fund] is a forum more in a
metaphysical than in a spatial or geographic sense, but the same principles are
applicable.").
482 See, e.g., id. at 834 (holding that "viewpoint based restrictions are [not] proper
when the [government] . . . expends funds to encourage a diversity of views from private
speakers").
483
Engdahl, supra note 1, at 72 ("What power can Congress claim over funds no
longer its own? It is ridiculous to posit a germ of federal power infecting Social Security
benefits like a virus incubated in the Federal Treasury." (footonote omitted)).
484
Id. at 92.
485
See, e.g., United States v. Edgar, 304 F.3d 1328-29 (lth Cir. 2002) (noting the
federal government's "continuing interest in the sound administration of Medicare reimbursement funds, long after any particular patient's course of treatment is completed").
486
See supra text accompanying notes 177-80.
487
It is worth noting that, if the "virus" theory is correct, a number of the Court's
recent and leading Establishment Clause cases are wrongly decided. In a long line of cases,
most recently in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, the Court has held that government funds distributed to individuals through religion-neutral public-benefit programs lose their governmental character when those individuals decide to direct those funds toward religious uses
or institutions. 536 U.S. 639, 655 (2002) ("[N]o reasonable observer would think a neutral
program of private choice, where state aid reaches religious schools solely as a result of the
numerous independent decisions of private individuals, carries with it the imprimaturof
government endorsement"); see, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 226-27 (1997) (holding parents' use of government funds for parochial schools not to be government support
of religion); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 13 (1993) (holding that a
deaf student could bring a state-employed interpreter to his Catholic school); Witters v.
Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 488-89 (1986) (holding that permitting
an individual to choose to use neutral state aid to pay for religious education is not a state
endorsement of religion); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 397 (1983) (holding that parents
of children in parochial schools are similarly entitled to deduct educational expenses as
are parents of children in secular schools); Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243-45
(1968) (upholding a statute providing textbooks to all school children, regardless of
whether their school is religious); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17 (1947) (upholding a statute reimbursing parents for cost of childrens' bus transportation, regardless of
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More generally, this Article's doctrinal arguments and conclusions are consistent with emerging understandings of the freedom of
association, with the renewed appreciation in public law and discourse
for the place of mediating associations in civil society, and with what
Professor McGinnis has called the 'Jurisprudence of social discovery"
that is, no less than the New Federalism, likely to be the legacy of the
Rehnquist Court.4 88 As McGinnis has explained, the Rehnquist Court

appears to be "rediscovering"-not only in the cases that obviously fall
under the New Federalism category, but in others as wel1489-the
"provisions of the Constitution that create alternative forums for
norm creation by empowering institutions .. .that engage the citizenry and restrain special interests. '490 That is, "the Rehnquist

Court's jurisprudence seems designed to protect the decentralized order and mediating institutions.'

4 91

I have written elsewhere about the place and importance of civil
society, voluntary associations, and mediating institutions in the
Court's recent First and Fourteenth Amendment decisions, 49 2 and still
more research and thought on these matters is surely warranted. For
now, suffice it to say, first, that the arguments presented here are consonant with the New Federalism's leading themes, and second, that
norm-generating mediating institutions, and the space they create,
are-in a world where public funds are everywhere and unavoidable-threatened by a view of the Spending Power and Sweeping
Clause that would permit the federalization of all entities, conduct,
4 93
agencies, and actors touched by those funds.

whether the school is religious). Were the "hungry dog" argument the law, the fact that,
for example, Mr. Witters, and not the State of Washington, decided to spend once-government funds on a religious education could not have prevented the government program
through which those benefits were disbursed from violating the First Amendment.
488
See McGinnis, supra note 53, at 490-91; supra text accompanying text note 53.
489
See McGinnis, supra note 53, at 490 ("The Rehnquist Court is tending toward this
goal through reviving federalism, protecting and facilitating rights of civil and religious
association, and empowering juries at the expense of judges." (footnotes omitted)).
490
Id. at 490.
491
Id. at 490-91 (footnote omitted). See also supra text accompanying notes 102-03
(noting that a "powerful and pervasive theme in the Rehnquist Court's decisions is a recognition, and even a celebration, of the place of mediating associations, their expression, and
their diversity in civic life.").
492
See Garnett, supra note 95.
493
Such a view was, apparently, endorsed by the court in United States v. Brown, 384
F. Supp. 1151 (E.D. Mich. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 557 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1977). The
Michigan district court upheld 18 U.S.C. § 844(f) as a "necessary and proper" protection of
"entities which are engaged in governmental functions .... Id at 1158. In the court's
view, the victim of the arson-the Planned Parenthood League-was an "'instrumentality'" of the federal government "in that it provides facilities in furtherance of an announced national goal." Id. at 1159. Given the abundance of "national goals," and the
ubiquity of federal-program funds, the premise implicit in Brown-that the activities of
associations and institutions whose aims are shared by the United States may be regulated
under the Necessary and Proper Clause-seems difficult to reconcile with the Rehnquist
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This Article has considered whether the path of federal funds
themselves, rather than, for example, the Commerce Clause or the
power to coin money, may serve as the constitutional basis for federal
criminal jurisdiction. It has asked whether and how the Spending
Power may serve as the basis for the creation and prosecution of federal crimes; whether Congress's power to promote the General Welfare through federal spending and grant-giving carries with it a power
to create crimes not otherwise grounded in Article I; and whether the
Spending Power includes the ability to outlaw conduct that relates to
or touches upon the funds spent, the programs through which they
are disbursed, the agents who supervise their dispersal, or the program beneficiaries who receive them. It has concluded that the cases
and doctrines dealing with conditional spending provide no support
for Section 666 or similar legislative efforts. Moreover, not only is
there no basis in constitutional text and history for the expansion of
federal criminal jurisdiction through spending, but such expansions
are also inconsistent with the structures explicitly created and reasonably implied by our Constitution, with the values these structures were
designed to advance, and with the liberties they were intended to
protect.
There remains, of course, the objection that this Article's arguments, and the New Federalism generally, are "formalistic." To be
sure, this term often functions, among academics and jurists, more as
an epithet than a description, 4 94 and it is often difficult to identify the
precise content of the insult. 495 But if, as Professor Schlag observed
Court's solicitude for civil society and its commitment to a meaningful line between state
action and private enterprise.
494 See, e.g., Morgan Cloud, The FourthAmendment During the Lochner Era:Privacy, Property, and Liberty in Constitutional Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 555, 564 n. 31 (1996) (collecting
examples of scholarly and judicial derision directed at "formalism"); Brian Leiter, Positivism, Formalism, Realism, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1138, 1144 (1999) (book review) ("'Formalism'
is, like 'positivism,' frequently used as an epithet, and thus inspires unflattering, and sometimes colorful, characterizations."); cf Stephen L. Carter, The Iran-Contra Pardon Mess, 29
Hous. L. REV. 883, 885 (1992) ("[O]nly law professors consider [the] epithet ["formalistic"] an insult;judges should be pleased to be accused of seeing the law as followed instead
of manipulated."); Robert Gordon, Legal Thought and Legal Practice in the Age of American
Enterprise, 1870-1920, in PROFESSIONS AND PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGISTS IN AMERICA 94 (Gerald L. Geison ed., 1983) ("The first-year law school curriculum to this very day consists of
an Oedipal slaying of our grandfathers-the authors of formalism in private law and
'Lochnerism' in constitutional law."); Cass R. Sunstein, Justice Scalia's DemocraticFormalism,
107 YALE LJ. 529, 531 n. 11 (1997) (book review) (asserting that the "kind of formalism...
that makes the term 'formalism' appropriately an epithet [...] refers to the masking of a
value judgment by reference to a judgment of law that actually encodes the value
judgment").
495
See Leiter, supra note 494, at 1144 (noting that "[t] he literature ... is replete with
differing statements of the doctrine"); Richard H. Pildes, Forms of Formalism, 66 U. CHI. L.
REV. 607, 607 (1999) (identifying several different types of formalism); Frederick Schaver,
Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 509 (1988) ("[W]hat is formalism, and what is so bad about
it?").
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recently, what is thought to be "repellent" about formalists is their
supposed "desire to maintain law's order at the expense of the living
human beings compelled to bear its marks[,]" 49 6 then the charge
seems misplaced. To insist, as did the Justices in Lopez, that ours is a
federal government of enumerated powers, whose admittedly distant
limits must nonetheless be identified, enforced, and respected, is not
necessarily to cloak value judgments disingenuously or unconsciously
beneath claims about law; nor need it reflect an elevation of "law's
order" over the needs and aspirations of "living human beings."
Rather, to affirm the reality and importance of constraints on federal
power to create, prosecute, and enforce, crimes-even when, as is true
here, such an affirmation does little to shrink the sphere of federal
regulatory power-is to teach.49

7

That is, whatever "formalism" might

be found lurking in the arguments has a pedagogical, and valuable,
function. On the one hand, it teaches the federal government that it
is meaningfully limited, and that the structural constraints imposed by
our Constitution are not trumped even by well meaning legislative aspirations. 49 8

It teaches citizens, on the other hand, that Captain

Vere's often-maligned "measured forms" can, at times, work to preserve and protect the space between the state and the individual that
is required for human flourishing. It helps to instill the "settled disposition on the part of the people in favor of local diversity and prerogative" and the "disciplined love of liberty that transcends the desire for
immediate gratification," both of which are required for a "truly robust federalism." 499 It could well be true, as Tocqueville charged, that

citizens in democracies "do not comprehend the utility of forms" and
even "feel an instinctive disdain for them. ' 50 0 Still, it is precisely this
496

Pierre Schlag, The Aesthetics of American Law, 115

HARV.

L. REV. 1047, 1062 n.47

(2002).
497
See, e.g., United States v. 'White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(observing that "[o]ur expectations ... are in large part reflections of laws that translate
into rules the customs and values of the past and present[,]" and that "[s]ince it is the task
of the law to form and project, as well as mirror and reflect, we should not, as judges,
merely recite the expectations and risks without examining the desirability of saddling
them upon society."); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) ("In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperiled if it
fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent
teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example."), overruled in part
by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
See generally M. Cathleen Kaveny, Autonomy, Solidarity and Law's Pedagogy, 27 LOUVAIN STUD.
339, 349-353 (2002) (exploring the role of "law as moral teacher.").
498
See HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, JR., AMERICA'S CONSTITUTIONAL SOUL 195 (1991) (noting
that the "adoption of forms" is one method of "holding down elites" and also "restraining ... the majority of the people").
499
Michael M. Uhlmann, Wretched Judicial Excess, FIRST THINGS, Nov. 2002, at 49, 51
(reviewing NAGEL, supra note 22).
500
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 669 (Harvey C. Mansfield ed.,
Delba Winthrop trans., 2000).
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"inconvenience" that renders forms "so useful to freedom, their principal merit being to serve as a barrier between strong and weak, he
who governs and he who is governed, to slow down the one and to
give the other time to recollect himself. ' 50 1 Even if Professor Tribe is
right in reducing Lopez to a "shot across the bow," and to merely a
"signal to Congress about the absence of plenary national power over
all spheres of life," it is still true that such a reminder, lesson, or "sig50 2
nal" is healthy in a free society.

501

Id.
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TRIBE,

supra note 121, § 5-4, at 824.

